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Benefits from Antitrust Private Antitrust Enforcement:  Forty 
Individual Case Studies 
 
Robert Lande and Joshua Davis1 
 
This Paper presents information about forty of the 
largest recent successful private antitrust cases.  To do 
this, the paper gathers information about each case, 
including, inter alia, (1) the amount of money each action 
recovered for the victims of each alleged antitrust violation, 
(2) what proportion of the money was recovered from foreign 
entities, (3) whether government action preceded the private 
litigation, (4) the attorney’s fees awarded to plaintiffs’ 
counsel, (5) on whose behalf money was recovered (direct 
purchasers, indirect purchasers, or a competitor), and (6) the 
kind of claim the plaintiffs asserted (rule of reason, per se, 
                                                          
1  The authors are, respectively: Venable Professor of Law 
at the University of Baltimore School of Law and a Director of 
the American Antitrust Institute; and Professor of Law and 
Director, Center for Law and Ethics at the University of San 
Francisco School of Law and a member of the Advisory Board of 
the American Antitrust Institute. They are grateful to the 
American Antitrust Institute ("AAI") for assisting with and 
supporting this project in numerous ways. However, all 
conclusions in this Study are solely those of the authors and 
are not necessarily those of the AAI.  
  The authors are also grateful to Morgan Anderson, Erin 
Bennett, Maarten Burggraaf, Stratis Camatsos, Jonathan Cuneo, 
Gene Crew, Erika Dahlstrom, Michael Einhorn, Mike Freed, Bobby 
Gordon, Norm Hawker, Gabrielle Hunter, Richard Kilsheimer, 
Ruthie Linzer, Phyra McCandless, Polina Melamed, Joey Pulver, 
Brian Ratner, Doug Richards, Tara Shoemaker, Andrew Smullian 
and Drew Stevens for researching and writing drafts of the 
individual case studies. The authors also thank Richard 
Brunell, John Connor, Eric Cramer, Albert Foer, Jonathan 
Jacobson, Carl Lundgren, Dan Small and members of the private 
bar too numerous to mention for information about individual 
cases and for comments on earlier versions of this Study. The 
authors are grateful for excellent research assistance by 
Erika Dahlstrom and Joey Pulver. 
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or a combination of the two). A separate Study, forthcoming in 
the U.S.F. Law Review, aggregates and analyzes this 
information.  That Study also compares the total monetary 
amounts paid in all forty cases, as well as from the subset of 
the forty cases that also resulted in criminal penalties, to 
the total criminal antitrust fines imposed during the same 
period by the United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”), and 
also to the deterrence effects of the prison sentences that 
resulted from DOJ prosecutions during this period.  The 
overall goal of the project is to take a first step toward 
providing an empirical basis for assessing whether private 
enforcement of the antitrust laws serves its intended purposes 
and is in the public interest.   
The results of the Study show that private antitrust 
enforcement helps the economy in many ways.  It very 
significantly compensates victims of illegal corporate 
behavior, and is almost always the only way they can receive 
redress. Private enforcement often prevents foreign 
corporations from keeping the many billions of dollars they 
illegally obtain from individual and corporate purchasers in 
the United States. The Study also shows that almost half of 
the underlying violations were first uncovered by private 
attorneys, not government enforcers, and that litigation in 
many other cases had a mixed public/private origin. The 
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evidence also shows that private litigation probably does more 
to deter antitrust violations than all the fines and 
incarceration imposed as a result of criminal enforcement by 
the U.S. Department of Justice.  This is one of the most 
surprising results from our Study.  We do not know of any past 
study that has documented that private enforcement has such a 
significant deterrence effect as compared to DOJ criminal 
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1. In Re Airline Ticket Commission Litigation,1996 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20361; 1996-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P71, 552 
 
This case is notable because: 1: This parties settled 
this case for $86.1 million; 2: The Court ordered the 
Defendants to pay 75% of the Plaintiffs’ discovery costs, 
related to the Defendants’ “passing on” defense;  3:  The 
Court awarded plaintiffs’ counsel one-third of the settlement 
due to their skill and effort. 
The American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) sued seven 
major airlines, including TWA, Continental, USAir, American 
Airlines, Delta, Northwest, and United Airlines; for 
violations of Section I and II of the Sherman Act.2   
According ASTA, the anticompetitive conduct occurred when 
the airlines imposed an industry-wide cap on the commissions 
they paid to travel agents.3  At the time of the suit, the 
defendants comprised about 85% of domestic flights in the 
United States.4 
                                                          
2  Price Fixing: Cy Pres Distribution Must Be More Closely 
Related to Airline Commission Cap Litigation Antitrust Trade & 
Regulation Daily (October 22, 2001). 
 
3  The airlines were charged with “conspiring to reduce 
commissions on ticket sales by travel agents from 10% to a 
maximum of $50 for round-trip domestic flights and $25 for a 
one-way ticket”.  Preliminary Okay Is Given to $86 Million 
Settlement Of Litigation By Travel Agents 
BNA Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily (September 24, 1996). 
4  In Re Airline Ticket Commission Antitrust Litigation, 898 
F.Supp. 685, 687 (D.Minn. 1995).  
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Prior to the caps, airlines paid travel agents a 
commission based on the ticket price.5  Delta was first to 
announce a cap on the commissions.6  Following this 
announcement, the other six major airlines implemented caps in 
less than a week.7  The plaintiffs argued that it didn’t make 
economic sense for the airlines to all impose commission 
caps.8  When the parties settled, the airlines agreed to pay 
ASTA for the anticompetitive conduct that occurred from 
February 1995 to September 1995.9 
This case first made news when Judge Rosenbaum ruled on 
the defendants’ request to take discovery pertaining to the 
“passing on defense” that was denied in Hanover Shoe.10  The 
defendants sought discovery regarding damages, or the lack 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
5  The travel agents claimed that, since 1960, the airlines 
paid 10% of the ticket price.  In Re Travel Agency Commission 
Antitrust Litigation, 898 F.Supp. 685, 687 (D.Minn. 1995). 
 
6  Id. at 687.  
 
7  Id. at 687. 
 
8  “(Plaintiffs) assert that, in an open and competitive 
environment, an airline which declined to cut commissions 
would benefit because travel agents would favor higher paying 
airlines”.  Id. at 688. 
 
9  Monetary Settlement Of Airline Ticket Commission Gets Final 
Okay, BNA Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily (Feb. 10, 1997). 
10  Airlines May Engage In Some Discovery To Support 
Impermissible Pass-On Defense, BNA Antitrust & Trade 
Regulation Daily (April 3, 1996). 
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thereof, suffered by the plaintiffs as a result of the caps.11  
The defendants reasoned that travel agents were not harmed by 
the caps because they could still make money from booking non-
flight travel, such as cruises.12  Although Judge Rosenbaum 
reluctantly granted the defendants’ request, he noted that the 
defendants’ contentions were “unusual” and “most 
conjectural”.13  Due to the questionable nature of the 
discovery, the defendants were ordered to pay 75% of the 
plaintiffs’ costs in producing the discovery.14  Furthermore, 
the judge warned the defendants that “if the proffered 
discovery is rejected both at trial and appeal, the Court may 
also consider assessing defendants with the remaining 25% of 
the plaintiffs’ survey cost”.15 
                                                          
11  Id. 
 
12  In Re Airline Commission Antitrust Litigation, 918 F.Supp. 
283, 287 (D. Minn. 1996). 
 
13  Airlines May Engage In Some Discovery To Support 
Impermissible Pass-On Defense, BNA Antitrust & Trade 
Regulation Daily (April 3, 1996). 
 
14  Id.  
 
15  Id. 
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The settlement totaled $86.1 million dollars.16  Only an 
approximate 0.5% of the class objected to the settlement.17  
The Court awarded plaintiffs’ counsel the full amount they 
asked for, one-third of the settlement.18  The Court noted that 
plaintiffs’ counsel “reasonably assessed the value of the 
case”…in order to reach a settlement that is “cost-effective, 
simple, and fundamentally fair” to members of the class.19 
Noting the absence of a “smoking gun”, and the existence 
of an “oligoplistic market” where “rapid price coalescence is 
the norm”, plaintiffs’ counsel “personally financed the case, 
incurring expenses exceeding $3 million with no guarantee of 
an ultimate recovery”.20   
In addition to the resources invested in the case, the 
Court also highlighted the fact that plaintiffs’ counsel 
                                                          
16  TWA was the first defendant to settle.  Continental settled 
for $4.25 million, and USAir paid $9.81 million.  The 
remaining four airlines settled with the class on the day 
trial was to begin, in which American Airlines paid $21.32 
million, Delta paid $20.3 million, Northwest paid $10.87 
million, and United Airlines paid $19.51 million.  Monetary 
Settlement of Airline Ticket Commission Litigation Gets Final 
Okay, BNA Antitrust & Trade Regulation Daily (February 10, 
1997).  
 
17  Id. 
 
18  Id. 
 
19  Id. 
 
20  Id. 
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“underwent difficult and protracted settlement negotiations 
while simultaneously preparing for trial.  This work required 
time, expense, and great skill, all to the class’s benefit”.21  
After the settlement funds were distributed to travel 
agents, about $600,000.00 remained unclaimed.22  The plaintiffs 
proposed that the funds should be distributed to travel agents 
in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, because they were 
harmed by the same anticompetitive conduct.23  Instead, the 
Court awarded the funds to several law schools and charities 
in Minnesota, where the litigation was filed.24  After an 
appeal, the Court awarded the funds to the travel agents, 
stating that these agents were “clearly the next best 










                                                          
21  Id. 
 
22  Cy Pres Award of Settlement Must Be Tailored To Goals Of 
Underlying Suit, United States Law Week (October 15, 2002).  
http://pub.bna.com/lw/021639.pdf 
 
23  Id. 
  
24  Id. 
 








In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., 164 F. Supp. 2d 345 
(S.D.N.Y. 2001), aff'd, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15327(2d Cir. 
2002) and Kruman v. Christie's International PLC, 284 F.3d 384 
(2d Cir. 2002).    
 
        These cases are outstanding examples of the successful 
outcome of a private antitrust class action for many reasons: 
1. The aggregate amount of the combined recoveries in the 
cases includes $412 million in cash and $100 million in 
discount certificates (in the class action involving domestic 
auctions), and $40 million in cash (in the class action 
involving foreign auctions), for a total recovery of $552 
million.  2. The vast majority of the settlement was obtained 
by U.S. businesses and consumers from the foreign defendants.  
3. The domestic portion of the settlement was found by the 
court to represent "perhaps 1.8 times to 4.0 times the 
damages" suffered by the domestic class.26 4. Counsel in the 
domestic case received legal fees that were approximately 80% 
                                                          
26 The foreign portion of the settlement represented a much 
smaller proportion of potential damages, but was substantially 
discounted for risks stemming from legal weaknesses in the 
claims, including the basic legal weakness subsequently 
demonstrated by the Supreme Court's decision two years later, 
in Empagran, S.A. v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd., 542 U.S. 155 
(2004), under which the foreign class would have had no viable 
claims under United States law.   
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cash and 20% discount coupons, the same ratio as the overall 
cash/coupon ratio in the settlement.  5.  The legal fees 
represented only 5.2% of the total settlement. 6.  If the 
coupons are not used after 5 years, they can be redeemed for 
their face value in cash.  
 
 In the late 1990s, the Department of Justice ("DOJ") 
initiated an investigation into the possibility that parallel 
increases in the amounts of commissions charged by Christie's 
and Sotheby's to both buyers and sellers may have been the 
result of a conspiracy.  That investigation seemed to stall 
until, in late 1999, counsel for Christie's came into the 
possession of handwritten notes made by CEO Christopher 
Davidge of Christie's, which clearly reflected conspiratorial 
communications between the defendants.  In January 2000, 
Christie's sought and obtained amnesty from DOJ.  In the 
ensuing weeks, many class actions were commenced on behalf of 
buyers and sellers at domestic auctions under United States 
antitrust law.  Those class actions were consolidated in the 
Southern District of New York before Judge Lewis A. Kaplan.  
In view of the clear evidence of conspiracy and Christie's 
amnesty commitments, Judge Kaplan took the unusual step of 
holding an auction for the position of lead counsel. The 
winning bid in that auction was submitted by David Boies, who 
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agreed to undertake representation of the class on the unusual 
and risky basis that his firm would receive 25 percent of any 
recovery in the case in excess of $405 million.  However, 
Boies elected not to include claims based on foreign auctions 
among the class claims, believing that such claims were not 
viable under United States law.  In October 2000, after only 
approximately four months of further litigation, a settlement 
of the domestic class action for the amount of $412 million in 
cash and $100 million in discount certificates was first 
documented and proposed to the District Court.   
        In the interim, the separate Kruman class action had 
been commenced by other class counsel on behalf of the 
purchasers and sellers at foreign auctions who had been 
excluded from the class in the action led by Boies. Initially, 
it was proposed to the court in the domestic class action that 
to the extent such foreign auction claims were held by persons 
who were also domestic class members, they would be released 
as part of the domestic settlement.  The effect of such a 
release would have been significantly to undercut the separate 
class action on behalf of customers at foreign auctions, since 
many if not most auction customers buy or sell at auctions 
both inside and outside the United States.  However, the 
District Court invalidated that aspect of the proposed 
releases in a series of rulings in early 2001, finding that in 
 16
proposing to release the claims based on foreign auctions for 
no additional consideration, Boies had had a "structural 
conflict of interest." 27 Those rulings by the District Court 
invalidating the proposed release of foreign claims were later 
affirmed by the Second Circuit in 2002.  However, in response 
to the District Court's initial invalidation of the releases, 
the parties had modified their settlement to provide that in 
the event the Second Circuit affirmed the invalidation of the 
releases, the settlement would continue to be final and 
effective.  Thus, the invalidation of the initially proposed 
releases of claims arising from foreign auctions ultimately 
did not derail the domestic settlement.  
         Thereafter, in 2003, the class of buyers and sellers 
at foreign auctions also was able to negotiate its separate 
settlement in the amount of an additional $40 million in cash, 
in the wake of their success, in Kruman v. Christie's 
International PLC, 284 F.3d 384 (2d Cir. 2002), in 
establishing the legal viability of the class claims arising 
from foreign auctions.  By the time of that 2003 settlement, 
testimony and evidence emerging in the criminal trial of 
Alfred Taubman of Sotheby's during 2003 (the government’s 
criminal case resulted in a $45 million fine and jail for at 
                                                          
27 Error! Main Document Only.In re Auction House Antitrust 
Litigation, 42 Fed. Appx. 511, 516 (2002). 
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least one defendant)28 had cast substantial doubt on the 
existence of any conspiracy between the defendants with regard 
to buyer's premiums charged by the defendants, as 
distinguished from seller's commissions.  In addition, looming 
over the case was the strong possibility that the Supreme 
Court might take certiorari and reverse the Second Circuit's 
decision upholding rights of customers at foreign auctions to 
bring claims arising from the foreign auctions under United 
States antitrust law.  Those two risks were the primary reason 
why less consideration was obtained for the class of foreign 
auction customers.  Indeed, after the $40 million foreign 
auction settlement had been reached and approved by the court, 
the Supreme Court did take certiorari and reverse a D.C. 
Circuit ruling that had followed the decision in Kruman, in 
Empagran.  Thus, the $40 million foreign auction settlement 
may be the only substantial settlement of its kind that ever 
will occur, based on United States antitrust law claims 
arising entirely from foreign transactions.   
 The coupons in the domestic case might have been the best 
coupons ever issued in an antitrust case.  Valued at $100 
million by the Court, they had a face value of $125 million 
                                                          
28 Scott D. Hammond, An Overview of Recent Developments In The 
Antitrust Division's Criminal Enforcement Program, Address 
Before the American Bar Association (Jan. 10, 2005), available 
at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.pdf, Pg. 
11. 
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when issued.29  They were and are fully transferable, and they 
do trade.  All unused coupons can be redeemed for face value 
after 5 years (in May 2007).  Counsel took approximately 20% 





































                                                          
29 Id. at 520. 
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Augmentin. Ryan-House et al v. GlaxoSmithKline plc, C.A. Doc. 
No. 2:02cv442 (E.D.Va. 2004); SAJ Distributors, Inc. and 
Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, 
Doc. No. 2:04cv23   
 
This case is notable because (1) it produced substantial 
recoveries for both direct and indirect purchasers; of $62.5 
million and $29 million respectively, all from a foreign 
corporation; (2) this case only involved Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act; (3) Class counsel asked for and was awarded 20% 
of the recovery in the direct action, and 25% in the indirect 
action; (4) there was no prior federal prosecution of the 
antitrust violations at issue;30 and (5) there were later state 
actions with participation from the US Department of Justice. 
GSK allegedly using invalid patents to prevent entry of 
generic products.  As stated in GSK’s 2004 Annual Report:31  
In 2002, the US District Court for the Eastern 
District of Virginia found various patents covering 
Augmentin invalid. That holding was subsequently 
affirmed by the [Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit].  Following the adverse trial court decision, 
purported anti-trust class actions were filed on behalf 
                                                          
30 SAJ Distributors, Inc. and Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings, 
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, Doc. No. 2:04cv23, Memorandum 
in Support of Class Counsel’s Motion for Award of Attorney 
Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses, page 4 (E.D. Va., 2004), 
[hereinafter “Fee Memo”].  (“There was no prior investigation 
from the Department of Justice or Federal Trade Commission 
complaint against GSK.”)   
  
31 GSK Form 20-F 03-2004, Annual report pursuant to Section 13 
or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 For the fiscal 
year ended December 31, 2004; Commission file number 1-15170, 
page 121 [hereinafter “20-F, 2004”]. 
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of classes of direct and indirect purchasers that were 
ultimately consolidated in the US District Court for the 
Eastern District of Virginia. Plaintiffs alleged that 
the Group knowingly obtained invalid patents and engaged 
in other anticompetitive conduct to prevent entry of 
generic products in violation of the monopolization 
section of the US anti-trust laws. The court has 
approved the Group’s settlement of those class action 
claims.  
  
Plaintiffs were a class of “All persons or entities in 
the United States that purchased Augmentin directly from GSK 
at any time from January 1, 2000 through April 30, 2004 
(hereinafter the “Class Period”), except for governmental 
entities, GSK, its officers, directors, and subsidiaries, 
which are expressly excluded.”32  The Class Counsel for the 
Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs (“Class Counsel”) alleged a 
section 2 monopolization claim33 involving IP and patent law as 
well as the Hatch-Waxman Act.34 
The Class Counsel were able to negotiate a settlement 
with the defendants during the discovery and pre-trial phase 
of the case.  Many of the vital facts of this case were the 
subject of motions for summary judgment in related cases.35  
                                                          
32 Final Order at 2. 
 
33 Fee Memo at 4. 
 
34 Id. at 22. 
 
35 See Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 349 
F.3d 1373 (2003); Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 213 F. Supp.2d 597 (2002) Geneva 
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Class counsel retained patent and economic experts to analyze 
liability and damages.36  This settlement was obtained despite 
the fact that, as the Court described, “GSK had significant 
defenses which the Class would need to overcome if the case 
went to trial.”37  
In September 2004 the Class Counsel filed a Motion for 
Award of Attorney Fees which described the risks they 
encountered in litigating this case, the difficulty of the 
case, and the extraordinary amount they were able to negotiate 
for.  Class Counsel explained that this was a section 2 
monopolization claim, which is more difficult to litigate than 
a per se violation of the Sherman Act.38  Next, Class Counsel 
explained that this was not a follow-on case; there was no 
prior federal antitrust action, no DOJ investigation, no FTC 
complaint.39  There were, however, other similar cases filed 
against GSK.40  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. GlaxoSmithKline PLC, 189 F.Supp.2d 
377 (2002). 
 
36 Final Order at 4. 
 
37 Id.  
 
38 Fee Memo at 3.   
 
39 Id. at 4. 
 
40 See 20F, 2004. 
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In the preceding cases finding certain Augmentin patents 
invalid, there was no court finding of fraud, which would 
require that Class Counsel prove fraud themselves as an 
element of their case.41  Class Counsel pointed out that 
damages would be difficult to prove because there could be 
factors other than anticompetitive behavior causing a delay in 
generic products reaching the market.42  Another risk was 
unfavorable law in the 11th Circuit, where a similar class had 
been decertified.43 In light of these factors Class Counsel 
asked the Court to award a fee percentage of the settlement 
fund, rather than use the “lodestar” method of calculating 
fees. 
The Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiffs, SAJ Distributors 
and Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings, Inc (“Plaintiffs”) as well 
as approximately 70 class members44 reached a Settlement 
Agreement with foreign company GlaxoSmithKline plc and 
SmithKline Beecham Corp (“GSK”) and in July 2004, GSK 
deposited $62.5 million into a Direct Purchaser Settlement 
                                                          
41 Fee Memo at 4. 
 
42 Id.  
 
43 Id. at 4-5. 
 
44 Fee Memo at 22.   
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Fund Account.45  The Court found this amount “fair and 
reasonable and fully justified,”46 saying that class counsel 
for the plaintiffs (“Class Counsel”) vigorously and 
effectively pursued class members’ claims.47  There was also an 
indirect purchaser class action on behalf of insurers and 
consumers.48  There, Counsel were awarded 25% of a $29 million 
recovery.49   
                                                          
45 SAJ Distributors, Inc. and Stephen L. LaFrance Holdings, 
Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp, Doc. No. 2:04cv23, Final 
Settlement Approval Order, page 6, (E.D. Va., 2004), 
[hereinafter “Final Order”]. 
 
46 Id. at 10.  
 
47 Id. at 9. 
 
48 See In re Remeron End-Payor Antitrust Litigation, Not 
Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2005 WL 2230314 (D.N.J.), page 10 (“Mr. 
Meltzer was appointed Co-Lead Counsel in Ryan-House v. 
GlaxoSmithKline plc, C.A. 2:02cv442 (E.D.Va.), a 
pharmaceutical antitrust class action brought on behalf of end 
payors of the prescription medication Augmentin which recently 
settled for $29 million”);  
also see e.g. 
http://www.amc.gov/commission_hearings/pdf/Gustafson.pdf - 
however, most citations point to www.augmentinlitigation.com, 
and that cite is no longer available. 
 
49 See page 3 (HTML page 5) of AAI, The American, Antitrust 
Institute, AAI Working Paper No. 06-05, ABSTRACT: Indirect 
Purchaser Class Action Settlements, Author: Patrick E. 
Cafferty, Miller Faucher and Cafferty LLP.  Though the pdf 
file cannot be found at the listed address, ( 
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/510.pdf), it can be 







 Following the initiation of this private action, States 
took action with participation from the U.S. Department of 
Justice.  In October of 2004, in West Virigina ex rel. McGraw 
v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC et al, Attorney General Darrell McGraw 
filed a lawsuit and consent order to settle the lawsuit 
against manufacturers GlaxoSmithKline, PLC, and SmithKline 
Beechham Corporation.  The State alleged that the defendants 
had unlawfully attempted to extend their patent protection for 
the Paxil, Augmentin, and Relafen.  After an investigation, 
with participation from the US Department of justice,50 and 
prior to filing the complaint, the State reached an agreement 
with the defendants to settle the manner.  Under the terms of 
the settlement, the State received $500,000.00.51 
Following that, states initiated the class action, In the 
Matter of GlaxoSmithKline, PLC (Augmentin) in 2005 with New 
York and Ohio as lead plaintiffs on behalf of states 
nationwide.52  An investigation was conducted and in 2006 a 








php?trans_id=458.  Also see Washington Medicaid to Receive 
Share of $3.5 Million Settlement with Augmentin Manufacturer, 
US State News, Copyright 2006 US Fed News (HT Syndication), 
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$3.5 million multistate settlement was entered into by the 



































                                                                                                                                                                                    
April 12, 2006, 2006 WLNR 6392719; Attorney General Petro 
Secures Antitrust Settlement Against Drug Maker, US State 
News, Copyright 2006 US Fed News (HT Syndication), July 19, 
2006, 2006 WLNR 12481907; 
 
53 Id.  
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In re Automotive Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litigation, 177 
F. Supp. 2d 1378 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 15, 2001).   
 
 These cases are noteworthy because: 1. they contain 
allegations of conspiring to fix, raise, maintain and 
stabilize prices, per se rule violations54; 2. class counsel 
obtained a cash settlement of $105.75 million55; 3. two of 
these defendants were foreign manufacturers56 who paid a total 
of $30.75 million to American purchasers;57 4. these cases 
followed a government investigation, but that investigation 
was closed by the government without any indictments.58 Counsel 
requested and was awarded a 32% attorneys’ fee. 
 In March 2001, the auto body trade publication “Hammer 
and Dolly” published an article exposing a Department of 
Justice grand jury investigation of a price fixing conspiracy 
                                                          
54 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29161 2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2004).  
 
55 The court granted final approval of a partial settlement 
with three defendants - Azko, BASF and DuPont - in September 
2003. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29161. at 3.  Plaintiffs obtained final 
approval of the proposed settlement with PPG and Sherwin-
Williams, the remaining two defendants, on December 28, 2007.  
See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 95004 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2007). 
 
56 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 291 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 13, 2004). 
 
57 $18.75 million was settled by Azko and $12 million was 
settled by BASF. See In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust 
Litig., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29161 3.   
 
58 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29161 at 23, 24. 
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among several paint manufacturers.59 This article seems to have 
spurred the private suits that followed. By November 2001, 
dozens of cases filed in five states by direct purchasers of 
Automotive Refinishing Paint were consolidated into one class 
action suit.60 Plaintiffs alleged “that defendants combined and 
conspired with one another to fix, raise, maintain and 
stabilize the prices that they charged their customers for 
Automotive Refinishing Paint sold in the United States during 
the period from January 1, 1993, to December 31, 2000, in 
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.”61 The defendants 
consist of three domestic companies: DuPont, PPG and Sherwin-
Williams; and two foreign based companies: BASF (Germany) and 
Akzo Nobel (The Netherlands).62 Automotive Refinishing Paint 
refers to paint products which are applied to motor vehicles 
directly after the initial manufacturing process; like base 
coat paint, clear coat paint, primer etc.63 
 Apart from the civil lawsuits, the federal grand jury 
that was initially investigating the allegations of price 
fixing was disbanded in 2003.64 The government’s closing of the 
                                                          
59 Sheila Loftus, Price Fixing in the Refinishing Industry?, 
Hammer and Dolly (Mar. 2001).  
 
60 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 177 F. Supp. 
2d 1378, 1379 (J.P.M.L. Nov. 15, 2001).  
 
61 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18123 1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 5 2003).  
 
62 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 358 F.3d 
291.  
 
63 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18123 at 29.  
 
64 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29161 at 24.  
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investigation came after a first settlement was reached with 
one of the two foreign defendants.65 Moreover, the fact that 
the government chose not to prosecute the case was one factor 
in the court’s approval of the settlement.66 The court felt 
that the settlement was reasonable in light of the best 
possible recovery and in light of the risks inherent in 
litigation since the government had already declined to 
prosecute.67      
On September 5, 2003, the Court granted final approval to 
a partial settlement with the Dutch based company Akzo Nobel.68 
They agreed to pay $18.75 million in cash and provided certain 
discovery.69 Subsequently, On September 27, 2004, the court 
approved a second settlement between plaintiffs and BASF and 
DuPont.70 The German based company BASF agreed to pay $12 
million in cash and the settlement agreement required DuPont 
to pay $36 million in cash.71 In addition, the defendants 
provided the plaintiffs with information for the discovery 
consisting of: documents, sales transactional data and the 
                                                          
65 Id.  
 
66 Id. at 23, 24.  
 
67 Id.  
 
68 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 18123 at 18. 
 
69 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 4681 3 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 17, 2003).  
 
70 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29161 at 29.  
 
71 Id. at 3.  
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permission to interview (former) employees.72 The settlement 
negotiations were tough, but for this settlement “[p]laintiffs 
have had the benefits of initial, first wave document 
discovery from all defendants – namely, the grand jury 
documents defendants produced to the Department of Justice.”73  
Moreover, the court granted a fee petition for 
plaintiff’s counsel in the amount of over $21.5 million (or 32 
percent of the settlements) plus reimbursement of over 
$700,000 in expenses.74 The award was made after objections by 
three of the plaintiffs who argued that a percentage fee was 
inconsistent with other “mega-fund cases.”75 Specifically, they 
argued that a lodestar method, by which the number of hours 
counsel spent on the case, should be used to calculate the fee 
award.76 The court overruled the objections and used several of 
the so-called “Gunter” factors including what they deemed as 
the high skill and efficiency of plaintiff’s counsel, the 
complexity of the litigation, the lengthy time devoted to the 
case, and the high risk of non-payment as warranting the 
percentage fee.77 The court in its decision spoke highly of the 
work done on behalf of the class and even said that 
                                                          
72 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29163 2 (E.D. Pa. May 10, 2004).  
 
73 Plaintiffs’ Memorandum, at 13. 
74 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2004 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 29162 *40 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 13 2004).    
 
75 Id. at 12.  
 
76 Id. at 13.  
 
77 Id. at 11-32.  
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“...Plaintiffs' counsel have repeatedly demonstrated their 
skill in managing this litigation.”78    
On December 28, 2007, the court approved plaintiffs’ 
final settlement with the remaining two defendants, PPG and 
Sherwin-Williams.79  This approval came a full six years after 
the first of the private suits were filed in November 2001.  
The agreement required PPG to pay $23 million and Sherwin-
Williams agreed to pay $16 million, bringing the combined 
total value of all the settlements to $105.75 million.  The 
court awarded class counsel’s requested one-third fee, plus 
expenses and incentive awards, for these additional 
settlements on January 3, 2008.80  In that order the court 
again commended counsel for “the manner in which Petitioners 
conducted all aspects of this litigation, including the very 
successful settlement negotiations....”81 
                                                          
78 Id. at 20.   
 
79 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 95004 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 28, 2007). 
 
80 In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., 2008 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 569 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 3, 2008). 
 
81 Id. at *13. 
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In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) MDL Doc. No. 1413, and In re Buspirone Patent 
Litigation, 185 F. Supp.2d 363 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).  Final 
Settlement approval at( 2003 U.S. Dist. Lexis 25638, April 17, 
2003). (BuSpar) 
 
 This case is noteworthy because: 1) Although it was not 
the first case to allege that a patent infringement settlement 
was actually a horizontal market allocation and therefore a 
per se violation of the Sherman Act, the $220 million dollar 
settlement in this case was the largest recovery in the first 
wave of such cases;82 2) The settlement exceeds the total 
amount of overcharges suffered by the Direct Purchaser Class 
and is approximately 95% of the total overcharges likely to be 
incurred through 2006, as estimated by Plaintiff’s expert;83 3) 
Private counsel was first to investigate and secured a 
substantial monetary recovery, amounting to more than double 
the monetary recovery obtained by the federal government;84 4) 
                                                          
 
82 See: In re Cardizem CD, 105 F. Supp 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 
2000); 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003) Settling for $175 million. 
See also: In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F.Supp.2d 1279, 
1286 (S.D. Fla. 2005) settling for $75 million. 
 
83 Dr. Jeffrey Leitzinger, Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, pg 3, In re Buspirone 
Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1413. (S.D.N.Y. 2003)  
 
84 Attorneys General for Maryland, New York and Texas lead a 
class of Plaintiff states, securing a $93 million settlement 
to reimburse consumers and state and local agencies for 
overcharges resulting from Buspar purchases between January 1, 
1998 and December 31, 2002. Alabama, et al, v. Bristol-Myers 
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The outstanding recovery is a result of Class Counsel’s 
efforts during the discovery process, which produced evidence 
of the Schein Agreement (discussed below), of which Plaintiffs 
were not previously aware; 5) Judge John G. Koeltl stated, 
“let me say that the lawyers in this case have done a 
stupendous job. They really have,”85 when he approved the 
settlement and awarded Class Counsel one third of the recovery 
in attorney’s fees; 6) This case was the first of several 
involving BMS’s strategies for delaying generic competition 
with its brand-name drugs (all told, BMS paid out $670 million 
dollars in settlements of antitrust suits arising from BuSpar, 
Taxol and Platinol);86 and 7) The size of the settlement will 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Squibb Co, et al, No. 01-CV. 11401, MDL 1413 (available at 
http://www.naag.org). The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
cooperated with the state attorneys general to obtain 
injunctive relief through a consent order which was finalized 
on April 14, 2003 and terminates on April 14, 2013. In the 
Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., Docket No. C-4076, 
Decision and Order (available at Federal Trade Commission, 
Bureau of Competition: Case Filings, 
http://ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbdo.pdf (last 
updated December 14, 2001)).  The order prohibits BMS from 
engaging in specific anticompetitive tactics including those 
used by the company to obstruct the entry of generic versions 
of Buspar and Taxol, and requires BMS to abide by certain 
reporting procedures for five years. 
 
85 See www.milbergweiss.com/whymilberg? Citing: In re Buspirone 
Patent Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1413 at 34:2-3 (S.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 6, 2003) (Final Approval Hearing Transcript). 
 
86 John R Wilke, Bristol-Myers Settles Charges of Patent-Law 
Abuse, The Wall Street Journal, Sec. A pg 5, Col. 1, Mar. 10, 
2003. “Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. settle FTC complaint that it 
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discourage other brand-name drug manufacturers from using the 
same tactics to delay or prevent generic competition, helping 
to keep national healthcare costs down by keeping prescription 
drugs competitively priced.87  
 In 1980 Bristol—Myers Squibb Company (“BMS”) obtained a 
patent (“the ‘763 Patent”) for treating anxiety with 
buspirone, an anti-anxiety drug. The patent was set to expire 
on November 21, 2000.  Since 1986, when buspirone was approved 
by the FDA, BMS has been selling it under the brand name 
Buspar.  Just before this patent was about to expire, BMS 
obtained another patent (“the ‘365 Patent”) for one of the 
metabolites88 that buspirone naturally produces in the body.  
BMS told the FDA that any manufacture of a generic version of 
buspirone would violate this second patent.89 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
illegally sought to extend patent protection on its drugs 
BuSpar, Taxol and Platinol; company agreed in January [2003] 
to pay $670 million to resolve related lawsuits by states, 
generic-drug makers and pharmacies.” 
 
87 See: Elyse Tanouye, Prices of Drugs Increase Faster than 
Inflation, The Wall Street Journal, pg B4, Feb. 13, 1997. 
 
88 The metabolite covered by the patent -6-hydroxy-buspirone- 
is a separate chemical compound that the body naturally 
produces after taking buspirone. See: Adams, Delayed Reaction; 
Drug Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics –
That’s One Reason It Takes Longer to Approve Knock-Off’s than 
Brands  --The ‘Metabolite Defense,’ The Wall Street Journal, 
pg A1, Jul. 12, 2001. 
 
89 “On Dec. 4, [2001], an attorney for Bristol-Myers faxed a 
letter to the FDA, saying the [‘365] patent did cover 
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  In anticipation of the expiration of BMS’s ‘763 Patent, 
several generic drug manufacturers90 filed Abbreviated New Drug 
Applications91 (“ANDAs”) with the FDA, seeking approval to 
begin selling generic versions of buspirone.  “Approximately 
eleven hours before the ‘763 Patent expired, Bristol-Myers 
hand-delivered copies of the ‘365 Patent to the FDA and 
applied to have it listed in the Orange Book as covering 
buspirone.”92 Because of this listing in the Orange Book,93 
BMS’ subsequent filing of patent infringement suits against 
the generic manufacturers triggered an automatic stay of FDA 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
swallowing BuSpar –even though the company had told the patent 
office that it covered only swallowing the metabolite.” 
Gardiner Harris and Chris Adams, Delayed Reaction; Drug 
Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics –That’s 
One Reason It Takes Longer to Approve Knock-Off’s than Brands  
--The ‘Metabolite Defense,’ The Wall Street Journal, pg A1, 
Jul. 12, 2001. 
 
90 Specifically, the generic manufacturers were: Danbury 
Pharmacal, Inc., Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mylan 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Mylan Laboratories, Inc., and Mylan 
Technologies, Inc.. 
 
91 For a detailed explanation of the Hatch-Waxman Act and 
Orange Book procedures involved this litigation see:  In re: 
Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340, 345-346 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
 
92 In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340, 
350 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) citing Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson, 139 
F. Supp. 2d at 8. 
 
93 The “Orange Book: is an official FDA publication formally 




approval of their applications for 30 months or until the 
patent infringement actions reached final resolution.94 Mylan 
Laboratories, Inc. 95 (“Mylan”) had already loaded trucks with 
generic buspirone and was ready to ship the product at 12:00 
am on November 22, 2000 when approval of its ANDA was delayed 
by the patent infringement suit filed by BMS.96 
 The second method BMS used to protect sales of its drug 
against competitors was to pay Schein Pharmaceutical, Inc.97 
(“Schein”) $72.5 million over four years not to enter the 
buspirone market (“the Schein Agreement”).  Schein and BMS 
                                                          
94 The generic manufacturers whose ANDA’s were suspended, 
immediately filed for injunctive relief in Federal Court. See: 
Mylan Pharm., Inc. v Thompson, 139 F. Supp. 2d at 8-9 and 
Watson Pharm., Inc. v. Henney, 194 F. Supp. 2d 442 (Dist. MD. 
2001) .  The patent infringement litigation proceeded and in 
February 2002 the generics won a motion for summary judgment 
declaring the second patent did not cover buspirone. In re: 
Buspirone Patent Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 2d 340. (S.D.N.Y. 
2002). 
 
95 Mylan Laboratories is based in West Virginia. 
 
96 Gardiner Harris and Chris Adams, Delayed Reaction; Drug 
Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics –That’s 
One Reason It Takes Longer to Approve Knock-Off’s than Brands  
--The ‘Metabolite Defense,’ The Wall Street Journal, pg A1, 
Jul. 12, 2001. See also: In re: Buspirone Antitrust 
Litigation, 185 F. Supp. 340, 346 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 
97 Schein Pharmaceutical Inc. (“Schein”) is now a subsidiary of 
Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Watson”), which is one of the 
generic companies seeking FDA approval for a generic version 
of buspirone. Watson settled its antitrust claims with BMS for 
$32 million in 2002. See: BMS Settles Antitrust Charges 
Involving BuSpar, Generic Line, Vol. 19, No. 7, April 5, 2002. 
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characterized the 1994 agreement as a settlement of a patent 
infringement suit regarding the original patent. However, 
plaintiffs alleged that the settlement “was a sham used to 
cover up an unlawful anticompetitive arrangement under which 
Schein agreed to stay out of the buspirone market and help 
maintain a public perception that the ‘763 Patent was valid … 
even though both parties knew that the ‘763 patent was not 
valid.”98 
Mylan launched its generic busprione product in April, 
2001, five months later than scheduled. The delay “yielded 
some $200 million in additional exclusive sales of BuSpar.”99 
By the end of June 2001, generics had captured two- thirds of 
BuSpar’s market share.100 
 On August 12, 2001 four patent disputes101 and twenty- two 
antitrust actions102 were consolidated for pre-trial purposes 
in the Southern District of New York.  The Direct Purchaser 
                                                          
98 In re: Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, 185 F. Supp. at 366. 
 
99 Gardiner Harris and Chris Adams, Delayed Reaction; Drug 
Manufacturers Step Up Legal Attacks That Slow Generics –That’s 
One Reason It Takes Longer to Approve Knock-Off’s than Brands  
--The ‘Metabolite Defense,’ The Wall Street Journal, pg A1, 




101 These suits had been consolidated under MDL-1410. 
 




Class103 alleged that the Schein Agreement, the listing of the 
‘365 patent in the Orange book and the sham patent 
infringement suits filed against competitors were 
anticompetitive acts designed to preserve BMS’s monopoly over 
the buspirone market.  
 After two years of intense litigation, the parties agreed 
to settle for a cash payment of $220 million. Class Counsel 
was in a position to negotiate such a substantial settlement 
because in the course of the litigation they discovered the 
Schein Agreement and amended their complaint, and because 
their motion for partial summary judgment arguing that the 
Schein Agreement was per se illegal under the Sherman Act had 
been fully briefed but not yet decided.  During the two years 
leading up to the settlement, which was preliminarily approved 
by the court on January 31, 2003, Class Counsel spent more 
                                                          
103 The Direct Purchaser Class is defined as “All persons who 
have directly purchased BuSpar(R) from defendant Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Company any time during the period November 9, 1997 
through January 28, 2003 ("Direct Purchaser Class" or the 
"Class"). Excluded from the Class are the defendants in this 
lawsuit, and their officers, directors, management and 
employees, subsidiaries and affiliates, and federal government 
entities. Also excluded from the Class are the claims brought 
by and/or assigned to entities which independently sued BMS in 
the actions styled CVS Meridian, Inc. and Rite Aid Corp. v. 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., et. al., No. 01-CV-10223, and 
Walgreen Co., et. al. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., et. al., 
No. 02-CV-2952, as well as claims asserted by certain States 
in the action styled State of Alabama et. al. v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., et. al., No. 01 CV 11401.” In re: Buspirone 
Antitrust Litigation, MDL Doc. No. 1413 at pg 6 (2003 U.S. 
Dist. Lexis 26538). 
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than 28,000 hours and conducted exhaustive discovery, prepared 
numerous expert witnesses and engaged in extensive motion 
practice, including a successful motion for class 
certification.  In a decision filed April 17, 2003, the 
Honorable John G. Koeltl for the district court awarded Class 
Counsel one third of the total recovery from which the 
$811,338.41 in expenses were to be deducted.104  
As this settlement was in the final stages of 
negotiation, on March 7, 2003 the FTC issued its first 
complaint against BMS. The complaint accused Bristol-Meyers 
Squibb of a decade-long pattern of alleged anticompetitive 
acts:  “Bristol avoided competition by abusing federal 
regulations in order to block generic entry; deceived the U.S. 
Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) to obtain unwarranted patent 
protection; paid a would-be generic rival over $70 million not 
to bring any competing products to market; and filed baseless 
patent infringement lawsuits to deter entry by generics.”105 
                                                          
104 In re Buspirone Antitrust Litigation, Order and Final 
Judgment, pg 5, ln 14, MDL Docket No. 1413, April 7, 2003. The 
court also awarded named plaintiff Louisiana Wholesale Drug. 
Co., Inc $25,000 as an incentive award. Id. at pg 6, ln 16.  
 
105 Press Release: FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with 
Pattern of Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug 
Competition, March 7, 2003, quoting Joe Simons, Director of 
the FTC’s Bureau of Competition (available at www.ftc.gov). 
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The complaint resulted in a consent order106 which will prevent 
BMS from using similar tactics in the future.  Attorneys 
General for Maryland, New York and Texas, who lead a class of 
Plaintiff States, worked with the FTC in securing this 
agreement and also settled their claims against BMS for $93 
million dollars in 2003.107  
The FTC action and the substantial amount that BMS paid 
to various plaintiffs in settlement of buspirone claims should 
discourage other brand- name drug manufacturers from using 
such agreements to delay or prevent generic competition, 
helping to keep national healthcare costs down by keeping 
prescription drugs competitively priced.108  
                                                          
106 Decision and Order, Docket No. C-4076, April 18, 2003 
(available at www.ftc.gov). 
 
107  The Plaintiff states initiated formal action against BMS 
in December, 2001. A summary of the efforts of Attorneys 
General in this case go to: www.naag.org.  According to 
Meredyth Smith Andrus, Deputy Attorney General for the 
Antitrust Division of the Maryland Attorney General’s Office, 
the Attorneys General and the FTC led parallel investigations 
of BMS and separately negotiated their settlements. Attorneys 
General will often conduct a non-public investigation, long 
before a complaint is filed. In this case, the attorneys 
general first took formal action in 2001 but they may have 
been looking into the agreement long before that so it is 
difficult to say with absolute certainty that private counsel 
initiated the investigation.  
 
108 See: Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
“Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust 
Implications of Patent Settlements,” May 24, 2001, (available 
at: www.ftc.gov); and Elyse Tanouye, Prices of Drugs Increase 
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Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Case No. 2:96CV645B, 72 
F.Supp.2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999). 
 
 This case is notable because: 1) Although the amount of 
the settlement is confidential, the Wall Street Journal 
estimated that Microsoft paid approximately $275 million to 
settle with Caldera;109 2) This case was filed by a competitor 
and was not, in its essence, a follow-up to any case brought 
by the U.S. government, a State, or the European Union against 
Microsoft; and 3) This case disclosed important information 
regarding Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct to consumers. 
 
In July 1996, Caldera filed suit against Microsoft, its 
competitor in the computer operating system market, for 
illegal tying and monopolization in violation of sections 1 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Faster Than Inflation, The Wall Street Journal, pg B4,  Feb. 
13, 1997. 
 
109 See Lee Gomes, Microsoft To Settle Suit By Caldera, The Wall Street Journal A3 (Jan. 11, 
2000).  This estimate was based on Microsoft’s reported charge to 
pay the settlement and its tax rate. "Microsoft Corp. agreed 
to pay an estimated $275 million to settle an antitrust 
lawsuit by Caldera Inc., heading off a trial that was likely 
to air nasty allegations from a decade ago. Microsoft and 
Caldera, a small Salt Lake City software company that brought 
the suit in 1996, didn't disclose terms of the settlement. 
Microsoft, though, said it would take a charge of three cents 
a share for the agreement in the fiscal third quarter ending 
March 31. Since the company has roughly 5.5 billion shares 
outstanding, the cost of the deal would appear to be about 
$165 million. Michael Kwatinetz, an analyst at Credit Suisse 
First Boston, estimated Microsoft paid about $275 million, 
based on its tax rate."  
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and 2 of the Sherman Act.  Caldera and Microsoft both produced 
versions of the computer operating system, DOS.  Caldera 
alleged that its DR-DOS offered more features that consumers 
wanted. 110  However, according to Caldera, Microsoft tied its 
MS-DOS operating system and its Windows graphical interface, 
allowing Microsoft to maintain an illegal monopoly in the 
computer operating system market with MS-DOS. 
Microsoft had already entered into a Consent Decree with 
the United States Department of Justice and a similar 
agreement with the European Union regarding certain licensing 
violations when Caldera filed suit.111  Caldera alleged that 
Microsoft continued to engage in anticompetitive conduct 
involving its operating systems, including violations for: (1) 
unreasonably long licensing agreements with original equipment 
manufacturers (OEMs); (2) pricing schemes that forced OEMs to 
only buy MS-DOS; (3) tying MS DOS with Windows; (4) giving 
deep discounts to OEMs that were vulnerable to competition; 
                                                          
110 For example, DR-DOS operated at a faster speed and was less 
expensive than MS-DOS.  See Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 
72 F.Supp.2d 1295, 1298. 
 
111 The U.S. and European government cases alleged licensing 
violations, including some involving operating systems.  The 
subsequent Consent Decree barred, among other things, 
conditioning licensing agreements of Microsoft operating 
system products on the license of another Microsoft product.  
See Final Judgment, United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. 94-
1564 (July 15, 1994). 
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(5) false public statements regarding Windows’ compatibility 
with DR-DOS; (6) unlawful “beta blacklisting” in order to stop 
pre-testing the compatibility of Windows and DR-DOS; (7) false 
public statements made about the timing of the release of MS-
DOS to coincide with the release of new versions of DR-DOS; 
(8) intentionally programming code into Windows with the sole 
purpose of displaying false error messages when running on DR-
DOS; and (9) “peer processor royalties,” also referred to as 
“the Microsoft tax.” 
In early 1998, Caldera filed an amended complaint, 
expanding its claims to include allegations that Microsoft 
tied MS-DOS to Windows 95 in an attempt to eliminate DOS 
competition.112  This claim was especially unique and has since 
appeared in the government cases that have followed.113 
Microsoft subsequently filed nine separate motions for 
summary judgment seeking to dismiss this and many of Caldera’s 
other claims.  In response Caldera filed a Statement of Facts, 
                                                          
112  Andrew Schulman, The Caldera v. Microsoft Dossier, 
2/7/2000, available at: 
www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/2000/02/07/schulman.html. 
 
113 See United States v. Microsoft Corp., No. Civ. A. 98-1232, 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14231, 1998 WL 614485 (D.D.C. Sept. 14 
1998). Microsoft had previously asserted that Windows 95, 
unlike previous versions of Windows, was an integrated 
operating system rather than an illegal combination of Windows 
and MS-DOS.  See Consolidated Statement of Facts in Support of 
Its Responses to Motions for Summary Judgment by Microsoft 
Corporation, generally, Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 
F.Supp.2d 1295. 
 43
making public much of its evidence against Microsoft, 
including emails sent by Bill Gates directing his development 
staff to identify ways that an application would run only with 
MS-DOS and not with DR-DOS.114 Judge Dee Benson denied 
Microsoft’s motions for summary judgment, ruling that 
Caldera’s evidence was sufficient to support its claims and 
present them to a jury. 115 
The parties entered into a settlement agreement on 
January 9, 2000, less than one month before the case was 
scheduled to go to a jury trial.  The timing of the settlement 
was also significant given the additional cases brought by the 
United States and European Union which had yet to be resolved, 
and Microsoft had recently prevailed in a jury trial action 
brought by Bristol, another of its competitors. 116  Some 
commentators concluded that the settlement represented the 
                                                          
114 See Consolidated Statement of Facts in Support of Its 
Responses to Motions for Summary Judgment by Microsoft 
Corporation, at paragraph 38, Ex. 16. 
 
115 Memorandum Opinion and Order (June 28, 1999).  Judge 
Benson’s rulings were upheld on appeal. See Caldera, Inc. v. 
Microsoft Corp., 87 F.Supp.2d 1244 (D. Utah 1998) (Plaintiff’s 
allegations were sufficient to support its claims of predatory 
practices and illegal restraint of trade in violation of 
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act); and Caldera v. Microsoft 
Corp., 72 F.Supp.2d 1295 (D. Utah 1999) (Denying Defendant’s 
motions for partial summary judgment on Plaintiff’s claims of 
predisclosure, perceived incompatibilities, intentional 
incompatibilities, and technological tying). 
 
116 See Bristol Technology Inc. v. Microsoft Corporation, Case 
No. 398-CV-1567 (D. Conn. Dec. 30, 1998). 
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first acknowledgment by Microsoft that “Caldera had a solid 
case,” and had not been simply playing the “litigation 
lottery.”117   
Consumers received important information regarding 
Microsoft’s conduct as a result of the discovery in this case.  
A consulting expert on the case noted, “Confidential 
settlements typically allow evidence of corporate wrongdoing 
to remain hidden.  However, the settlement of Caldera v. 
Microsoft isn’t quite like this.”118  Caldera released a series 
of “smoking gun” emails, which included one email from Bill 
Gates that threatened “the price of Windows without MS DOS 
would be twice as much” to companies that sold personal 











                                                          
 
117 It had been Microsoft’s contention that in purchasing DR-
DOS from Novell for $400,000, Caldera bought the lawsuit in 
the hopes of winning a big payout from the industry giant. The 




119 First Amended Complaint and Jury Demand, at paragraph 55, 
Caldera, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 72 F.Supp.2d 1295. 
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In re: Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1278; 
105 F.Supp 2d 682 (E.D. Mich. 2000); 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 
2003). 
 
 This case is noteworthy because: 1) It was the first of 
several cases that challenged the validity of settlement 
agreements between brand-name pharmaceuticals and their 
generic competitors: as the Judge noted, “[t]his case has 
helped put prescription drug pricing and marketing tactics at 
the forefront of media, Congressional scrutiny, and judicial 
scrutiny;”120 2) The initial investigation apparently was led 
by private counsel and followed by an FTC investigation;121 3) 
                                                          
120 Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for 
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman 
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees, 
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named 
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at 22. In re Cardizem CD, MDL no. 
1278 (E.D. Mich 2004). 
 
121 Private counsel began an investigation in June 1998. In re 
Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 508, 511 (E.D. 
Mich. 2003).  “These cases began after an intensive private 
investigation, conducted by Co-Lead Counsel for the State Law 
Plaintiffs in June 1998, two months before the first class 
action case was filed. Lowey Dannenberg Bemporad & Selinger 
("LDBS") was informed of the existence of the September 1997 
HMRI/Andrx Agreement by a confidential source in June 1998. 
Thereafter, LDBS engaged in an intensive pre-litigation 
investigation of factual and legal issues relevant to this 
litigation. (Pls.'s Motion, 9/22/03 Lowey Decl. (describing in 
detail pre-litigation investigation).) In August 1998, Norman 
Morris, a California pharmacist, and Betty Morris, his wife 
who was a consumer of Cardizem CD, retained LDBS and Co-Lead 
Counsel Berman DeValerio Pease Tabacco Burt & Pucillo ("BDPT") 
to commence the first lawsuit related to the September 1997 
HMRI/Andrx Agreement. LDBS and BDPT filed a comprehensive 
California state law complaint on the Morris's behalf In 
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California state court on August 20, 1998 as a putative class 
action (the "Betnor action"). The following day, The Wall 
Street Journal published a story concerning the Betnor 
complaint. This publicity led to inquiries to Co-Lead Counsel 
from in-house counsel at Aetna and Cobalt (formerly known as 
"United Wisconsin Services"), the parent company of Wisconsin 
Blue Cross, about the possibility of their serving as class 
representative plaintiffs.  Within several months, actions 
were filed in 11 different states and the District of 
Columbia. All were filed in state courts, under state 
antitrust and related laws, by consumers and health insurers. 
In late 1998 and early 1999, various wholesalers, or retailers 
who had obtained assignments of claims from wholesalers, filed 
direct purchaser class actions under the Sherman Antitrust 
Act, reiterating the allegations of the Betnor complaint, but 
asserting federal antitrust claims not available to the State 
Law Plaintiffs who were indirect purchasers of Cardizem CD.” 
Id. at 511-512 (internal citations omitted).  
 
Although the FTC did not file a complaint until March 16, 
2000, it was looking into the agreement as early as March 9, 
1999. See: Ralph T. King Jr., “Drugs: FTC widens Prove Into 
Generic-Drug Barriers,” The Wall Street Journal. Mar. 9, 1999. 
Pg B-1. (The first private complaints in this case were filed 
in November 1998 and February 1999.)  See also: Jerry Guidera 
and Ralph T. King Jr., “Abbot Labs, Novartis Unit Near Pact 
With FTC Over Agreement on Hytrin,” The Wall Street Journal. 
Mar. 14, 2000, pg B6, writing that the FTC probe “of the drug 
industry’s alleged efforts to block generic rivals and thus 
protect sales of brand-name medications” was “launched about a 
year ago.” Id. 
 
Working with the FTC, class of states led by Attorneys General 
for Michigan and New York initiated proceedings against 
HMS/Aventis in 2001 which settled for $80 million dollars in 
2003.  The FTC secured a consent order preventing HMR from 
entering into such agreements in the future. See infra, fn 14.  
 
In some cases the Attorneys General, the DOJ, and/or the FTC 
will conduct a lengthy non-public investigation before filing a 
complaint, making it difficult to determine whether the 
government or private counsel began investigating first, or 
were conducting separate, parallel investigations. In this 
case, the attorneys general first took formal action in 2001 
but they may have been looking into the agreement long before 
that so it is difficult to say with absolute certainty that 
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Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Class persuaded the court 
that the agreement was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, 
the first time such an agreement was declared per se illegal; 
2) Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Class secured a cash 
settlement of $110 million,122 which, according to plaintiffs’ 
expert economist, represents more than 200% of the total 
amount the Class was overcharged123 during the period the 
illegal agreement was in effect;124 and 3) in her opinion 
approving the final settlement, Judge Nancy G. Edmunds for the 
Eastern District of Michigan awarded Class Counsel their 
requested thirty percent of the total recovery in attorneys’ 
fees, noting that the award was justified by their “excellent 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
private counsel initiated the investigation. However, the fact 
that private counsel first filed a complaint as early as 1998 
supports the inference that this case was initiated by private 
counsel.  
 
122 Andrx  recorded a $60 million litigation settlements charge 
in the second quarter of 2002 for all pending litigation 
relating to Cardizem CD. Andrx 2002 Annual Report (available 
at http://www.andrx.com).  However, although HMR and Andrx 
collectively paid into the settlement fund, the proportion 
contributed by each is confidential as per the settlement 
agreement. Settlement Agreement, In re Cardizem CD, MDL No. 
1278 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
 
123 Memorandum in Support of Sherman Act Class Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, filed 11/04/2002, In 
re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1278, at 
page 2 (E.D. Mich. 2002). 
 
124 September 24, 1997 through June 9, 1999. 
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performance on behalf of the Class in this hotly contested 
case. 125 
 
The litigation stems from a 1997 agreement whereby HMR, 
manufacturer of the brand-name drug Cardizem CD, agreed to pay 
$40 million a year to Andrx, a generic drug manufacturer, in 
return for Andrx’s promise not to produce or sell its generic 
version of Cardizem CD.  Plaintiffs alleged that this 
agreement delayed generic competition and kept prices for 
Cardizem CD artificially high in violation of the Sherman Act. 
Cardizem CD is the brand-name version of diltiazem 
hydrochloride, which is used for the treatment of angina and 
hypertension and for the prevention of heart attacks and 
strokes.  While Andrx’s generic version was still in 
development, the company anticipated the possibility of a 
patent infringement suit being filed by HMR and, in the hopes 
of avoiding litigation, Andrx provided samples of its version 
of the drug to HMR so that HMR scientists could perform their 
own tests and be sure that the Andrx version did not infringe 
on the HMR patent.  In September 1995, Andrx filed an 
                                                          
125 Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for 
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman 
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees, 
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named 
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at pg 21. In re Cardizem CD, MDL No. 
1278 (E.D. Mich. 2004). 
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abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”) with the FDA 
requesting approval to begin marketing a generic version of 
diltiazem hydrochloride.  As required by the Hatch-Waxman 
Act,126 Andrx filed a certification that its generic product 
did not infringe on any of the patents listed with the FDA. 
                                                          
126 The complicated provisions of the Hatch-Waxman act provide 
the backdrop for this and similar litigation. Under its 
provisions, the first generic manufacturer to file an ANDA is 
entitled to a 180-day exclusivity period.  Each ANDA must be 
accompanied by a certification that the drug for which they 
seek approval does not infringe on a legitimate patent right 
because the patent is either invalid, expired, or will not be 
infringed by the marketing of the generic drug. The patent 
holder is entitled to notice of this certification and, can 
immediately file a patent infringement suit against the 
generic competitor.  Filing a patent infringement suit 
triggers an automatic stay of FDA approval of the generic 
manufacturer’s ANDA for 30 months or until the patent 
litigation is resolved. 21 U.S.C. 355. Relevant provisions of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act were amended in 2003 See: The Medicare 
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, 
Title XI: Access to Affordable Pharmaceuticals, sections a-b,  
United States Public Laws, 108th Congress –1st Session, 108 
P.L. 173 (2006). The amendments adopt FTC recommendations that 
brand-name companies be limited to one 30-month stay of 
approval, that a counterclaim for improper Orange Book listing 
be authorized for generic companies faced with patent 
infringement suits, and that limits be put on the 180 day 
exclusivity period. Statement of the Honorable Timothy J. 
Muris before the Senate Judiciary committee. Aug. 1, 2003. For 
a history of the act and a discussion of the recent amendments 
See: Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The 
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure and Legacy, 71 Antitrust 
L.J. 585 (2003). For a discussion of the 2003 amendments and 
the loop holes that still exist see: Brian Porter, Comment: 
Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Mylan’s Effort 
to Close the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch Waxman Act, 22 J. 
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 177 (Fall 2005). For an overview of 
the Act and how it has been manipulated by brand-name 
pharmaceutical manufacturers as well as differing views as to 
how such manipulations should be treated see: Eric L. Cramer 
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  In November 1995, HMR obtained patent127 rights for a 
new version of diltiazem hydrochloride with a different 
dissolution profile. The following January, HMR and Carderm 
Capital L.P. (“Carderm”)128 filed a patent infringement suit 
against Andrx claiming that the generic drug it intended to 
market would violate their  new patent. The filing of this 
suit triggered an automatic stay of FDA approval of Andrx’s 
ANDA for 30 months or until the patent infringement litigation 
reached a final resolution.  Andrx countered with unfair 
competition and antitrust claims against HMR and Carderm. 
 The parties settled the patent infringement suit in 
1997: HMR agreed to pay Andrx $40 million a year, as long as 
Andrx did not bring its generic drug to the market. By the 
time this arrangement was terminated by agreement of both 
parties in June 1999, HMR had paid Andrx a total of $89.83 
million.  After its subsequent release on June 23, 1999, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and Daniel Berger, The Superiority of Direct Proof of Monopoly 
Power and Anticompetitive Effects in Antitrust Cases Involving 
Delayed Entry of Generic Drugs, 39 U.S.F. L.Rev. 81 (Fall 
2004), Herbert Hovenkamp et al., Anticompetitive Settlement of 
Intellectual Property Disputes, 87 Minn. L. Rev. 1719 (20030), 
and  Kristopher L. Reed, A Return to Reason: Antitrust 
Treatment of Pharmaceutical Settlements Under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act, 40 Gonz. L. Rev. 457 (2004/2005).  
 
127 U.S. Patent No. 5,470,584 was issued to Carderm Capital, 
L.P. and licensed to HMR. 
 
128 See material two notes earlier. 
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Andrx’s generic diltiazem hydrochloride drug, Cartia XT sold 
for a much lower price that Cardizem CD and captured a 
substantial portion of the market.129  
The firm of Lowey Dannenberg Bemporad and Selinger 
(“LDBS”) began investigating the HMR/Andrx agreement in June 
1998 after receiving an anonymous tip.130  After LBDS conducted 
an investigation, complaints were filed on behalf of several 
classes of plaintiffs beginning in August 1998. Thanks to the 
publicity of an article in the Wall Street Journal131 the issue 
received national attention.   
In 1999, the FTC launched a “probe of the drug industry’s 
alleged efforts to block generic rivals and thus protect sales 
of brand-name medications.”132 The FTC filed a complaint 
against HMR and Andrx on March 16, 2000133 which was resolved 
                                                          
129 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d 896, 903 
(6th cir. 2003). 
 
130 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 508, 511 
(E.D. Mich. 2003). 
 
131 Ralph T. King, Drugs: Novel Heart-Drug Deal Protects Sales, 
Spurs Suit, The Wall Street Journal, Aug. 21, 1998, Pg B1. 
 
132 Jerry Guidera and Ralph T. King Jr., Abbot Labs, Novartis 
Unit Near Pact With FTC Over Agreement on Hytrin, The Wall 
Street Journal. Mar. 14, 2000, pg B6. 
 
133 In the Matter of Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc.; Carderm 
Capital L.P.; and Andrx Corporation, Complaint, March 16, 
2000, Docket No. 9293, available at: www.ftc.gov. 
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with a consent order whereby HMR and Andrx agreed not to enter 
into similar agreements in the future.134 
Class Counsel filed class action suits on behalf of 
Direct Purchasers on November 18, 1998 and February 22, 
1999.135 The claims were consolidated and Plaintiffs’ motion 
for certification of a class of direct purchasers was granted 
on March 14, 2001.136  In addition to the substantial $110 
million settlement, Class Counsel’s greatest success was 
winning a motion for partial summary judgment in which the 
court held that the agreement whereby HMR paid Andrx not to 
enter the market was a “naked, horizontal restraint of trade 
                                                          
134 See: “Analysis to Aid Public Comment on Both Consent 
Orders,” April 2, 2001. Docket No. 9293, available at 
www.ftc.gov. 
 
135 The first complaint filed by purchasers arising from these 
facts was based on California State Law and was filed on 
August 20, 1998. Only the direct purchaser actions are under 
Federal Antitrust laws.  There were eventually five groups of 
plaintiffs: 1) consumers and third party payers, the State Law 
Plaintiffs 2) Litigating States represented by their attorney 
generals; 3) direct purchasers 4) individual retailers and 
chains that opted out of the Direct Purchaser Class and 5) 
individual blue cross plaintiffs.   The Litigating States 
coordinated their prosecution and settlement with the State 
Law Class.  Together, they settled for $80 million dollars. 
 
136 The final Direct Purchaser Class consisted of all persons 
(or assignees of such persons) who directly purchased Cardizem 




and, as such, per se illegal.”137  Defendants appealed the 
class certification and the grant of partial summary judgment 
to the Sixth Circuit and lost.138 After nearly four years of 
litigation the case finally settled for a cash payment of $110 
million.139 
Class Counsel expended more than 37,000 hours litigating 
this case over the course of four years, preparing successful 
motions for class certification and partial summary judgment, 
and coordinating an “efficient discovery effort that included 
the filing of numerous motions to compel, the review of over a 
million pages of documents and conducting over 25 depositions 
of witnesses.”140  In approving the final settlement, the court 
                                                          
137 In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 332 F.3d at 905.  
Citing the district court opinion, In re Cardizem CD Antitrust 




139 See: Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions 
for Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and 
Sherman Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s 
Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for 
Named Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at 3. In re Cardizem CD, Master 
File No. 99-md-1278, MDL no. 1278. (E.D. Mich 2004).  The 
Litigating States and State Law Class coordinated their 
settlement efforts and settled for a combined $80 million 
dollars. See: In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation, 218 
F.R.D. 508, MDL No. 1278 (E.D. Mich. 2003).  
 
140 Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for 
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman 
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees, 
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named 
 54
observed that “[t]he complexity of this case cannot be 
overstated. Despite its complexity, Class Counsel was able to 
efficiently and effectively prosecute and settle this 
matter.”141  The court granted Class Counsel’s request for 
reimbursement of $1,080,231.74 in expenses and thirty percent 
of the total recovery in the case, noting that, “this Court 
would be remiss if it failed to acknowledge the experience, 
hard work, and skill demonstrated by Class Counsel in this 
matter.  Their excellent performance on behalf of the Class in 
this hotly contested case justifies the award they seek.”142  
Like other antitrust litigation involving brand-name 
pharmaceutical companies such as In re: Terazosin 
Hydrochloride,143 the success of private counsel in securing a 
substantial settlement and persuading the court that such 
agreements are a per se violation of the Sherman Act will 
discourage other brand-name drug manufacturers from using such 
agreements to delay or prevent generic competition, helping to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at 3. In re Cardizem CD, Master File 
No. 99-md-1278, MDL no. 1278 (E.D. Mich 2004). 
 
141 Id. at 20-21. 
 
142 Id. at 21. 
 
143 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F.Supp. 2d 1279 (S.D. 
Fla 2005). In re Terazosin Hydrochloride involved a similar 
agreement between a brand-name manufacturer and its generic 
competitor.  Plaintiffs in that case won a motion for summary 
judgment on the same issue and secured a cash settlement. 
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keep national healthcare costs down by keeping prescription 
drugs competitively priced.144 The particular importance of 
this litigation was recognized by the court.  “This case has 
helped put prescription drug pricing and marketing tactics at 
the forefront of media, Congressional scrutiny, and judicial 
scrutiny.  Encouraging qualified counsel to bring inherently 


















                                                          
144 See: Prepared Statement of the Federal Trade Commission 
Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 
“Competition in the Pharmaceutical Marketplace: Antitrust 
Implications of Patent Settlements,” May 24, 2001, (available 
at: www.ftc.gov); and Elyse Tanouye, Prices of Drugs Increase 
Faster Than Inflation, The Wall Street Journal, pg B4,  Feb. 
13, 1997. 
 
145 Order granting Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs’ Motions for 
Final Approval of Settlement, Plan of Allocation and Sherman 
Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorney’s Fees, 
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Awards for Named 
Plaintiffs. Order No. 49 at 22. In re: Cardizem CD, MDL no. 
1278. (E.D. Mich 2004). 
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In re: Citric Acid Antitrust Litigation, MDL Docket No. 1092; 
996 F. Supp. 951 (N. Dist. Cal. 1998). 
 
Summary: The citric acid litigation is noteworthy because: 1) 
The FBI uncovered the price-fixing conspiracy while 
investigating the price-fixing conspiracy for lysine; 2) The 
class-action suit settled for $86.2 million, of which $51.2 
million came from two foreign defendants; 3) Four of the 
largest purchasers of citric acid opted out and settled for 
approximately $89 million from the same defendants, of which 
at least $4.3 million came from foreign defendants; 4) The 
total amount recovered by private plaintiffs, all of which 
were direct purchasers, was approximately $175 million; 5) The 
DOJ received $105.4 million in criminal fines, of which $25.4 
million came from three foreign defendants; 7) Individuals 
involved in the conspiracy were fined nearly $500,000. 
 In the fall of 1992, Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) 
executive and whistleblower Mark Whitacre began working with 
the FBI as a cooperating witness, using hidden tape recorders 
to reveal price fixing in the lysine market.  While doing so, 
Whitacre captured Michael Andreas, vice chairman of ADM, and 
Terrance Wilson, head of the corn processing division, 
participating in price-fixing meetings concerning citric 
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acid.146  On June 27, 1995, the FBI raided ADM’s headquarters 
in Decatur, Illinois, and within days the FBI also raided 
several other corn-products companies, including Haarmann & 
Reimer (Haarmann), Hoffman-La Roche (Roche), and 
Jungbunzlauer.  The FBI seized thousands of incriminating 
documents implicating all four of these companies in a 
conspiracy to fix prices of citric acid.147  Several years 
later, in 1998, the U.S. government filed charges against a 
fifth company, Cerestar Bioproducts BV (Cerestar).148 
 Shortly after the criminal proceedings began, civil 
antitrust suits against ADM, Haarmann, Roche, and 
Jungbunzlauer were filed by hundreds of food, beverage, and 
chemical companies, which were consolidated in the summer of 
1996 as In re Citric Acid Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1092, 
in the Northern District of California.149  These direct 
purchasers alleged that the conspiracy occurred from July 1991 
                                                          
146 Citric acid is a flavor additive and preservative produced 
from various sugars.  It is found in soft drinks, processed 
food, detergents, and pharmaceutical and cosmetic products. 
 
147 John M. Connor, What Can We Learn from the ADM Global Price 
Conspiracies?, Staff Paper 98-14 (August 1998), 
http://www.ag.uiuc.edu/famc/program98/connor.htm.  
 
148 U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dutch Company Charged with Price-
Fixing on Citric Acid, 98-298 (June 23, 1998), http:// 
149.101.1.32/atr/public/press_releases/1998/1805.pdf. 
 
149 Cargill, Inc. was also named as a defendant, but was 
dismissed from the class-action suit in January 1998. 
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through December 1995, in which U.S. sales of citric acid 
ranged from $1.2 billion to $1.45 billion.150  Plaintiffs 
estimated that overcharges during this period could have been 
as high as $400 million, and therefore were entitled to treble 
damages of nearly $1.2 billion.151  However, in October 1996, 
the four defendants offered settlements in proportion to their 
market shares of citric acid for $94 million.   
  Proctor & Gamble, Quaker Oats, Kraft Foods, and 
Schreiber Cheese, four of the largest buyers of citric acid, 
decided to opt out of the class, and brought their own private 
suit against the defendants in June 1997.  One month later, on 
July 11, 1997, the class action suit settled for a reduced 
amount of $86.2 million: ADM, Haarmann, Roche, and 
Jungbunzlauer agreed to pay $35 million, $38 million, $5.7 
million, and $7.5 million, respectively.152 
 In March 1998, the four opt-out firms, who purchased 
approximately 19-24% of all U.S. citric acid, reached a 
settlement with the defendants for an estimated total of $89 
                                                          
150  John M. Connor, What Can We Learn from the ADM Global 





152 Id. The settlement was reduced because the four large 




million.153  This settlement “was from 2 to 3.5 times more 
generous than what was received by the members of the federal 
class less than a year before.”154   
 In October 1996, ADM agreed to plead guilty to its 
involvement in the price-fixing conspiracy, which ultimately 
led to guilty pleas from the other major companies in early 
1997.  Overall, the DOJ received $105.4 million in criminal 
fines, $25.4 million of which came from foreign companies.155  
                                                          
153 ADM paid $36 million.  The other three defendants are not 
public companies under U.S. law and therefore are not required 
to reveal this information.  However, Roche Holding’s CEO, 
Franz Humer, stated that Roche paid $10 million to settle the 
civil antitrust suit.  It paid $5.7 million to members of the 
federal class, leaving $4.3 million for the opt-out firms.  
Also, it is believed that Unilever settled separately as well 
for $25 million, but that has not been verified.  John M. 
Connor, Archer Daniels Midland: Price Fixer to the World, 
Staff Paper 00-11 (Dec. 2000), 
http://www.agribusinessaccountability.org/pdfs/ 
182_ADM%20Price%20Fixer%20to%20the%20World.pdf.  It is unknown 
how much was awarded in attorneys’ fees for either the class 
action or the private suit.   
 
154 “The class settlement of $86.2 million represented an 
assumed overcharge of $1.7 to $2.4 million per percentage 
point of the market. However, the opt-out firms received $4.7 
to $6.0 million per percentage point.”  John M. Connor, What 
Can We Learn from the ADM Global Price Conspiracies?, Staff 
Paper 98-14 (August 1998), 
http://www.ag.uiuc.edu/famc/program98/connor.htm.   
 
155 ADM was fined a total of $100 million ($70 million for the 
lysine case and $30 million for the citric acid case).  
Haarman, a U.S. subsidiary of Bayer AG, a foreign corporation, 
paid $50 million in criminal fines, and the two Swiss 
companies, Roche and Jungbunzlauer, paid fines of $14 million 
and $11 million, respectively.  Cerestar, a Dutch company, was 
fined $400,000.  U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dutch Company Charged 
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According to the DOJ in 1998, the conspiracy was “one of the 
largest, if not the largest, conspiracies ever prosecuted by 
the Department of Justice.”156  The companies were also fined 
in Canada and Europe for approximately $11.5 million and 
$120.5 million, respectively.157 
 Individuals from each company were also charged for their 
participation in the conspiracy.  Although none actually went 
to jail, each pled guilty and paid hefty fines totaling 






                                                                                                                                                                                    
with Price-Fixing on Citric Acid, 98-298 (June 23, 1998), 
http:// 149.101.1.32/atr/public/press_releases/1998/ 1805.pdf. 
 
156 John M. Connor, What Can We Learn from the ADM Global Price 
Conspiracies?, Staff Paper 98-14 (August 1998), 
http://www.ag.uiuc.edu/famc/program98/connor.htm. 
 
157 Harry Chandler, Cartels and Amnesty: The State of Play in 
Canada, Competition Bureau, 
http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/internet/index.cfm?itemID=1
194&lg=e (April 5, 2000).  CBG, European Commission Fines Five 
Companies in Citric Acid Cartel, 
http://www.cbgnetwork.org/408.html (December 5, 2001). 
 
158 ADM’s Michael Andreas and Terrance Wilson were both 
imprisoned and fined solely for their involvement in the 
lysine conspiracy.  Hans Hartmann (Haarman), Udo Haas (Roche), 
and Rainer Bichlbauer (Jungbunzlauer) each paid $150,000, and 
Silvio Kluzer (Cerestar) paid $40,000 for their roles in the 
conspiracy. U.S. Dept. of Justice, Dutch Company Charged with 




In re Commercial Explosives Litigation, 945 F. Supp. 1489 (D. 
Utah 1996). 
  
Summary: These related cases concern an agreement between some 
of the largest manufacturers of commercial explosives in the 
world to fix prices in the sale of certain commercial 
explosives. They are noteworthy because: 1) the initial 
investigation was apparently initiated by private counsel and 
was later followed by a DOJ investigation;  2) There were two 
settlements totaling $113 million settlement; 3) of this 
amount $97.75 million came from foreign owned corporations, 
and; 4) Counsel was awarded a 30% fee in one case; the other 
was confidential.159 
 This litigation and the government investigation that 
followed apparently arose out of a 1992 private civil suit 
initiated by Thermex Energy Corporation (“Thermex”), a Texas 
manufacturer of commercial explosives, against Atlas Powder 
Company, owned by Imperial Chemical Industries P.L.C. of 
Britain (“ICI”).160 Thermex brought state and federal antitrust 
allegations against Atlas Powder and alleged it was forced out 
of business for refusing to participate in a conspiracy to 
                                                          
159  Order Awarding Fees and Reimburse. of Expenses for Atty. 
Fees, Doc. 874 (Dec. 30, 1998).  
 
160 Thermex Energy Corporation v. Atlas Powder Co. d/b/a ICI 
Explosives U.S.A., Inc., et al., No. 92-03-141, District Court 
of Wise County Texas (1992).  
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monopolize a part of the commercial explosives market.161  
In August 1995, a jury awarded $488.5 million to Thermex 
and found that ICI had engaged in a conspiracy with Defendant 
Dyno Nobel’s predecessor, Ireco Incorporated, “to allocate 
territories and fix prices.”162 The case settled for a 
confidential amount, later reported to be $36 million.163  
 In September 1995, the Department of Justice secured 
guilty pleas and fines for two of the defendants in the  
Commercial Explosives litigation, Dyno Nobel Inc., a unit of 
Dyno Industrier A.S. of Norway and ICI, a unit of Imperial 
Chemical Industries P.L.C. of Britain.164165 The Defendants were 
                                                          
161 ICI’S Atlas Powder Unit Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, NEW 
YORK TIMES (SAT. LATE ED.) Sec. 1; Page 35; Column 1, (Aug. 
12, 1995.   
 
162 Consolid. Amend. Complaint ¶ 8 (June 14, 1996). Richard 
Forsythe, CEO of Thermex, commented that he’s relieved the 11-
year order was ending and added that the verdict could trigger 
a ripple effect in the construction, mining and the oil and 
gas industries worldwide. “This decision should promote 
competition and hopefully lower prices for the customer.” 
Internet Bankruptcy Library Archives, Dallas, Texas, July 14, 
1995. Available at http://bankrupt.com/TCR_Public/950724.MBX 
 
163 Business Wire (August 24, 1995), ICI Explosives USA Inc. 
Settles Texas Action. Available at html 
 
164 Dyno is Fined $15 Million in Price Fixing, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (THURS. LATE ED.), Section B, Page 5, Column 1 (Sept. 7, 
1995).   
 
165  There is corroboration that the DOJ began its 





charged with conspiring to fix the prices of commercial 
explosives in Kentucky, Illinois and Indiana and to eliminate 
competition in the sale of commercial explosives to three 
limestone quarries in central Texas. Dyno Nobel of Sale Lake 
City, pleaded guilty and agreed to pay a $15 million fine to 
settle antitrust charges. This litigation brought about the 
largest ever fine up until that time for a single defendant in 
a criminal antitrust case. ICI, which was involved in the same 
case agreed to pay a $10 million fine.166 By May 1997, this 
investigation had resulted in 14 guilty pleas by 12 
corporations and two individuals, and the assessment of $37.5 
million in criminal fines.167  
In February, 1996 a class action suit was brought by 
seventy plaintiffs representing a number of companies that 
purchase commercial explosives. In their complaint plaintiffs 
allege that the defendants engaged in an over-arching 
nationwide conspiracy to fix prices of commercial explosives, 
and that they did so by such activity as meeting with 
competitors to discuss and agree on prices, imposing 
fabricated surcharges, and retaliating against Thermex Energy 
                                                          
166 Id.  
 
167 Press Release U.S. Dept. of Justice (May 30, 1997), 
Lacroche Industries Inc. Pleads Guilty to Price Fixing, Pays 




Corporation, another manufacturers of commercial explosives, 
for refusing to cooperate in this conspiracy. The time of the 
conspiracy was approximately 1985 until 1993.  
Another, similar, class action suit was brought in August 
1996 and the two were consolidated.168 The cases then settled 
for approximately $77 million by 1998.169  Attorney’s fees of 
30% were awarded Plaintiffs’ counsel in addition to 









                                                          
168 Defendants E.I. DuPont de Nemours and Company and 
Austin Powder attempted to have plaintiffs’ Consolidated 
Amended Complaint dismissed, but their requests were denied.  
 
169 Out of this settlement, most was paid out by foreign 
defendants. Dyno Nobel Inc. (a unit of a Norwegian company) 
paid 43,750,000. Settle. Agreement of Defendant Dyno Nobel 
Inc. Pg. 3 (Mar. 26, 1998). ICI Explosives USA, Inc. (a unit 
of a British company) paid $18 million. Settle. Agreement of 
Defendant ICI Explosives U.S.A. Inc., Pg. 2 (Sept. 12, 1996). 
DuPont paid $5,750,000. Settle. Agreement of Defendant DuPont, 
Pg. 3 (Oct. 13, 1998). Austin Powder Company paid $10 million. 
Settle. Agreement of Defendant Austin Powder Co., Pg. 3 (Sept. 
23, 1996). Mine Equipment & Mill Supply Co., Inc. paid 
$1,150,000. Settle. Agreement of Mine Equip. & Supplies, Pg. 3 
(Dec. 31, 1997). The money was distributed to the class and in 
2006 the very small amount remaining was subject to a cy pres 
distribution, some of which was allocated to the American 
Antitrust Institute.   
 
170  Order Awarding Fees and Reimburse. Of Expenses for Atty. 
Fees, Doc. 874 (Dec. 30, 1998). 
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Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768 (6th 
Cir. 2002). 
 
This case is noteworthy because: 1) The $1.05 billion 
unanimous jury verdict represents the largest antitrust 
judgment ever affirmed on appeal; 2) Plaintiff’s counsel 
survived motions for summary judgment and for judgment as a 
matter of law, and secured injunctive relief to prevent the 
defendant from further anti-competitive conduct; 3) Plaintiff 
is a competitor; and 4) This case is not a follow-on to any 
government action, rather private counsel alone initiated and 
obtained substantial monetary and injunctive relief. 
 
In 1998 Conwood (“Conwood”) brought an action against 
United States Tobacco Co. (“USTC”), its competitor in the 
moist snuff smokeless tobacco industry, for alleged violations 
of § 2 of the Sherman Act, § 43(a) of the Lanham Act and 
various state law violations. 
The moist snuff smokeless tobacco industry makes more 
than $1 billion in profits each year. USTC controls 75-80% of 
that market with its popular Copenhagen and Skoal brands and 
“has the highest profit margin of any public company in the 
country.”171 Conwood is USTC’s largest competitor with its 
                                                          
171 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 290 F.3d 768, 774 
(6th Cir. 2002). 
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Kodiak brand, holding approximately 13% of the market. Swisher 
International and Swedish Match (“Swedish”) are the only two 
other competitors in the industry with about four percent and 
six percent of the market share, respectively. 
 Conwood alleged that beginning in 1990 USTC sought to 
exclude competition in the market by pursuing anti-competitive 
strategies, issuing from high-level executives, including 
unauthorized removal and destruction of Conwood racks, and 
deceptive practices in category management and discount 
programs. 
Moist snuff products are sold from gravity-fed racks, 
known as “facings,” which dispense cans of the product and 
provide for point of sale advertising (POS). This method of 
advertising is particularly important in the moist snuff 
industry since the government restricts other forms of tobacco 
advertising, and prohibits television and radio advertising 
altogether. The racks are often the sole means by which a 
manufacturer can reach consumers and are therefore provided to 
retail stores by each manufacturer at no cost. 
Conwood proved at trial that USTC sales representatives, 
at the direction of their supervisors, routinely removed 
Conwood and other competitors’ racks, and their accompanying 
POS, without obtaining consent or by misrepresenting facts to 
retailers who were often unaware that there were multiple 
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manufacturers of moist snuff products. Conwood presented 
testimony that USTC sales representatives stated that their 
bonuses were tied to the destruction of competitors’ racks and 
POS. Once competitors’ racks were removed, their products were 
either put in USTC racks or bagged up and left under a 
counter. According to Conwood’s Chairman, after 1990 the 
company “spent $100,000 a month on replacement racks”172 and 
its sales representatives spent approximately 50% of their 
time repairing or replacing damaged racks. 
Conwood asserted that USTC also excluded its competitors 
through abuse of its role as category captain, which involves 
store-by-store management of an entire class of products and 
can control the number of items a store sells. Retailers began 
utilizing category management in the 1990s to determine which 
products were more profitable and should therefore be 
displayed more prominently or given more shelf space. As part 
of the process, retailers sometimes rely on manufacturers for 
information on “which items to sock, consumer information, 
sales, and which stores are stocking what items.”173 In its 
role as category captain, USTC supplied false information to 
retailers including inflated or “skewed” sales data, in order 
to limit the facings and POS of competitors’ products, 
                                                          
172 Id. at 778. 
 
173 Id. at 776. 
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particularly the “price value” brands introduced by Conwood 
and Swedish in the mid-1990s. According to internal USTC 
documents, the company found it “imperative” to continue as 
category captain “to eliminate competitive products,” and to 
“inhibit competitive growth . . . to the best of [their] 
ability.”174 
USTC was also successful in excluding competition through 
its Consumer Alliance Program, which granted a discount to 
retailers who agreed to provide sales data and participate in 
promotion programs, and/or give USTC racks the best or 
exclusive placement. According to Conwood, this program was 
used in an effort to obtain exclusive vending, and according 
to a USTC internal document, “the elimination of competition 
products.”175 USTC was successful in signing 37,000 retailers, 
representing 80% of its entire volume in moist snuff sales, in 
the first few months of the program. 
Through these and other anticompetitive practices USTC 
engaged in a widespread campaign to limit the distribution of 
competing brands at retail outlets. These actions harmed 
consumers by limiting consumer choice and causing higher 
prices. In fact, Conwood’s expert testified that “there was a 
                                                          
 
174 Id. at 777. 
 
175 Id. at 778. 
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direct relationship between the number of facings controlled 
by UST[C] and higher prices for consumers.”176 
Although Conwood’s market share did increase 2.5% between 
1990 and 1998, there was evidence that its share was lower 
than its national average in locations where USTC had rack 
exclusivity and higher for those locations where USTC had not 
obtained such exclusivity, and that its share would have 
increased 6.5 to 8.1 percent177 had USTC not engaged in 
anticompetitive behavior. According to Conwood’s expert this 
disparity was caused by USTC’s exclusionary practices and 
resulted in between $313 million and $488 million in 
damages.178 
USTC did not challenge that it had monopoly power and 
asserted that this power was a result of a superior product, 
rather than an exercise of monopoly power. The company 
defended that Conwood’s evidence of destroyed and discarded 
racks supported isolated sporadic torts rather than antitrust 
                                                          
 
176 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 12797, 12 (W.D. Kent. August 10, 2000). 
 
177 Conwood’s expert testified that where “Conwood had a market 
share in 1990 of 20 percent or more, the market share grew on 
average an addition 8.1 percent . . . [and] where Conwood’s 
market share in 1990 was at least 15 percent, it grew an 
additional 6.5 percent.” Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco 
Co., 290 F.3d at 780. 
 
178 Id. at 780. 
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violations, and that its actions as category captain were 
merely aggressive competition and common practice.179 
Before going to trial plaintiff’s counsel successfully 
defended motions to exclude Conwood’s expert testimony and 
separately, the damages study, and also won on USTC’s motion 
for summary judgment. The case then went to trial in February 
2000 with both parties agreeing to dismiss their respective 
Lanham Act claims and Conwood dismissing its state law claims 
before going to the jury. After just four hours of 
deliberation the jury returned a $350 million verdict for 
Conwood and ruled in favor of Conwood on USTC’s counterclaims 
for conversion and Sherman Act violations. 
Plaintiff’s counsel also prevailed in its subsequent 
motion for injunctive relief to prevent USTC from removing 
competitors’ racks and POS without obtaining the retailer’s 
prior consent and successfully defended USTC’s motion for 
judgment as a matter of law. After trebling, the total amount 
of damages awarded was $1.05 billion, the largest antitrust 
judgment ever affirmed on appeal. In reviewing the judgment, 
district court Judge Thomas B. Russell stated that the award 
was “well within the range that Conwood proved at trial.”180 
 
                                                          
179 See Final Brief for Appellants at page 5. 
180 Conwood Co. v. United States Tobacco Co., 2000 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS at 16. 
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In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust 
Litigation, Master File No. M-02-1486PJH, MDL No. 1486. 
 
 
This case is noteworthy because: 1) The $325,997,000 
settlement represents more than 85% of the alleged pre-trebled 
damages;181 2) Of this total, $310,997,000 was recovered from 
foreign cartelists; 3) The direct purchaser action182 was filed 
shortly after a federal grand jury issued subpoenas to various 
DRAM manufacturers;183 4)  Class Counsel cooperated with the 
Department of Justice to obtain documents already produced in 
the grand jury investigation; and 5) Class Counsel negotiated 
a successful settlement despite many of defendants’ key 
employees invoking their Fifth Amendment privilege against 
self-incrimination as a result of the Department of Justice 
investigation, and were awarded a 25% attorneys fee. 
  
                                                          
181 This percentage, 85% of the pre-trebled damages, is based 
on damages as alleged by Plaintiffs.  Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in Support of Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses & 
Incentive Awards, FN 5, In re Dynamic Random Access Memory 
(DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. M-02-1486PJH, MDL 
No. 1486.  
 
182 An indirect purchaser action is still pending.  See In re 
Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, 2007 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 44254. 
 
183 “The three largest chip makers said that they had been 
subpoenaed or informally contacted in recent days by the 
Justice Department” as part of an industry-wide antitrust 
investigation.  Barnaby J. Feder, Chip Makers Report Inquiry 
on Industry, The New York Times C1 (June 20, 2002). 
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Dynamic random access memory (“DRAM”) is an electronic 
microchip used in everyday electronics, including personal 
computers, printers, digital cameras and cell phones, and is 
sold in two forms and a variety of densities, speeds, and 
frequencies.184  DRAM manufacturers sell to both large and 
small-scale customers185 through a variety of channels and 
using at least two pricing methods.186  In the year leading up 
to the alleged anticompetitive conduct, the $11.2 billion 
industry sustained significant losses due to waning sales in 
the personal computer market, causing manufacturers to lose 
money on “every DRAM they made.”187  However, prices for DRAM 
components and modules rose from approximately $1 per in 
December 2001 to between $4 and $5 per by the end of May 
2002.188 
                                                          
184 In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 at 21. 
 
185 Purchasers include equipment manufacturer customers, 
franchise distributors, smaller-volume customers, and those 
who purchased through defendant Micron’s online DRAM sales.  
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litigation, 2006 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841 at 22-23. 
 
186 All defendants use contract and spot pricing, “while 
defendant Micron additionally engages in direct sales to 
customers through its [online] division.”  Id. at 23. 
 
187 Barnaby J. Feder, Chip Makers Report Inquiry on Industry, 




A federal grand jury sitting in the Northern District of 
California began investigating several DRAM manufacturers in 
June 2002 for antitrust violations.189  Shortly thereafter, on 
June 21, 2002, direct purchasers filed suit against the 
leading manufacturers190 for violations of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act.  Specifically, the complaint alleged that during 
the period April 1, 1999 through June 30, 2002, defendants 
engaged in an international conspiracy to fix, raise and 
maintain prices for DRAM, causing purchasers to pay 
artificially inflated prices.191 
The direct purchaser class faced significant hurdles 
throughout the course of the litigation.  First, on October 
16, 2002, the Department of Justice (DOJ) moved to stay all 
discovery pending its grand jury investigation.  While 
                                                          
 
189 See U.S. v. Censullo, No. CR 03 0368 PJH, paragraph 3 (N.D. 
Cal. Dec. 17, 2003). 
 
190 Defendants’ market share was more than 70% during the class 
period.  In re Dynamic Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841, 21 (N.D. Cal. June 5, 2006).  
Defendants include Elpida Memory, Inc., Hynix Semiconductor, 
Inc., Infineon Technologies AG, Micron Technology Inc., Mosel 
Vitelic Corporation, Nanya Technology Corporation, NEC 
Electronics America, Inc., Samsung Semiconductor, Inc., 
Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd., Winbond Electronics 
Corporation, and their U.S. subsidiaries.  See Third 
Consolidated Amended Complaint, In re Dynamic Random Access 
Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. M-02-
1486PJH, MDL No. 1486. 
 
191 Third Consolidated Amended Complaint. 
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numerous agreements resulted in production of documents by 
defendants on a rolling basis, merits discovery did not begin 
until July 14, 2005.192   During the course of the litigation 
Class Counsel ultimately reviewed and analyzed more than 4.5 
million pages of documents, participated in 129 depositions 
around the world, and defended against repeated motions to 
compel and five separate motions for summary judgment.193  
Perhaps Class Counsel’s greatest success was certifying the 
class on June 5, 2006, despite defendants’ vigorous argument 
that typicality could not be met given the different types of 
DRAM, different categories of customers, and different 
channels though which plaintiffs purchased DRAM.194  Class 
Counsel also had to contend with the ramifications of 16 of 
defendants’ key employees invoking their Fifth Amendment 
                                                          
192 See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses & Incentive Awards.  The parties 
stipulated to production by Defendants, on a rolling basis, of 
all documents produced to the grand jury, and Plaintiffs 
agreed to wait to take depositions and make interrogatory 
requests.  The DOJ renewed its request for a stay of 
deposition and interrogatory discovery in July 2004 and again 
on January 20, 2005.  “On July 14, 2005, Class Counsel worked 
with Defendants and the DOJ to come up with an agreement 
whereby merits discovery could finally begin.” Id. 
 
193 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses & Incentive Awards, page 11-12. 
 
194 Order Granting Motion for Class Certification, pages 31-32, 
In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust 
Litigation, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39841. 
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privilege against self-incrimination due to the continuing DOJ 
investigation.195 
The parties began settlement discussions in 2004, with 
several partial settlements occurring between 2004 and 2007.  
Seven of the nine defendants settled prior to February 20, 
2007, when the Court ruled on four of defendants’ summary 
judgment motions.196  The remaining two defendants settled only 
after mediation, and just one month before the case was set to 
go to trial in April 2007.197 
On August 15, 2007, Judge Phyllis Hamilton granted Class 
Counsel’s request for attorneys fees in the amount of 25% of 
the settlement, plus expenses and incentive awards for the ten 
                                                          
195 As of March 7, 2007 the DOJ investigation has resulted in 
more the $732 million in fines, and criminal charges against 
four companies and 18 individuals.  See Statement of Thomas O. 
Barnett Assistant Attorney General Antitrust Division: Before 
the Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer 
Rights Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate, March 
7, 2007, available at: 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/221777.htm. 
 
196 Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Attorneys’ Fees, Expenses & Incentive Awards, page 11-12.  The 
Court ruled on four of defendants’ motions for summary 
judgment, denying all but one, resulting in the dismissal of 
defendant Nanya’s foreign parent corporation and Taiwan 
subsidiary, but keeping in Nanya’s American subsidiary. 
 
197 The defendants settled with plaintiffs as follows: Infineon 
$20,750,000; Samsung $67,000,000; Hynix $73,000,000; Elpida 
$14,750,000; NEC $35,960,000; Micron $90,537,000; Winbond 
$2,000,000; Mosel $15,000,000; and Nanya $7,000,000.  See 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Attorneys’ 
Fees, Expenses & Incentive Awards, page 16. 
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Class Representatives in the amount of $10,000 each.198  In 
granting the $81 million award, Judge Hamilton praised Class 
Counsel for “an exceptional job” coordinating and litigating 
the case, and stated, “I have cases a fraction the size of 
this one that take up more of my time, just because counsel 














                                                          
198 Matthew Hirsch, DRAM Case Yields $81 Million Fee Award, The 
Recorder (August 16, 2007) available at: 
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1187168529608.  Judge 
Hamilton did take $20,000 off of the $4.2 million in requested 






Natural Gas Antitrust Cases I, II, III & IV.  Sweetie’s, v. El 
Paso Corporation, No. 319840 (S.F. Super. Ct.); Continental 
Forge Company v. Southern California Gas Co., No. BC237336 
(L.A. Super. Ct.); Berg v. Southern California Gas Co., No. 
BC241951 (L.A. Super. Ct.); City of Long Beach v. Southern 
California Gas Co., No. BC247114 (L.A. Super. Ct.); City of 
L.A. v. Southern California Gas Col, No. BC265905 (L.A. Super. 
Ct.); Phillip v. El Paso Merchant Energy LP, No. GIC 759425 
(San Diego Super. Ct.); and Phillip v. El Paso Merchant Energy 
LP, No. GIC 759426 (San Diego Super. Ct.). (El Paso) 
 
This settlement positively exemplifies private class 
action enforcement of antitrust violations because: (1) 
Approximately thirteen million California consumers and three 
thousand businesses200 benefited from the settlement;201 (2) The 
settlement consideration consisted of more than $1.552 
billion,202 including $551 million in upfront cash and stock 
valued at market rates, $876 million in semi-annual cash 
payments, and $125 million in rate reductions on 
electricity,203 a total settlement consideration which at the 
                                                          
200 Ruling Following Oral Argument, 1, (Dec. 5, 2003). 
  
201 The class consisted almost entirely of indirect purchasers. 
202 After disbursement to city and states and compensation for 
attorney’s fees, the class will receive more than $1.4 
billion.  Ruling, 2.   
 
203 The upfront payment included cash totaling over $323.8 
million and stock worth over $227.5 million at market rates at 
the time of the settlement, for a combined value of slightly 
over $551 million.  The semi-annual payments are to be paid 
out over 15 or 20 years, depending on El Paso’s credit rating.  
In regard to the $125 million reduction of the price paid for 
electricity, El Paso lowered its prices to the California 
Department of Water Resources and class members received the 
benefit in the form of reduced natural gas bills.  Ruling, 2.   
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time resulted in the “largest antitrust class action 
settlement in California history;”204 (3) The recovery was 
significantly larger than the profit earned by the illegal 
overcharge and a substantial proportion of the damages 
allegedly caused by the conduct at issue;205 (4) Attorneys’ 
fees composed only 6% of the settlement-date206 total 
recovery;207 (5) Because of private counsel’s efforts, the 
California Attorney General’s office chose not to pursue the 
defendants independently;208 and (6) The defendants’ conduct 
increased prices significantly for more than six years.209  
 Private plaintiffs first filed natural gas antitrust 
actions in California Superior Court in September 2000, the 
same year that California Attorney General Bill Lockyer began 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
204 Ruling, 1. 
 
205 “The [$1.5 billion] settlement is also extraordinary in 
relationship to the $184 million in profits reportedly earned 
by [defendant] El Paso Merchant Energy on the pipeline 
capacity it purchased.”  Ruling, 4. 
 
206 The Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting 
Final Approval to the Class Action Settlement, 6 (Dec. 10, 
2003), estimated the present value at approximately $1 
billion. 
 
207 $60 million.  
 
208  “Except as a vehicle to implement the structural relief 
terms of this settlement.”  MPA ISO Motion for an Award of 
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Costs, 11 (Nov. 6, 2003). 
  
209 09/01/1996 – 03/20/2003. 
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investigations under his Energy Task Force.210  Defendants, 
including El Paso and its subsidiaries (“El Paso”)211 and 
Sempra, removed to federal court, though the federal court 
later remanded to state court.  The California Judicial 
Council next coordinated the cases in the San Diego Superior 
Court under Coordination Trial Judge Richard Haden.  In May 
2002, Judge Haden ordered that the cases be divided into 
Northern and Southern California tracks.   
Plaintiffs in Northern and Southern California then filed 
two separate complaints against the defendants.  The Northern 
California Plaintiffs alleged that El Paso and its 
subsidiaries entered into self-dealing in, or manipulation of, 
the price of natural gas in California.212  Northern California 
                                                          
210 Brooks, Nancy Rivera, “Lockyer's Goal Is to Make Them Pay;  
While U.S. seeks convictions, California has settled with 
energy suppliers, winning nearly $450 million,” Los Angeles 
Times, Business, Part 3, 6, Home Ed. (Dec. 2, 2002).  
 
211  El Paso consists of El Paso Pipeline and El Paso Merchant.  
Both have several subsidiaries.  MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, 5 (May 8, 
2003). 
 
212 El Paso Natural Gas (“Natural Gas”) acquired additional 
pipeline capacity—enough to meet one-sixth the daily 
requirement for natural gas in California—for gas traveling to 
California.  The El Paso companies decided to engage in a sham 
open bidding process in February 2000, and Natural Gas 
announced it would only accept bids over $37.5 million for the 
entire capacity.  Another El Paso subsidiary, El Paso Merchant 
(“Merchant”), was the only bidder for the entire capacity, 
offering $38.5 million.  Unknown to other bidders, Mojave 
Pipeline, another El Paso subsidiary, had agreed to give 
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Plaintiffs, overcoming challenges to their actions, ultimately 
proceeded on an intra-corporate conspiracy claim.213  The 
Southern California Plaintiffs alleged that El Paso and Sempra 
“participated in a conspiracy to eliminate competition, 
preserve and maintain their market power, artificially 
constrain supplies of natural gas, and exploit the 
deregulation of the electricity industry for their illicit 
gain.”214  Plaintiffs proceeded with their actions after the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Natural Gas a secret discounted rate for its downstream 
transportation costs.  Thus, the discounted transportation 
rate allowed Natural Gas to bid high for the capacity.  Once 
Natural Gas won the capacity, El Paso had firm-wide capacity 
rights to transport “an enormous amount of the total 
capacity,” allowing El Paso to “manipulate the market and 
raise prices to class members.”  MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, 7.  
Merchant overbooked delivery of natural gas into California on 
the pipeline and allowed its gas to flow, while denying long-
term customers delivery.  Merchant forced those shorted 
customers, still needing to supply their customers, to buy gas 
in the spot markets.  During this time, El Paso sold in the 
spot market at inflated prices, “unlawfully [tying] the 
purchase of gas transportation services to the purchase of the 
natural gas.”  Id. at 8.  
  
213  Declaration of Bill Lockyer, 3 (November 5, 2003).  
“Defendants unlawfully tied the purchase of gas transportation 
services to the purchase of natural gas.” MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ 
Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement, 5, 
citing Nor. Cal. Compl. ¶¶195-202. 
 
214  MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ Motion for Final Approval of Class 
Action Settlement, 5.  In the early 1990s, changes in the law 
allowed pipelines outside California to deliver gas to 
California, eliminating the monopolies of Southern California 
Gas Company (“SoCal Gas”) and San Diego Gas & Electric 
(“SDG&E”).  In 1992, Tenneco finished a pipeline that 
partially bypassed SoCal Gas and SDG&E and began planning new 
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Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) finding that El 
Paso had “violated FERC’s affiliate rules, substantially 
injuring California consumers”215 when it falsely reported its 
natural gas sales to the trade press to influence published 
natural gas prices.216  The claims included allegations of 
conduct that would ordinarily be subject to the per se rule 
under the Cartwright Act, the California antitrust statute.217  
The settlement resolved the claims against El Paso. 
 After three years of substantial investigation, 
discovery218 and litigation, the Court approved the parties’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
pipelines that would entirely bypass the SoCal Gas and SDG&E.  
In 1996, El Paso acquired Tenneco.  The plaintiffs alleged 
that in September 1996, El Paso, SoCal Gas and SDG&E secretly 
met and agreed not to compete with each other in California 
and to increase their stranglehold on the Southern California 
market.  El Paso agreed to abandon Tenneco’s projects intended 
to circumvent SoCal Gas and SDG&E.  In exchange, SoCal Gas and 
SDG&E agreed to stop competing with El Paso on pipeline 
project in Mexico.  The agreement left SoCal Gas and SDG&E 
without competition. 
 
215 Declaration of Bill Lockyer, 2.  
 
216  FERC confirmed this conduct.  See Final Report on Price 
Manipulation in Western Markets, Fact-Finding Investigation of 
Potential Manipulation of Electric and Natural Gas Prices, at 
III-12-15 (March 2003), quoted in MPA ISO Plaintiffs’ Motion 
for Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlement, 11. 
217 The court did not rule on whether the conduct at issue was 
per se illegal, subject to the rule of reason, or some 
combination of the two.  
 
218  Plaintiffs’ discovery included reviewing over 1,650,000 
pages of documents and 30,000 electronic files.  Ruling, 6. 
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settlement in December 2003.219  The settlement class220 (the 
“Class”) consisted of California purchasers of natural gas for 
consumption, but not for resale or generation of electricity 
for resale, between September 1, 1996 and March 20, 2003.221  
Three subclasses existed within the Class: (1) Core Natural 
Gas Subclass; (2) Non-Core Natural Gas Subclass; and (3) 
Electricity Subclass.  The Core Natural Gas Subclass consisted 
of core subscribers of at least one California natural gas 
utility.  The Non-Core Natural Gas Subclass was non-core 
subscribers of at least one California natural gas utility.  
The Electricity Subclass included purchasers of electricity 
from any California public utility.  Government entities, 
including federal and state agencies, cities, counties and 
other municipalities, were excluded from the class.222 
                                                          
219 Id. Ruling Following Oral Argument, entered Dec. 5, 2003. 
Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting Final 
Approval to the Class Action Settlement, entered Dec. 10, 
2003. 
  
220  See Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting 
Final Approval to the Class Action Settlement, 5 (Dec. 10, 
2003) (certifying the class and subclasses for the 
settlement). 
 
221 Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting Final 
Approval to the Class Action Settlement, 2-3.  The class 
consisted almost entirely of indirect purchasers. 
 
222 Id. at 3. 
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The total recovery of $1.55 billion was significantly 
larger than the profit earned by El Paso’s illegal overcharge 
and a substantial proportion of the alleged damages caused by 
the defendants’ conduct.223  After deducting attorneys’ fees, 
litigation expenses, and payments to various state and city 
governments, the settlement provided a net of $1.4 billion224 
to the Class including $481 million in upfront cash and cash 
equivalent,225 $799 million in semiannual payments226 and a $125 
                                                          
223 “The [total] settlement is also extraordinary in 
relationship to the $184 million in profits reportedly earned 
by El Paso Merchant Energy on the pipeline capacity it 
purchased.”  Ruling, 4.  The exact correlation between the 
settlement and El Paso’s profit is unclear, as $184 million is 
only the profit El Paso Merchant made by purchasing pipeline 
capacity and does not include other potential sources of 
profit, e.g., how much El Paso might have gained by 
eliminating competing pipeline projects into Southern 
California.  The alleged damages were significantly larger, as 
the conduct at issue allegedly cause a general increase of 
prices for gas and electricity in California. 
 
224 Amounts received by non-Class plaintiffs, attorneys’ fees 
and litigation expenses of the utilities and California 
governmental parties account for the deductions from the full 
amount.  Ruling, 2.  The payments to non-Class plaintiffs 
provided compensation to the states of Nevada, Oregon, and 
Washington, and to the cities of Los Angeles and Long Beach.   
  
225  The upfront cash equivalent consisted of the proceeds of 
the sale of El Paso common stock.  Id.  Again, the $481 
million is the net amount paid to the class, after deducting 
payments for non-Class plaintiffs, attorneys’ fees and the 
litigation expenses of the utilities and California 
governmental parties.  The $481 million is based on the value 
of the stock at the time of the settlement, which was slightly 
over $227 million.     
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million reduction of the price paid for electricity.227  
Regarding the price reductions, to avoid performing “‘any sort 
of ’true-up’ of the allocation in place at the time’” of the 
overcharge, the California Public Utilities Commission 
(“CPUC”) found that the only efficient manner to distribute 
the settlement funds was to adjust current gas rates upon 
receipt of the funds.228  Class member payout by check was 
unsatisfactory because of the substantial administrative cost 
to maintain mailing addresses and print checks.229 
Counsel received the full fee award they requested—which 
amounted to 6% of the settlement-date value of the total 
settlement.230  The Court approved a 3.32 multiplier of 
Southern California counsel’s $16 million in costs and fees,231 
granting $50 million. “Such a fee request,” the Court noted, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
226 The $799 million is the amount the class will receive over 
a 15 or 20 year period, after deducting amounts paid to non-
class members, including to Nevada, Oregon, Washington, Los 
Angeles and Long Beach.   
227 Id.  
 
228 Id. at 9.  
 
229 Id.   
 
230 The Amended Judgment, Final Order, and Decree Granting 
Final Approval to the Class Action Settlement estimated the 
present value at approximately $1 billion. Id. at 6.  This 
evaluation was based on the value of the stock at the time of 
the settlement, which was slightly over $227 million.   
 
231 Costs of $1,380,752.14 and fees of $15,072,831.  Id.  
 
 85
“would be one of the lowest fees requested and granted in a 
common fund settlement of this magnitude,”232 especially given 
that the “risks faced by plaintiffs’ attorneys were 
enormous.”233  Northern California counsel requested a 4.58 
multiplier for $2 million in costs and fees234 and received $10 
million.  In addition, the Court lauded counsel because 
“[h]ere an exceptional benefit was achieved, even though 
plaintiffs’ counsel had significant contingent risk.”235  
The settlement provided consumers with certain and long-
term monetary benefits.  For instance, “[the settlement] 
contains significant structural benefits that will assure more 
plentiful and affordable gas to Californians for decades.” 236 
California Public Utilities Commission “not only approved [the 
settlement] but. . . guaranteed ratepayers will receive 100 
percent of the benefit of the [$125 million electricity] rate 
                                                          
232 Id. at 11.  The Court reiterated that Southern California 
counsel’s “requested five (5) percent fee is low when 
contrasted with customary contingent agreements in class 
action cases.” Id. at 12. 
 
233 Id. at 11.  
 




236 Id. at 1. 
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reductions over 15 to 20 years.”237  The reach of the 
settlement is also impressive, given that “[e]very California 
consumer and business that purchases natural gas and/or 
electricity will benefit from this settlement in the form of 
rate relief.”238 
Consumers also benefited by the settlement’s deterrent 
effect.  The settlement imposed a “significant deterrent 
benefit and require[d] El Paso to implement an antitrust 
compliance program.”239  More broadly, “the settlement amount 
serves as a strong deterrent to industries who believe they 
can engage in antitrust activities with impunity.”240  “In 
sum,” the Court concluded, “the settlement confers a 
substantial benefit on the class as a whole [and] is an 
outstanding result in a case that may be challenging to prove 
at trial...  .”241 
These important benefits resulted directly from private 
enforcement of El Paso’s alleged antitrust violations.  Though 
                                                          
237 Id. at 2.  These rate reductions provide compensation in 
addition to the upfront cash and stock proceeds and the semi-
annual cash payments. 
 
238 Id. at 4. 
 
239 Id. at 1. 
 
240 Id. at 12. 
 
241 Id. at 4. 
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the “California Attorney General’s office investigated El Paso 
for over two years, they never filed a case...  .”242  
California Attorney General Bill Lockyer noted that while FERC 
in 2002 found that El Paso had violated FERC’s rules, FERC’s 
outcome “did not provide the same opportunities for relief” as 
the private actions filed.243  “Class counsel,”244 Lockyer 
stated, “were crucial to bringing [the settlement] to 
















                                                          
242 MPA ISO Motion for an Award of Attorney’s Fees and 
Reimbursement of Costs, 11 (Nov. 6, 2003).  The California 
Attorney General’s office became aware of the El Paso 
situation during an on-going investigation into higher gas 
costs commenced in the summer of 2000.  Declaration of Bill 
Lockyer, 1. 
 
243 Declaration of Bill Lockyer, 2.  
 
244  Lockyer also noted that “[c]ounsel for both the Southern 
California Plaintiffs and the Northern California Plaintiffs 
were well-financed and expert litigators, bringing particular 
credibility to the [settlement] negotiations.”  Id. at 4. 
 
245 Id. at 4.  
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In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, MDL 1200, Master Docket 
Misc. 97-0550 (W.D. Pa.) 
 
In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation is significant for a 
number of reasons: (1) the Federal Government had initiated an 
investigation into price-fixing in the flat glass industry, 
but no indictments were ever issued nor any government civil 
proceedings commenced against any company or individual; 
(2) one of the defendants had applied for leniency under the 
DOJ’s Corporate Leniency Program, but its application was 
rejected; (3) plaintiffs successfully appealed to the Third 
Circuit from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the sole remaining defendant246; (4) settlements in 
the litigation, to direct purchasers, ultimately totaled 
$121.7 million, $37.7 million of which came from foreign 
corporations or wholly-owned US subsidiaries of foreign 
corporations247; (5) plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees averaged 32% 
(33 1/3% from settlements with some defendants and 30% from 
the settlement with another)". 
 Beginning in July 1997, numerous lawsuits were filed in 
various district courts against six manufacturers of glass 
                                                          
246  See 385 F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 
247  $17.9 million came from Libbey-Owens-Ford Co, Inc. and 
Pilkington, and $19.8 million came from AFG Industries Inc. a 




products sold in the United States: Libbey-Owens-Ford Co, Inc. 
(“LOF”) (now know as Pilkington North America); its parent, 
Pilkington plc, (“Pilkington”) a United Kingdom corporation; 
AFG Industries, Inc. (“AFG”), a wholly-owned subsidiary of 
Asahi Glass Co, a Japanese corporation ; Guardian Industries 
Corp. (“Guardian”); Ford Motor Company (“Ford”); and PPG 
Industries, Inc. (“PPG”). All of the lawsuits were 
subsequently consolidated by the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania before then Chief 
Judge Donald E. Ziegler.  The cases were filed after two 
former senior executives of LOF made disclosures in an 
unrelated criminal case against them, that there had been a 
marketwide price-fixing conspiracy in the flat glass industry.  
It was later revealed that LOF had applied for leniency under 
the DOJ’s Corporate Leniency Program, but was turned down.  It 
was also later revealed that the DOJ had initiated two grand 
jury investigations into anticompetitive conduct in the flat 
glass industry, but no person or entity was ever indicted or 
charged. 
 On February 27, 1998, plaintiffs filed an Amended 
Complaint alleging that defendants had engaged in a classic, 
per se, horizontal conspiracy to fix, raise and maintain the 
price of flat glass products and automobile replacement glass 
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(“ARG”) sold in the United States from August 1991 through 
December 1995.  It was also alleged that, as a result of the 
defendants’ conspiracy, members of the Class paid higher 
prices than they would have paid absent the conspiracy. 
By Orders dated November 5, 1999 and February 16, 2000, and in 
a  decision reported at In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litigation, 
191 F.R.D. 472 (W.D. Pa. 1999), the Court certified the Class.  
Following arm’s length settlement negotiations, plaintiffs 
reached settlement agreements on behalf of the Class with five 
of the six defendants: LOF/Pilkington ($17.9 million), AFG 
($19.8 million), Guardian ($16.9 million), and Ford ($8 
million), for a total of $61.7 million. Following Court 
approval of the settlements, plaintiffs filed an application 
for fees and reimbursement of expenses and the court awarded 
attorneys’ fees of 33 1/3%. 
 After the conclusion of merits discovery, PPG, the sole 
non-settling defendant, moved for summary judgment. In May 
2003, in an unreported decision the District Court granted 
summary judgment to PPG248   The Court held that the record, 
considered as a whole, “though it undoubtedly evidences that 
several of the settling defendants conspired to fix prices [of 
flat glass products], does not tend to exclude the possibility 
                                                          
248 . In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., Misc. No. 97-550, 
Opinion (W.D. Pa. May 29, 2003). 
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that PPG acted independently and therefore does not support a 
reasonable inference that PPG was involved in a price fixing 
conspiracy.”249   
 Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s summary judgment 
ruling and on September 29, 2004, the Third Circuit issued its 
opinion, In re Flat Glass Antitrust Litig., 385 F.3d 350 (3d 
Cir. 2004). The Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s 
grant of summary judgment as to the conspiracy to fix prices 
of flat glass products.250  Among other things, the Third 
Circuit rejected PPG’s contention that the Court should look 
at each piece of evidence separately to see if it was as 
consistent with the absence of a price fixing conspiracy, and 
found that, considered as a whole, there was sufficient 
evidence that PPG conspired with the settling defendants to 
fix the prices of flat glass products to create a question of 
fact for the jury, and remanded the case for further 
proceedings.251  Thereafter, a trial date was set and the 
                                                          
249  Id. at 40. 
 
250  The Third Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment 
as to the ARG conspiracy. Id. at 369-70. 
 
251 Id. At 368-69.  After the Third Circuit’s decision, PPG 
filed petitions for rehearing, for a stay of the mandate, and 
for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. These 
petitions were denied.  See In re Flat Glass Antitrust 
Litigation, 115 Fed. Appx. 570 (3d Cir. 2004); PPG Industries 
Inc. v. Nelson, 125 S. Ct. 1699 (2005). 
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parties prepared the case for trial. The parties exchanged 
lists of proposed trial exhibits and deposition designations, 
proposed jury instructions and voir dire questions, and filed 
15 in limine motions.  During this period of intense trial 
preparation, settlement negotiations between the parties were 
undertaken and in October 2005, virtually on the eve of trial, 
a settlement agreement was reached with PPG for $60 million, 
an amount nearly equal to the total of the settlements with 
all of the other defendants combined. After notice and a 
hearing, the district court approved this settlement, and 
granted plaintiffs’ application for attorneys fees of 30% of 
this settlement fund.   
 Both Chief Judge Ziegler and Chief Judge Ambrose (to whom 
the case was reassigned after Judge Ziegler's retirement) made 
statements about the quality of plaintiffs’ counsels’ legal 
representation at the time of the award of attorneys' fees and 
expenses. At a hearing on May 28, 2003 Judge Ziegler, in 
awarding fees of 1/3 of the $61.7 million settlements with all 
defendants except PPG said: "Next, we have carefully reviewed 
the counsel fee request of class counsel and find that the 
requested contingent of 33 1/3 percent and the sums to be 
distributed to class counsel, including for expenses, are not 
only fair, reasonable, and appropriate, but the fees are 
modest when the Court considers the stature of class counsel 
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and the relief obtained for the class in this case and under 
the circumstances."252  Similarly, Chief Judge Ambrose, in 
approving the requested fee of 30% of the $60 million 
settlement with PPG stated: "Well, I find that the request 
from plaintiffs for an award of attorneys' fees and 
reimbursement of expenses is reasonable, considering the skill 
and efficiency of counsel in obtaining this result, the 
complexity and duration of the litigation, the risks 
undertaken by plaintiffs' counsel and the time and effort 
devoted by them."253   
 Thus, in this case, where there were (a) no governmental 
criminal or civil proceedings, (b) a grant of summary judgment 
against plaintiffs and reversal on appeal, and (c) nearly 
completed trial preparations, total attorneys fees amounted to 
slightly less than one-third of the settlements combined.  
Moreover, purchasers of flat glass received distributions from 
the settlement funds equal to approximately 2.1% of their 
total purchases of flat glass during the relevant period, 





                                                          
252 Transcript of May 28, 2004 at 9. 
 
253 Transcript of Feb. 3, 2006 at10. 
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In Re: Fructose Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. File 1087, Master 
File # 94-1577 (Michael Mihm) (C.D.Ill. 1995) 
  
  
 The Fructose Antitrust Litigation is an important example 
of private antitrust litigation because:  (1) while the 
government convened a grand jury to investigate price fixing 
among the major manufacturers of fructose, no indictments were 
brought, even though indictments were brought against the 
major manufacturers of two related products, lysine and citric 
acid;  (2) notwithstanding the absence of an indictment, after 
10 years of litigation, including three appeals to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals and two petitions to the Supreme 
Court for writs of certiorari, the case settled for $531 
million, one of the largest antitrust class action settlements 
ever achieved;  (3) Of this amount, $100 million came from a 
foreign corporation, A.E. Staley Manufacturing; (4)  due to 
the relatively small number of fructose purchasers, the 
payments to individual absent class members were very large - 
in excess of $10 million per class member in some instances; 
(5) each of the three appeals to the Seventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals254 resulted in a significant ruling relating 
to antitrust law in particular, and civil conspiracy in 
                                                          
254 216 F. 3d 621 (7th Cir. 2000); 295 F. 3d 651 (7th Cir. 
2002); 361 F. 3d 459 (7th Cir. 2004). 
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general; and (6) the presiding judge repeatedly praised the 
skills and conduct of the class counsel. 
  
 In 1995, following a well-publicized FBI raid at the 
Decatur, Illinois headquarters of Archer Daniels Midland 
Company, a number of antitrust class action suits were filed 
against manufacturers of 3 products: fructose, lysine, and 
citric acid.  The cases were all sent to the Judicial Panel on 
Multi-District Litigation, which in turn separated the cases 
by product, transferring them to different judicial districts 
for consolidated and coordinated pretrial discovery.  The 
Fructose cases were transferred to the United States District 
Court for the Central District of Illinois.255 
   Although grand jury investigations were conducted with 
respect to the manufacture and sale of fructose, citric acid, 
and lysine, indictments were issued only with respect to 
citric acid and lysine.  Guilty pleas were entered 
by manufacturers and their agents relating to citric acid and 
                                                          
255 The Citric Acid cases were transferred to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of California, and 
the Lysine cases were transferred to the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. In Re 




lysine.256 Given the fact that a final judgment in a criminal 
proceeding to the effect that a defendant has violated the 
antitrust laws, is prima facie evidence of violation of the 
antitrust laws in a related civil case,257 as could have 
been expected, class action settlements were entered into, in 
relatively short order, in both the Citric Acid Antitrust 
Litigation258 and the Lysine Antitrust Litigation.259   
   In contrast, no guilty pleas were entered into by any 
manufacturer of fructose.260  Indeed, Archer Daniels 
Midland Company, while entering a guilty plea with respect to 
citric acid and lysine, and agreeing to pay a then-record $100 
million fine, did not enter a plea with respect to fructose.  
                                                          
256 In addition, after trial, convictions were obtained against 
certain officers of Archer Daniels Midland Company relating to 
lysine and citric acid.  
 
257 15 U.S.C. §16 
 
258 1997 WL 446241 (N.D. Cal. 1997); 1997 WL 446240 (N.D. Cal. 
1997); 1997 WL 446242 (N.D. Cal. 1997); and 1997 WL 446239 
(N.D. Cal. 1997) 
 
259 1996 WL 197671 (N.D. Ill. 1996) and 1996 400017 (N.D. Ill. 
1996) In addition, there were numerous purchasers of citric 
acid and lysine in each case which elected to be excluded from 
the class and commence their own non-class action cases.  
These opt-out cases settled as well. 
 
260 The fructose defendants were Error! Main Document 
Only.Archer Daniels Midland Company  (ADM), A.E. Staley 
Manufacturing Company, Cargill, Inc., and American Maize-
Products Company. 
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As a result, the Fructose case became a heavily litigated case 
which lasted almost 10 years from inception to conclusion. 
  During the course of the Fructose Antitrust Litigation, 
there were three separate significant appeals to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals: 
   1.  In 216 F. 3d 621 (7th Cir. 2000), the Court of 
Appeals was asked to rule on whether plaintiffs could enforce 
a subpoena to obtain copies of both audio and video recordings 
which were made by a Vice-President of Archer Daniels Midland 
during the course of the criminal price fixing investigation.  
These recordings had not been used in the criminal proceedings 
but were filed with the Department of Justice.  The district 
court held that recordings of face-to-face-conversations 
should be produced but that audio recordings did not have to 
be produced.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal required 
production of all the recordings filed with the Department of 
Justice.  
  2.  In 295 F. 3d 651 (7th Cir. 2002), plaintiffs 
appealed the grant of a summary judgment by the district court 
against plaintiffs and in favor of all non-settling 
defendants.  At the time this ruling was entered, there was 
only a single $7 million settlement, so plaintiffs counsel 
were at risk for virtually all of their time and expense in 
the matter.  On appeal, the Seventh Circuit reversed.  After 
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analyzing the record evidence, the court held that fact 
questions precluded the entry of summary judgment in favor of 
the defendants.  In a subsidiary ruling, the court held that 
an adverse inference could be drawn against Archer Daniels 
Midland, but no other defendant, as a result of the refusal 
of two ADM officers to answer deposition questions on the 
grounds that their answers might tend to incriminate them.  In 
rendering its' ruling, the Court of Appeals made two 
significant rulings relating to antitrust enforcement - - it 
declined to accept defendants' extreme interpretation of the 
application of the Matsushita case to the case on appeal and 
rejected defendants argument that if no single item of 
evidence presented by the plaintiff points unequivocally to 
conspiracy, the evidence as a whole cannot defeat summary 
judgment. 
 3.  In 361 F. 3d 439 (7th cir. 2004), the Seventh Circuit 
was presented with the novel question of whether the trial 
court had the authority to effect severance of two defendants 
for trial by impaneling two separate juries to sit 
simultaneously in one trial.   The trial court had ruled that 
it had such authority and that, therefore, severance into two 
separate trials was not necessary.  On appeal, the Seventh 
Circuit affirmed this ruling. 
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  As a result of their determined efforts, class plaintiffs 
and their counsel overcame the absence of a government 
indictment, ten years of litigation, and the entry of summary 
judgment for the defendants, and achieved a settlement of $531 
million, which resulted in payments of more than $10 million 
to some absent class members.  Without this private class 
action litigation, the purchasers of fructose during the class 
period would have received nothing, since there was not a 
single fructose purchaser which elected to be excluded from 
the class in order to pursue it's own case. 
 The judge who oversaw the case, the Honorable Michael M 
Mihm, repeatedly praised the effort and conduct of class 
counsel. “I’ve said many times during this litigation that you 
and the attorneys who represented the defendants here are as 
good as it gets.  Very professional...You’ve always been 
cutting to the chase and not wasting my time or each others’ 
time or adding to the cost of the litigation.  And this was 
very difficult litigation... Skill and efficiency of the 
attorneys. As good as it gets. Complexity and duration of the 
litigation. It was very complex.  We made some new law on more 
than one occasion....261 He accordingly awarded class counsel 
costs plus 25% of the settlement fund.  
 
                                                          





In Re: Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, 2003 WL 
22358491 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
 
 This settlement in the last of three related cases is 
noteworthy because (1) the two defendants in this settlement 
returned over $47 million to overcharged direct purchasers; 
(2) this cash recovery came from foreign firms; (3) legal fees 
were at most 15% of the total recovery; (4) the recovery was 
estimated at 105% of their actual damages;  (5) The cases were 
successful follow-ons to a federal criminal prosecution that 
resulted in a criminal fines of more than $300 million against 
at total of six defendants. 
 
 This case is a “follow on case” to a federal criminal 
prosecution of an international price-fixing conspiracy. The 
plaintiffs were direct purchasers of the defendants products, 
graphite electrodes, in the U.S. market. (The steel industry 
uses graphite electrodes to general the intense heat needed to 
melt scrap metal and refine steel in electric arc furnaces.) 
The Department of Justice obtained over $300 million in 
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criminal fines against the cartel members and many of their 
executives.262  
 The Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation consisted of 
three class action lawsuits alleging horizontal price-fixing 
in the graphite electrodes industry.263 
 During the period from December 1998 through November 
2002, settlements were approved with all of the defendants 
                                                          
262 Kylie Cooper & Adrienne C. Dedjinou, Twentieth Survey of 
White Collar Crime: Article: Antitrust Violations, 42 Am. 
Crim. L. Rev. 179, 214 (2005). The criminal fines for each 
company were: Mitsubishi of Japan, $134 million; “SGL Carbon 
AG of Wiesbaden, Germany, $ 135 million; UCAR international of 
Danbury, Conn., $ 110 million; Showa Denko of Ridgeville, 
S.C., $ 32.5 million; Tokai Carbon Co. of Japan, $ 6 million; 
and Nippon Carbon, also of Japan, $ 2.5 million. A seventh 
producer, the Carbide Graphite Group of Pittsburgh, cooperated 
in the investigation and the company and its executives 
received amnesty.” J. Seper, Mitsubishi Fined for Price Fixing 
on Key Parts in Steel Industry, Wash. Times, May 12, 2001. 
 
263 (1) Kentucky Electric Steel Inc. v. The Carbide/Graphite 
Group, Inc., SGL Carbon AG, and UCAR International Inc., No. 
97-CV-4182 (E.D. Pa.), (2) Kentucky Electric Steel Inc. v. 
Showa Denko Carbon, Inc., No. 98-CV-1017 (E.D. Pa.), (3) 
Kentucky Electric Steel Inc., No. 99-CV-482 (E.D. Pa.). The 
defendants were: Tokai Carbon Company, Ltd., Tokai Carbon 
U.S.A., Inc. (collectively “Tokai”); SEC Corporation (“SEC”); 
Nippon; Mitsubishi; VAW Aluminum AG, VAW Carbon GmBH 
(collectively “VAW”); The Carbide/Graphite Group, Inc. (“CG”); 
SGL Carbon AG, SGL Carbon Corporation (collectively “SGL”); 
UCAR International Inc. (“UCAR”); and Showa Denko Carbon, Inc. 
(“SDC”). 
 One of the defendants,  SGL, attempted to evade civil 
liability by filing for a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition in 
1998. The Third Circuit, however, ordered the dismissal of 
SGL’s bankruptcy petition on grounds that it had been filed in 




except Mitsubishi and Nippon. The certified the class in the 
action against these two defendants in February 2003. Shortly 
thereafter, the plaintiffs reached a settlement with the 
remaining defendants, and the Court approved a notice of the 
proposed settlement on May 14, 2003.264 
 Under the terms of the proposed settlement, Mitsubishi 
agreed to pay the Class $45,000,000, and Nippon agreed to pay 
$2,875,000. Plaintiff’s counsel agreed that their request for 
attorney fees would not exceed fifteen percent of the 
settlement funds, plus reimbursement of litigation costs and 
expenses. According to the notice of the proposed settlement, 
a pro rata distribution of the proceeds would be determined by 
using the overcharge percentage found in the report prepared 
by the Plaintiffs’ expert on damages.265 The overcharge varied 
overtime and was higher for deliveries in the United States 
than for deliveries outside the United States. To account for 
the variance over time, the proposed settlement divided the 
relevant period of time into twelve six month periods and 
                                                          
264 See, Notice of Proposed Settlements with Mitsubishi 
Corporation and Mitsubishi International Corporation in the 
Amount of $45,000,000, and With Nippon Carbon Company, Ltd. in 
the Amount of $2,875,000, Class Action Determination and Other 
Matters, IN RE: Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, MDL 
No. 1244 (E.D. Pa. May 14, 2003). 
 
265 The court does not appear to have made any published 




called for the assignment of an overcharge percentage for each 
period.266 Overall, the plaintiffs’ expert estimated the amount 
distributed to the class members at 105% of their actual 
damages.267 
 Ellwood Quality Steel had chosen to opt-out of earlier 
settlements and had succeeded in recovering larger amounts 
from the other defendants.  As a result, the allocation plan 
in the proposed settlement with Mitsubishi and Nippon would 
have denied Ellwood any distribution of funds because its 
settlements outside the class exceeded the amount it would 
have otherwise received in the settlement with Mitsubishi and 
Nippon. Nonetheless, Ellwood chose to opt-in to the 
Mitsubishi/Nippon settlement, and it objected to the 
allocation plan insofar as it took into account Ellwood’s 
prior settlements. 
 Judge Weiner denied Ellwood’s objection. First, the 
provision ensured that all of the class members received equal 
distributions from the Mitsubishi/Nippon settlement. Second, 
there was precedent for offsetting a share of a class 
settlement with funds received in private litigation. Finally, 
                                                          
266 Although the class was limited to consumers who purchased 
graphite electrodes from July 1, 1992, through June 30, 1997, 
the proposed settlement provided for damages for purchases 
from July 1, 1992, to June 30, 1998. Id. at 3. 
 
267 In re Graphite Electrodes Antitrust Litigation, 2003 WL 
22358491, at *2 (E.D. Pa. 2003) 
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Ellwood had received an opportunity to opt-out of the 
Mitsubishi/Nippon settlement and knowingly chose not to do so. 
 The award of damages had a material effect on the 
earnings of at least some consumers. Roanoke Steel Corporation 
reported that $1.4 million of its $1.5 million profit for the 

































                                                          
268 Roanoke Electric Steel Corporation Reports First Quarter 
Results, P.R. Newswire, March 9, 2004. 
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IBM v. Microsoft 
This case is noteworthy because: 1) It settled for $775 
million cash and a $75 million credit toward Microsoft 
software; 2) It was a successful follow-on resolving claims 
between International Business Machines, Inc. (“IBM”) and 
Microsoft arising from the U.S. government’s antitrust case 
against Microsoft; 3) IBM’s allegations were broader than 
those in the government’s case; 4) The settlement was reached 
in the absence of a separate lawsuit; and 5) The federal judge 
in the government case found that Microsoft’s anticompetitive 
practices harmed both competitors and consumers. 
In November 2003, on the heels of a settlement with the 
Department of Justice, Microsoft entered into a tolling 
agreement with IBM extending the statute of limitations on 
antitrust claims to avoid protracted litigation and explore 
settlement options.269 The final settlement resolved claims 
arising from the government’s case against Microsoft which was 
filed in 1998 and alleged violation of Sections 1 and 2 of the 
Sherman Act, including unlawful maintenance of monopoly power 
and unreasonable restraint on trade through anticompetitive 
                                                          





marketing practices. 270 The U.S. District Court for the 
District of Colombia issued findings of fact in the government 
case in November 1999 establishing that Microsoft had used its 
“prodigious market power and immense profits” 271 to harm 
competitors, including IBM.272 Specifically, the judge found 
that Microsoft had “punished” IBM for failing to halt the 
promotion of its own products that competed with Windows and 
Office by withholding technical and marketing assistance, 
blocking the issuance of a Windows 95 license, and forcing IBM 
                                                          
270 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d 9 (D.D.C. 1999). 
Although twenty states joined in the government action, nine 
ultimately joined in the final judgment while the remainder 
went on to pursue a full remedies trial. The final judgment 
which was entered on November 12, 2001, prohibited Microsoft 
from engaging in a number of anticompetitive practices, 
including discriminatory pricing and overcharging, and from 
retaliating against its competitors for supporting or 
developing certain competing software − the same actions the 
court identified as having harmed IBM. Final Judgment (Nov. 
12, 2001) (available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f200400/200457.htm). 
 
271 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 112. 
 
272 Microsoft defended its actions in the press and complained 
that its competitors were using the government action out of 
jealousy to attack the company. The Microsoft-funded 
Independent Institute ran a full-page ad in both The 
Washington Post and The New York Times on June 2, 1999 
delivering “An Open Letter to President Clinton from 240 
Economists on Antitrust Protectionism.” The letter complained 
that not only did consumers not ask for the antitrust actions, 
but that consumers benefited from Microsoft’s success. An Open 
Letter to President Clinton from 240 Economists on Antitrust 




to pay higher prices.273 According to the findings, these 
actions also resulted in harm to consumers since, “some 
innovations that would truly benefit consumers never occur[ed] 
for the sole reason that they do not coincide with Microsoft’s 
self-interest.”274 
Two months before the tolling agreement was set to 
expire, Microsoft and IBM entered into settlement discussions 
to resolve the claims arising out of the factual findings in 
the government case. The parties reached an agreement on July 
1, 2005 whereby Microsoft agreed to pay $775 million lump sum 
and extend a $75 million credit toward Microsoft software. 275 
The settlement agreement resolved claims arising out of 
the government case, including the discriminatory pricing and 
                                                          
273 U.S. v. Microsoft Corp., 84 F. Supp. 2d at 39. 
 
274 Id. at 112. 
 




Although it is unclear whether IBM has used the $75 million 
credit, a principal analyst commented that the company would 
“most likely procure Microsoft PC software, such as operating 
systems and office productivity applications, with that 
credit.” Juan Carlos Perez, Microsoft to Pay IBM $775 Million 






overcharge claims addressed in the findings.276 The parties 
also negotiated to resolve claims related to IBM’s OS/2 
operating system and SmartSuite products. The OS/2 claims 
first arose in the early 1980s when the parties publicly 
agreed to develop the OS/2 operating system together as a 
replacement for MS-DOS, which was the original IBM operating 
system. 277 Microsoft undercut that agreement when it developed 
its Windows operating system and also impacted the software 
that IBM and others initially developed for the OS/2 system.278 
The agreement does not include claims against Microsoft 
for harm to IBM’s server hardware and software businesses, 
though IBM did agree not to assert claims for money damages 
for a period of two years and not to seek recovery for claims 
involving events prior to June 30, 2002. This exclusion leaves 
IBM the option to pursue further legal actions, particularly 
in Europe where antitrust disputes against Microsoft remain 
unresolved.279 The parties did not release any further details 
of the agreement.280 
                                                          








279 In 2004 the European Commission fined Microsoft $662 






























                                                                                                                                                                                    
abused its dominance in desktop operating systems to gain an 
unfair advantage in related markets, including servers.” 
Perez, InfoWorld. If this ruling is upheld on appeal, it could 
pave the way for a similar action by IBM. 
 
280 Microsoft has paid more than $4 billion to settle state and 
federal antitrust suits related to the government case, 
including those brought by Sun Microsystems, Gateway Computers 
and Novell, and 13 class actions. Perez, InfoWorld; see also 
Steve Lohr, Preaching from the Ballmer Pulpit, N.Y. Times 
(Jan. 28, 2007). Microsoft agreed to pay Gateway $150 million 
over four years to settle its claims arising out of the 
government case, which were similar to IBM’s discriminatory 
pricing and overcharge claims. Robert A. Guth, Microsoft Takes 
$714 Million Charge, Wall St. J. A.2 (Apr. 12, 2005). In 
addition, “Novell settled antitrust claims related to its 
NetWare network operating system in November 2004, with 
Microsoft paying the company $536 million.” Perez, InfoWorld. 
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In Re: Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464 (N.D. 
CA 19989); reversed, 938 F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991); affirmed 
sub nom Hartford Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 
 This highly publicized and jurisprudentially important 
case is notable because: 1. It resulted in a settlement with 
significant prophylactic relief through an injunction that 
restructured the industry-wide mechanism for providing support 
and advisory services to Commercial General Liability 
insurance; 2. It also included a total of $36 million in cash 
paid by the defendants; 3. Of the cash payout, 27.2% consisted 
of attorneys fees; 4. The cash component of the settlement was 
a creative remedy that: (i) funded the development of a Public 
Entity that provides risk management education and technical 
services to small businesses, public entities, and non 
profits; and (ii) funded the States for development of a risk 
database for municipalities and local governments. 5. Money 
was returned to American businesses from foreign ($6 million) 
and domestic ($30 million) reinsurers. 6. The private action 
was a follow-up to investigations initiated by State 
enforcers.7. The case went to the Supreme Court and 
established important legal principles. 
 
 In 1989 the plaintiffs - consisting of “nineteen states 
and numerous private plaintiffs” 281 - sued “a group of 
insurance companies, reinsurance companies, underwriters, 
brokers and individuals, and the Insurance Services Office, 
                                                          
 
281 In Re: Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 723 F. Supp. 464, 
468 (N.D. CA 19989). 
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Inc. (“ISO”)”282 for alleged violations of Section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and state antitrust laws. 
The insurance companies sold Commercial General Liability 
Insurance (“CGL”), which protects the insured against the risk 
of liability to third parties for bodily injury or property 
damages. To share their risks, insurers turn to reinsurers. 
“Reinsurance is arranged by specialized brokers and 
underwriters. Much … [of which] is done by syndicates doing 
business through Lloyd’s of London.”283 The terms and 
availability of reinsurance directly affect those of primary 
insurance. The insurance association, ISO, had an important 
role in the furtherance of the business of insurance by the 
states, and consisted of 1400 domestic property and casualty 
insurers. ISO’s function at that time was to draft the 
standard CGL forms that were submitted to State regulators for 
approval, and to provide support services by collecting 
statistical data and estimating risks relevant to the forms. 
This information was then used by the insurers in underwriting 
decision making, including pricing of premiums. 
But the defendants’ primary insurers didn’t like the 
standard ISO form for CGL insurance, and challenged the 
accidental pollution and the “long tail”284 coverage. They 
“exerted concerted pressure on ISO to get it to withdraw its 
                                                          
282 Id. 
 
283 In Re: Insurance Antitrust Litigation, 938 F.2d 919, 923 
(9th Cir. 1991). 
 
284 “Long tail” coverage means that a claim can be made after 
the policy has expired if the event occurred during the life 
of the policy. The defendants preferred a “claims made” form 
under which only claims made during the life of the policy 
would be covered. See Id. at 923 
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form for CGL insurance.”285 They also persuaded key foreign 
underwriters and substantial American reinsurers to join their 
boycott of the ISO form. “As a result of the reinsurers’ 
actions, primary insurers were precluded from selling long 
tail insurance and also from selling accidental pollution 
insurance.”286 Therefore the availability of these varieties of 
insurance was substantially diminished. Eventually, ISO gave 
into the pressure and eliminated the challenged accidental 
pollution coverage, and withdrew its support services for the 
challenged long tail insurance. 
 Plaintiffs subsequently filed this Complaint over an 
agreement between the domestic insurers and ISO to limit long-
tail risks, and the enlistment of the London reinsurance 
market to refuse to provide reinsurance for long-tail risks 
which competitors of the domestic insurers might wish to 
offer.  This allegedly constituted a conspiracy to withhold 
the inputs required by competitors in order to be able to 
offer long-tail coverage in competition with the domestic 
defendants' short-tailed products. Plaintiffs also alleged 
that defendants’ boycott removed their conduct from the 
insurance exemption to the antitrust laws, pursuant to Section 
3(b) of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. The District Court 
dismissed the complaints on defendants’ 12(b)(6) motion. The 
court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, and the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Supreme Court affirmed 
the Court of Appeals and remanded for further proceedings. 
After the document discovery in the District Court had 
started, the case was settled. 
                                                          
 
285 Id. 
286 Id. at 923, 924 
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 The settlement agreement of March 19, 1995287, consisted 
of significant injunctive relief and a cash payment of $36 
million. The underwriters from the London Market paid, as 
alleged co-conspirators, a part of this. The injunctive relief 
disengaged ISO from industry members and instead put them 
under control of an independent board of directors. 
Furthermore, certain defendants were restricted from 
participating in contract development activities for five 
years. A total of $9.8 million dollars of the settlement fund 
was awarded for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses for the 
private plaintiffs. The remaining $26.2 million was placed in 
an escrow fund, of which $21 million was used to develop the 
Public Entity Risk Institute (“PERI”). PERI provides risk 
management education and technical services to public 
entities, small businesses, and non-profit organizations. PERI 
seems to have become an extremely successful self-sustaining 
entity which, apparently, public risk managers find quite 
useful.  Another $5.2 million was distributed to the States for 




















In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1261, 2000 WL 
1475559, at *1–3 (E.D.Pa. Oct.4, 2000) (“Linerboard I” ); In 
re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 203 F.R.D. 197, 201–04 
(E.D.Pa.2001) (“Linerboard II” ); In re Linerboard Antitrust 
Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 147–49 (3d Cir.2002) (“Linerboard III”); 
In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 321 F.Supp 2d 619 (E.D. Pa. 
2004). 
 
Summary: This case is a good example of the significance of 
private enforcement because: 1. it was a class action that led 
to a cash settlement of $202.5 million; 2. the total 
settlement represented 42-55 percent288 of alleged damages; 3. 
the awarded attorneys fees were 30% of the total settlement; 
4. the court stated repeatedly that “the lawyering in the case 
at every stage was superb”;289 5. “there was no prior 
government action to establish liability”290 and the plaintiffs 
“did not benefit from the fruits of a prior government 
investigation or prosecution.”291 
 
In 1998, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) filed a 
complaint against Stone Container Corporation (Stone) charging 
them “with a unilateral violation of Section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. According to the FTC, Stone had 
attempted to reduce linerboard292 inventories and had 
"invite[d]" some of its competitors to join in a "coordinated 
                                                          
288 321 F.Supp.2d 619 (E.D.Pa. 2004), at 623 
 
289 2004 WL 1221350, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 2, 2004) 
 
290  Id. at 5. 
 
291 Id. at 11 
 
292 “Linerboard includes any grade of paperboard suitable for 
use in the production of corrugated sheets, which are in turn 
used in the manufacture of corrugated boxes (...) corrugated 
sheets are also referred to as containerboard.” See 203 FRD 
197, at 201 
 115
price increase." The FTC did not allege that any other 
manufacturer had accepted Stone's "invitation," nor did it 
allege the existence of any conspiracy.”293  
Shortly after the complaint of the FTC, several lawsuits 
where filed against Stone on behalf of corrugated sheets 
purchasers and others on behalf of corrugated box purchasers. 
The latter expanded their allegations in comparison to the 
complaint of the FTC. They not only charged Stone, but also 
several of its competitors (manufacturers of linerboard), 
claiming that “the Non-Stone defendants accepted Stone’s 
“invitation” to restrict the production of linerboard and 
artificially raise prices, resulting in an antitrust 
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act.”294  
 In 2001 the corrugated sheets plaintiffs and the 
corrugated box plaintiffs joined and requested the court to 
certify both classes in re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation. 
“This case is grounded on allegations that defendants 
conspired to restrict the output of linerboard in order to 
support increases in the price of linerboard with the 
objective of increasing the price of corrugated sheets and 
corrugated boxes. Linerboard is the key component in 
production cost of corrugated sheets and corrugated boxes, and 
is the primary determinant of the prices of those items.”295 
The plaintiffs accused the defendants of a price fixing 
conspiracy in violation of the Sherman act, based on an 
agreement between Stone and the other defendants. The 
defendants agreed to “close their their mills for “market 
                                                          
293  Id., referring to: In re Linerboard Antitrust Litigation, 
2000 WL 1475559, *1 (E.D.Pa, Oct. 4, 2000) 
 
294 Id. at 202 
 
295 Id. at 203 
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downtime,” thereby reducing industry inventory at mills and 
box plants. (...) Stone would than purchase inventory from 
other manufactures while idling its own mills. (...) A total 
of 435,000 tons had been withdrawn from the market. Inventory 
reached “a twenty-year low in terms of weeks of supply” (...) 
[Defendants] successfully increased their prices for 
containerboard and boxes for the first time in more than two 
years.”296 
The court ruled that the plaintiffs had sufficiently 
proven that the prices of corrugated sheets and boxes directly 
related to the price of linerboard.297 Therefore the court 
acknowledged that both classes of plaintiffs where direct 
purchasers of linerboard. On September 4, 2001 the court 
certified both classes of the plaintiffs. 
Eventually four settlements were reached between the 
plaintiffs and the defendant. On April 21, 2004 the Court 
approved all of these settlements298, worth a total of 
$202,572,489 which covers 55% of the total damages for the 
limitations period and approximately 42% of the damages for 
the full period.299 The awarded attorneys’ fees amounted 
$60,771,747, representing 30% of the settlement, the amount 
requested.300 
Furthermore the Court awarded $1,391,203 in expenses and 
$25,000 in incentive fees to each of the five corporate class 
representatives. The Court reasoned that “[a]s well as being 
                                                          
296 305 F.3d 145 (3rd Cir. 2002), at 150 
 
297 203 FRD 197, at 214 
 
298 321 F.Supp.2d 619 (E.D.Pa. 2004) 
 
299 2000 WL 1475559, *4 (E.D.Pa, Oct. 4, 2000) 
 
300 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10533 (E.D. Penn. June 2, 2004). 
 117
novel, this litigation was highly complex and thus required a 
great deal of lawyering skill.”301 And “[t]he settlements are 
remarkable given the fact that there was no prior government 
action to establish liability and the case covered a 
relatively short conspiracy period of 26 months. The number of 
persons benefited is large, and includes all entities that 
purchased corrugated containers and sheets during the class 
period. (...) The size of that population is (...) 
approximately 80,000 companies.”302 And finally, “[t]hroughout 
every phase of the litigation petitioners managed a major 
discovery effort”303 and the plaintiffs “did not benefit from 






















                                                          
301 Id. at 14 
 
302 Id. at *5 
 
303 Id. at 10 
 
304 Id. at 11 
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In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1083, 
918 F. Supp. 1190. 
 
 This is a noteworthy price fixing settlement because: 1.  
it led to a court approved cash settlement with the three 
major defendants of $45 million and a the cash settlement with 
the other two defendants amounted almost $5 million; 2. in 
addition, an estimated amount of $15 million in cash was 
recovered by 33 plaintiffs who opted-out of the class 
settlement; 3. in total about 400 direct buyers were recovered 
from their damage; 4. approximately $24 million dollar of the 
total recovery to U.S. businesses was contributed by foreign 
companies; 5. only 7% ($3.5 million) of the total class 
settlement was awarded for counsel fees; 6. the main 
settlement was reached at a time that the government 
investigation of the same businesses appeared to be stalled 
and four months before the government obtained the first of 
its guilty pleas. 
 
 
 On June 27, 1995, the FBI raided the world headquarters 
of Archer-Daniels-Midland Company (ADM) in Decatur, Illinois; 
soon followed by raids on the offices of two Japanese 
companies: Ajinomoto and Kyowa Hakko Kogyo, and of two South 
Korean companies: Sewon and Cheil Jedang. All of the five 
companies manufactured or imported lysine and where suspected 
by the Department of Justice (DOJ) of price fixing agreements, 
a per se violation of the Sherman Act. “In September and 
November 1995, while the DOJ’s investigation was continuing 
and formal federal charges had not yet been filed, a number of 
private civil (treble damages) suits were filed by buyers of 
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lysine.”305 The civil suits were brought together in one case, 
called Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation. 
Lysine is an essential amino acid and a building block of 
proteins. It speeds the development of muscle tisssue and it 
is therefore an important supplement in animal feeds. Lysine 
is mainly produced by biotechnology. Since the late 1980s 
there were three major producers of lysine in the world: 
Ajinomoto and Kyowa Hakko of Japan, and Sewon of South Korea. 
Until 1991, the year in which ADM opened a new and very large 
lysine production facility in Decatur. This facility doubled 
the world’s production capacity for lysine and brought ADM 
among the major producers. Cheaper production costs as well as 
the huge increase in supply, caused a steep decline in the 
prices of lysine of 45% in the first 18 months of operation. 
In 1992, ADM officials (including Mark Whitacre) met with 
officials of Ajinomoto and Kyowas Hakko and agreed to the 
formation of the International Amino Acids Manufacturers’ 
Association. The meetings of the association became a forum 
for discussions of prices, production levels, and sales share 
allocations. Sewon and another South Korean company also 
joined the association. This resulted in rising prices of 
lysine. By the end of 1992, Mark Whitacre of ADM became an 
inside source of information for the FBI and he supplied them 
with evidence of the illegal meetings. The lysine cartel came 
to an end in June 1995, when the DOJ convened a grand jury in 
Chicago to consider the collected evidence of the price fixing 
conspiracy and the FBI raided the offices of the 
manufacturers. The DOJ investigation resulted in three major 
federal antitrust actions and lead to more than 40 civil 
                                                          
305 Lawrence J. White, Lysine and Price Fixing: How Long? How 
Severe?, Review of Industrial Organization, 18(1), Feb 2001, 
23-31, at 25 
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antitrust suits in federal district courts by direct buyers of 
lysine. 
The civil suits were brought together in 1996 under the 
name of Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, in which about 
400 plaintiffs were certified as a single class. This lead to 
a settlement offer by the three largest defendants in April 
1996, totalling $45 million. ADM offered $25 million to the 
plaintiffs; Ajinomoto and Kyowa both offered $10 million to 
settle the suit. “This offer came at a time when the DOJ’s 
criminal investigation appeared stalled. Indeed, a rather 
unusual feature of the civil suit is that the settlement offer 
was made four months before the government obtained the first 
of its guilty pleas.”306 Therefore the plaintiffs couldn’t 
benefit from extensive information gathered from a closed 
grand-jury investigation or from facts admitted in guilty 
pleas. Subsequently, it was hard to determine the amount of 
overcharge, which resulted in a major dispute about the 
adequacy of the settlement amount. 
“[A] number of plaintiffs objected that the proposed 
settlement was too low. A report by Connor (1996) supported 
these claims. (...) [H]e concluded that the combined price-
overcharge and deadweight loss came to about $165-$180 
million.”307 However, “[c]rucial and controversial in Connor’s 
analysis were his assumptions with regard to the “but for” 
price (...) and the time period during which the conspiracy 
had an effect on prices.”308 In 2002 Connor adjusted his 
                                                          
306 John M. Connor (2002), Global Cartels Redux: The Amino Acid 
Lysine Antitrust Litigation (1996), at 17. 
 
307 White, at 26. 
 
308 Id. at 27. 
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earlier conclusions on the amount of the overcharge. He 
concluded that “[w]ith the benefit of hindsight and a great 
deal more information, it appears now that the first $150-
million estimate by the plaintiffs was too high.”309 
In July 1996 the court determined “that the proposed 
payments in settlement by three of the defendants in this 
antitrust action (...) were within the range of fairness, 
adequacy and reasonableness.”310 About 33 plaintiffs chose to 
opt out of the settlement and according to estimates managed 
to settle for $15 million.311 “Most of the opt outs were larger 
firms with the legal resources to continue hard negotiations 
with the defendants. Although settlement terms are 
confidential, reports in the press suggested that the opt-out 
firms, with the benefit of criminal guilty pleas by the lysine 
cartel members, got at least double the amount per dollar of 
purchases than did the smaller buyers in the class.”312 
The two other lysine defendants settled with the 
plaintiffs for almost $5 million in 1997.313 “The federal 
lysine class and the opt-outs from the class eventually 
collected approximately $70 million from the cartel members; 
indirect purchasers of lysine obtained an estimated $15 
million in state courts (...) Thus, U.S. lysine buyers 
                                                          
309 Connor (2002), at 28. 
 
310 In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, 1996 WL 
411665, at 1. 
 
311 Connor, John M. (1997) ‘The Global Lysine Price-Fixing 
Conspiracy of 1992–1995’, Review of Agricultural Economics, 
19, 158–174, at table 1. 
 
312 Connor (2002), at 28. 
 
313 Id. at 2. 
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recovered as a group slightly more than single damages; net of 
legal fees, buyers recovered less than single damages.”314 
About $25 million of the total recovery went from foreign 
violators of U.S. antitrust law to U.S. businesses. The court 
had awarded the role of lead class counsel on the basis of a 
fixed-fee auction. “The fee was capped at $3.5 million for any 
settlements above $25 million. The firm hired no economists to 
analyse the overcharge issue. The legal fees, at 7% of the 
settlement, were very low by historical standards.”315 But it 
also lead to discussions whether the counsel represented the 
plaintiffs properly, namely “the suggestion, which has 
appeared in some of the media coverage, that the class counsel 
may have sold out too cheaply because of their unwillingness 
to invest all of the time that is required for the full 
representation of their clients' interests.”316 But the court 
ruled that “it is a total red herring to suggest that either 
the bidding process to obtain the best quality representation 
at the lowest cost to the plaintiff class members, or the cap 
on fees that the Kohn firm chose to include in its ultimately 
successful bid, has in any respect disadvantaged the plaintiff 
class. Instead precisely the opposite is true.”317 
Apart from the treble-damage settlements, the DOJ 
obtained convictions for criminal price fixing by the five 
corporate lysine sellers. By the end of 1996 all the 
defendants had agreed to plea guilty to criminal price fixing 
                                                          
314 Id. at 29. 
 
315 Id. Supra note 22, at 17. 
 
316 In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litigation, 1996 WL 
197671, at 1. 
 
317 Id. at 3. 
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charges. Ajinomoto and Kyowa paid a fine of $10 million, Sewon 
paid a fine of $1.3 million and ADM paid the largest fine of 
$70 million. In addition, four of the executives who managed 
the conspiracy pleaded guilty and paid substantial fines. Four 
other executives were prosecuted by the DOJ. In 1999, three of 
them were found guilty and sentenced to long prison terms by a 
jury in Chicago. Michael D. Andreas, a top ADM officer, got 
sentenced to 36-month of imprisonment which is the maximum 




































In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation, MDL No 
1402 
 
These related cases are notable because 1) they produced 
recoveries for three classes of direct purchasers of 
Microcrystalline Cellulose (“MCC”) against two defendants, the 
foreign Asahi Defendants and the domestic Defendant FMC 
Corporation; 2) Class Counsel recovered $25,000,000 from each 
defendant for a combined total of $50,000,000 plus accrued 
interest up to the date of payment; 3) this settlement amount 
represented approximately 40% of the damages claimed by the 
classes; 4) Plaintiffs’ Counsel was awarded one-third (33 
1/3%) of the combined gross settlement funds; 5) though this 
was a follow-on to an FTC action for violations of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act, Class Counsel alleged violations of 
Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and did further discovery 
to expose the defendants’ involvement.   
The background of this case was described by the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania, where the case was brought:  
In the early 1960s, FMC purchased the company that had 
developed MCC and obtained a patent for the product. 
Shortly thereafter, FMC chose Asahi as the exclusive 
distributor of Avicel®, its brand name of MCC, in Asia. 
FMC also licensed Asahi to manufacture some of its MCC 
products. The two companies continued to cooperate in 
marketing Avicel as well as some unbranded MCC products 
during the 1970s and 1980s. [This portion under seal]. 
From 1984 to 1997, the relevant class period, FMC sold 
approximately 50 different MCC products and blends for 
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use in the pharmaceutical, vitamin, and food industries. 
The two major categories of MCC products are colloidal 
and non-colloidal. Non-colloidal MCC is used mainly in 
drug and vitamin tablets and some food products, while 
colloidal MCC is a blended product used in liquid drug 
suspensions and emulsions and other food products.  
*   *   * 
After FMC's patents expired, approximately ten firms 
entered the MCC market . . . .  At least four of these 
competitors had exited the market by the early 1990s.  
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, FMC had lost some of 
its MCC market share to competitors that had expanded 
their MCC production, . . .  Competition increased in 
the mid-1990s as competitors improved the quality of 
their MCC products and production neared market 
capacity.318   
 
In late December of 2001, the FTC announced it had filed 
a complaint319 and simultaneously entered into consent 
decrees320 with FMC and Asahi.  The complaint alleged that FMC 
and Asahi had allocated geographic markets for MCC.  The FTC 
also alleged that FMC solicited other MCC manufacturers to 
conspire to allocate markets.321  This complaint was brought 
under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.322 
                                                          
318 In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation, 218 
F.R.D. 79, 82 (2003) (internal citations omitted); 





320  www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/fmcconsent.htm. 
 
321 See 65 FR 83038 Federal Trade Commission Analysis to Aid 
Public Comment (Dec. 29, 2000); also see 
www.ftc.gov/opa/2000/12/fmc.htm. 
 
322  15 U.S.C. § 45. 
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The FTC Consent Order prohibited Asahi and FMC from 
conspiring further, and barred FMC for a number of years from 
serving as the U.S. distributor for any MCC competitor 
including Asahi.323 
 As a result of these and a public announcement by the 
FTC, Class counsel investigated potential claims.  The first 
complaint was filed in January 2001 by the Ivax Corporation, a 
firm that had purchased MCC products from FMC, against FMC and 
Asahi.  The plaintiffs alleged that FMC and Asahi conspired to 
allocate the MCC market in violation of Sections One and Two 
of the Sherman Act.324  
Classes were certified in August, 2003.325  There were 
three classes which consisted of approximately 1700 class 
                                                          
323  http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/fmcd_o.pdf. 
324   MCC litigation at 81, (“See Complaint in Civ. A. No. 01-
111 . . . .  In simple terms, the alleged agreement barred 
Asahi from selling any MCC products in North America or Europe 
without FMC's consent and barred FMC from selling MCC products 
in Asia. Plaintiffs claim that this alleged allocation of the 
market was an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of 
Sections One and Two of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 
2. The action is brought under Sections 4 and 16 of the 
Clayton Act, which provide for the private enforcement of the 
antitrust laws to recover resulting damages. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 
15(a), 26.”). 
 
325 MCC litigation. 
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members, the Pharmaceutical Class, the Vitamins Class, and the 
Food Purchasers Class.326  
Though this private action was a follow on to the FTC 
action, Class Counsel argued that the FTC’s case was not 
sufficiently developed to permit Class Counsel to rely on any 
record created by the FTC.  Class Counsel fought discovery 
battles to retrieve documents that had not been uncovered by 
the FTC.  The FTC did not take discovery of the Japanese Asahi 
entity responsible for manufacturing MCC, but only sought 
documents from the American affiliate, which related to 
jurisdictional issues.  Class Counsel asserted that the 
                                                          
326 MCC litigation at 94: 
 
In August of 2003, the Court determined that this case 
could proceed as a class action and certified the 
following three classes: 
1. The Pharmaceutical Class is defined as:  United 
States All persons or entities in the United States who 
purchased microcrystalline cellulose directly from 
defendant FMC Corporation in the United States for use 
in connection with the manufacture or preparation of 
prescription and/or over-the-counter pharmaceutical 
products at any time during the period January 1, 1984 
through December 31, 1997.  The Class excludes governmental 
entities, defendants, defendants’ parents, subsidiaries, 
and affiliates. 
2. The Vitamins Class is defined as:  [all direct U.S. 
purchasers of MCC] for use in connection with the 
manufacture or preparation of vitamin products [during 
the relevant time period].   
3. The Food Purchasers Class is defined as:  [all direct 
U.S. purchasers of MCC] for use as a food additive 
[during the relevant time period].   
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documents received from Asahi, along with depositions of Asahi 
employees, were essential to this case.327  
In April 2005 Class Counsel was able to negotiate a 
settlement with Asahi.  Asahi agreed to make a $25 million 
dollar cash payment, and to cooperate with Plaintiffs 
litigation against FMC.328  Class counsel received approval 
from the court to use up to $2,500,000 of the proceeds from 
that settlement to pay expenses in the FMC litigation.329   
Class Counsel submitted merits expert declarations 
finding that the relevant antitrust market was the sale of MCC 
to pharmaceutical and vitamins manufacturers in the U.S., the 
entry of small, lower quality MCC manufacturers into the US 
market during the class period was insufficient to prevent FMC 
from exercising monopoly power.  FMC Defendant’s merits 
declaration of two experts found that Asahi’s decision not to 
enter the U.S. market was consistent with independent business 
                                                          
327 In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,  
MDL No. 1402, Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition for 
Award of Attorney’s Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses, and 
Incentive Payments to Class Representative, pages 9 – 11; 
[hereinafter “Memo in Support of Fees”].  
 
328 In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,  
MDL No. 1402, Declaration of H. Laddie Montague, Jr. in 
Support of Plaintiff’s Motion for Final Approval of the 
Settlement with Defendant FMC Corporation and for an Award of 
Attorney’s Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses, page 2, ¶ 5; 
[hereinafter “Montague Declaration”]. 
 
329 Memo in Support of Fees at 11. 
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decision making.  The experts based this on findings that 
Asahi was not successful in selling MCC outside of Japan, 
faced capacity and distributor network restraints, and did not 
have a plant in the U.S.330   
Class Counsel reached a settlement with FMC while an FMC 
summary judgment motion was pending.331  The settlement with 
FMC consisted of a cash payment of $25,000,000.  This occurred 
after more than five and a half years of litigation, and the 
gross settlement fund represented approximately 40% of the 
damages claimed by all three classes over the 14 year class 
period.332 This settlement was approved by the Court.333 
The Pharmaceutical/Vitamin Classes’ Counsel used an 
expert, Dr. John C. Beyer, to calculate that the 
Pharmaceutical and Vitamin Classes suffered an average 
overcharge of 22.1% in purchases of MCC from FMC, which 
translates into class-wide single damages of $78.259 million.  
The Food Purchasers Class Counsel used an expert, Dr. Douglas 
F. Greer, to calculate that the Food Purchaser Class suffered 
                                                          
330 Montague Declaration at 21, 22. 
 
331 Id. at 29. 
 
332 Id. at 30. 
 
333 In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,  
MDL No. 1402, Final Judgment Order (Nov. 20, 2003); 
[hereinafter “Final Judgment Order”]. 
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an average overcharge of 18.5%, which translates into class-
wide single damages of $50.9 million.334   
These percentages served as the basis for a proposal by 
the Plaintiffs’ Counsel as to each Class’ allocation. Members 
of the Pharmaceutical/Vitamins Classes’ claims were to be 
calculated at the rate of 22.1% of their purchases of MCC from 






















                                                          
334 In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,  
MDL No. 1402, Plaintiffs’ Proposed Plan of Distribution 
(attached to Final Judgment Order as Exhibit C) page 2, 3. 
 
335 In re: Microcrystalline Cellulose Antitrust Litigation,  
MDL No. 1402, Agreement of Settlement and Plaintiffs’ Proposed 
Plan of Distribution (attached to Final Judgment Order as 
exhibits B and C respectively). 
 
336  Final Judgment Order at 2. 
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In Re: NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No, 
1023, No. 94 Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 
Summary: The NASDAQ litigation is an outstanding example of 
private antitrust litigation because: 1. the case returned a 
significant amount of cash to victimized consumers ($1.027 
billion plus interest); 2. It involved a large nationwide 
class action; 3. It was not a follow-up to a government action 
(private attorneys uncovered the wrongdoings, initiated the 
litigation, and carried it to conclusion); 4. The awarded 
attorneys' fees were quite modest in percentage terms (only 
13% of the total recovery); and 5. It achieved important 
prophylactic relief. 
 
 In 1993 private plaintiffs began their investigation of 
possible collusion involving NASDAQ.337 It was triggered by a 
Forbes article338 that criticized the influence of large 
market-makers trading on NASDAQ, and it was supported by a 
later study which concluded: “In effect, spreads on the 
affected NASDAQ securities were rounded-up to the nearest 
even-eight, and were therefore substantially larger than 
spreads on comparable securities traded on the NYSE.”339 
 The private plaintiffs filed their complaints in May 
1994, representing “a class of over 1.0 million individual and 
                                                          
337 See Arthur M. Kaplan, “Antitrust As A Public-Private 
Partnership: A Case Study of the NASDAQ Litigation”, 52 Case 
W. Res. L. Rev. 111, 114 (2001). This summary is based upon 
Kaplan’s article. 
 
338 Gretchen Morgenson, “Fun and Games on NASDAQ”, Forbes, Aug. 
16, 1993, at 74. 
 
339 Kaplan, supra note 1, at 114.  See William Christie & Paul 
Schultz, “Why Do NASDAQ Market Makers Avoid Odd-Eighth 
Quotes?”, 49 J. Fin. 1813, 1840 (1994). 
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institutional investors who purchased or sold shares of class 
securities on the [NASDAQ Exchange] during the period of May 
1, 1989 to May 24, 1994”340 The defendants consisted of thirty-
seven market makers on the NASDAQ Exchange.341 
 One of plaintiffs’ earliest actions was to obtain a 
document preservation order which prevented periodic erasure 
and recycling of crucial audiotapes. This happened long before 
any government subpoenas. It was not until after the class 
actions were filed that the SEC and the DOJ opened formal 
investigation in the fall of 1994. “Without the early 
preservation orders crucial evidence would have been lost to 
private plaintiffs and the government. The preserved audiotape 
eventually provided important, direct evidence of 
collusion.”342  
 The Defendants planned to file a motion arguing antitrust 
preemption, and contacted the SEC. But after the plaintiffs 
met with the SEC, the SEC decided that the complaint was not 
preempted. The plaintiffs initiated another meeting with the 
Antitrust Division of the DOJ and convinced them, by 
presenting factual and economic evidence, to start an 
investigation. As Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. (member of the 
Legal Advisory Board of the National Association of Securities 
Dealers (“NASD”) stated in his affidavit: “[private 
plaintiffs] awake the federal government to … price collusion 
                                                          
340 184 F.R.D. 506 (S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
 
341 A market maker quotes a buy and sell price, trading for its 
own account. Their profit – or for the party at the other 
side, the trading costs - derives from the spread between the 
bid and the offer. That is the difference between the buying 
and selling price of the same stock. 
 
342 Kaplan, supra note 1, at 117. 
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that the government had previously ignored,” and pulled “the 
principal laboring oar in advancing this case.” 343 
 This early cooperation between the plaintiffs and the SEC 
resulted in a consent agreement with the NASD on August 8, 
1996, reorganizing the NASD and NASDAQ, followed by the 
implementation of new trading rules for NASDAQ. “The new rules 
(expressly formulated in response to imperfect competition on 
Nasdaq) furthered and systematized the narrowing of spreads 
that already had occurred on many high profile Nasdaq 
securities, under the glare of publicity and private 
litigation.”344 
 The discovery leading to class certification was a 
complex process. The plaintiffs also actively helped to keep 
the government investigation alive by providing them with 
relevant factual and economic information.345 In the end the 
plaintiffs “reviewed and analyzed over 3,000,000 pages of 
documents, and over 10,000 hours of audiotape, in addition to 
the numerous depositions taken by plaintiffs, and more than 
200 government transcripts.”346 
 The plaintiffs achieved the first individual settlement 
on April 9, 1997. But it was difficult to reach a collective 
settlement with the defendants, who where resisting an all 
cash settlement in favor of a coupons settlement. On March 23, 
1998 the last settlement was signed. “The settlements in the 
aggregate totaled approximately $1.027 billion. [All cash!] An 
                                                          
343 Affidavit of John C. Coffee, Jr. par. 24, In re Nasdaq 
Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. No. 1023, No. 94 
Civ. 3996 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. 1998). 
 
344 See Kaplan, supra note 1, at 120. 
 
345 Id. at 119. 
 
346 Id. at 125. 
 134
affidavit of Professor Michael Barclay showed that this amount 
approximated plaintiffs’ individual damages.“347 On top of 
this, the private litigation and the new SEC rules greatly 
reduced NASDAQ spreads. An subsequent study showed a “large 
decline” in NASDAQ spreads, resulting in newly “competitive 
pricing.”348 
 Because the awarded attorneys' fees were quite modest in 
percentage terms (only 13% of the total recovery), a total of 
$896,233,301 were paid to class members. Approximately 
1,249,500 claimants received payment, with a range from $25 to 
more than $11 million.349 The cooperation between the private 
plaintiffs and the government agencies resulted in the largest 
antitrust recovery in history at the time of the final 
settlement. And, as strikingly pointed out by Professor 
Stephen Calkins: “NASDAQ did not follow a prior governmental 
investigation. Indeed, the private action appears to have 









                                                          
347 Id. at 128. 
 
348 James P. Weston, “Competition on the Nasdaq and the Impact 
of Recent Market Reforms”, 55 J. Fin. 2565, 2566 (2000). 
Kaplan at 128 
 
349 Re Nasdaq Market-Makers Antitrust Litigation, 2000-1 Trade 
Cas. (CCH) at 86,648 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 
350 Stephen Calkins, An Enforcement Official’s Reflections On 
Antitrust Class Actions, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 413, 422 (1997). See 
also id. at 443 (“NASDAQ’s genesis was entirely private.”) 
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Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 902 F.Supp. 1394 
(D.Kan. 1995); affirmed, 134 F. 3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998); 
reversed, 938 F. 2d 919 (9th Cir. 1991). 
 
 
 This case is an interesting example of recent antitrust 
litigation for six reasons: 1. The National Collegiate 
Athletic Association holds a unique position in multiple 
markets, as both a major producer and consumer, based on the 
distinct relationship between higher education and sports 
marketing; 2. The trial court: (i) examined the case under a 
“quick look” rule of reason analysis, and (ii) made specific 
determinations that there was an antitrust violation; 3. The 
anticompetitive action significantly depressed wages in the 
market for assistant college coaches; 4. The case included a 
total of $74.5 million in cash paid by the defendants; 5.  Of 
this total, $20 million (26.8%) went for attorneys’ fees and 
expenses; 6. The case was exclusively litigated by private 
parties, without any Federal or State action taken. 
  
 In 1989, the National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n. (“NCAA”) 
formed the Cost Reduction Committee (“Committee”) in response 
to rising costs in athletic programs. “As a result of its 
deliberations, the [c]ommittee proposed legislation 
(collectively, the “Restricted Earnings Coach Rule”),”351 which 
was subsequently adopted in January 1991 by Division I NCAA 
members. Essentially the rule limited the number of coaches 
allowed on each college team who were allowed to make more 
than a baseline level set by the REC rule. 
In 1994, several coaches who had been adversely affected 
by the REC rule brought separate suits against the NCAA, 
                                                          
351 See Law v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n., 902 F. 
Supp. 1394, 1400-401 n. 5 (D.Kan. 1995). 
 136
claiming injuries as a result of antitrust violations. 
Plaintiff’s jointly brought a motion for summary judgment 
asserting that the “NCAA . . . conspired to limit the 
compensation they will pay to one category of . . . coaches 
[and] that the restriction on its face is an impermissible 
restraint of trade.”352  
In response, the NCAA offered several arguments designed 
to show that the REC rule was justified, including: (1) The 
rule was “necessary to maintain competitive equity and to 
prevent schools from escalating personnel expenditures,”353 
(2)”establish an “unrestricted” head or assistant coach 
category that will accommodate any type of volunteer, paid, 
full-time or part-time coach, and (3) establish a “restricted-
earnings” category that will encourage the development of new 
coaches while more effectively limiting compensation to such 
coaches.”354  
The trial court began its analysis by explaining that 
although such an obvious case of horizontal price fixing among 
NCAA Division I institutions would normally be subject to a 
“per se” analysis, such application would be inappropriate 
under the Supreme Courts holding in NCAA v. Board of Regents 
of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).355 Based on the 
unique situation of college sports, some horizontal collusion 
is necessary to preserve the integrity of the NCAA and its 
                                                          
352 Id. at 1398. 
 
353  Id. at 1399. 
 
354  Id. at 1401. 
 
355  Id. (explaining that the NCAA is “an industry in which 
horizontal restraints on competition are essential if the 
product is to be available at all”).   
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ability to make college sports available to the public. As 
such, the court analyzed the NCAA’s actions under a “quick 
look” rule of reason standard.356  
The trial court determined that the NCAA, through 
application of the REC rule, prohibited the operation of the 
free market by limiting demand for coaches, some of whom made 
“$60,000 to $70,000” before the implementation of the rule.357 
The court was not persuaded by any of the NCAA’s 
justifications for the REC rule, finding that they offered no 
evidence to support the conclusion that they were trying to 
promote competition; rather, that the NCAA’s actions were 
solely in the interest of it’s member institutions financial 
stability. As such, the trial court granted the plaintiff 
classes’ motion for summary judgment on the issue of 
liability, finding that the NCAA failed to meet the burden of 
showing “that the Restricted Earnings Coach Rule actually 
promotes a legitimate, pro-competitive objective.”358  
Subsequent to the court granting plaintiffs’ motion, the 
plaintiff groups filed motions for permanent injunction,359 and 
a motion for class certification for proceedings on injunctive 
relief and damages.360 Although the court recognized that many 
                                                          
356 “[U]nder the quick look standard[,] because adverse effects 
on competition are apparent, the court does not require proof 
of market power, and instead moves directly to an analysis of 
the defendant's proffered competitive justifications for the 




358 Id. at 1410; affirmed 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 
359 Law v. NCAA, Not Reported in F.Supp., 1996 WL 104328 
(D.Kan. 1996) 
 
360 Schreiber v. NCAA, 167 F.R.D. 169 (D.Kan., 1996.) 
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of the plaintiffs were no longer employed with NCAA Division I 
schools, so as to be immediately in danger of suffering 
irreparable harm, plaintiffs who could demonstrate harm would 
be entitled to an injunction prohibiting the NCAA from 
enacting similar legislation in the future. However, the court 
declined to certify the plaintiffs as a class with respect to 
damages, because they failed to show a manageable method of 
dealing with individual issues of harm. 
 On plaintiffs’ request for interim attorneys fees 
pursuant to § 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26, the court 
acknowledged that plaintiffs had substantially prevailed in 
the litigation, however there were complications as to the 
reasonable amount to be awarded each attorney. Although the 
court ordered the NCAA to pay out interim fees by April 29, 
1996, the NCAA failed to do so and had sanctions imposed by 
the court accordingly.361 On appeal, the court upheld the order 
imposing the payment of interim fees, but reversed based on 
the trial courts failure to adequately notify the NCAA of the 
possibility of being held in criminal contempt. 
 After the Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit affirmed 
the trial court’s order granting plaintiff classes motion for 
summary judgment,362 the trial court considered the issue of 
damages with regards to individual plaintiffs and the class as 
a whole. In three separate class awards, class representatives 
Law, Hall and Schreiber were awarded CPI adjusted damages of 
$12,053,528.00, $10,194,861.00, and $1,704,059.00 for their 
classes, respectively.363 After trebling of damages, the total 
                                                          
361 See Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1025, (10th Cir. 1998). 
 
362 Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 
363 Law v. NCAA, 185 F.R.D. 324 (D.Kan. 1999). 
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amount of damages awarded to the classes was $71,857,344.00, 
although the prior injunction against NCAA was reversed due to 
availability of appropriate remedies for future harm.364 
 What appeared to be an ending to five years of back and 
forth rulings and appeals was not quite over.  
“Before the Court awarded attorneys' fees, the NCAA 
agreed to pay $54,500,000.00 to settle the lawsuits. 
On August 31, 1999, the Court approved the 
settlement but did not rule on the allocation of the 
proceeds among class members. On August 31 and 
September 3, 1999, the Court awarded attorneys fees 
in the amount of $18,209,149.50 and costs in the 
amount of $1,749,302.80 to counsel for 
plaintiffs.”365 
 
In 2000, the court set out the terms of a revised settlement 
allocation fund based on the trial testimony of plaintiffs’ 
expert; which was upheld on appeal as a reasonable method for 
fair payment allocation. Finally, all of the excess damages 
from the settlement, after paying out the coaches and 













                                                          
364 Id. at 350. 
 







North Shore Hematology & Oncology Associates v. Bristol-Myers 
Squibb Co., Civil Action No. 1:04cv248(EGS)(2004)(Platinol) 
 
This case is notable because: 1. The plaintiffs obtained 
a $50,000,000 verdict in a Section 2 case; 2. This case 
settled in less than one year after its inception as a follow-
up to an FTC case.366 
Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS) developed cisplatin, a drug 
used to treat certain types of cancer, under the brand names 
“Platinol” and “Platinol AQ” (Hereinafter collectively 
referred to as “Platinol”).367  Both drugs contain the same 
active ingredient, cisplatin.368  The Plaintiffs, direct 
                                                          
366   This case was filed on May 22, 2004.  The Final Order 
Approving Settlement was entered on November 30, 2004.  Docket 
entries available at: https://courtlink.lexisnexis.com/ 
DocketSearch/Results.aspx.  The Federal Trade Commission filed 
the government case on April 23, 2003.  Complaint, In The 
Matter of Bristol-Myers Squibb Company, A Corporation, 
available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf.  The 
government case ended in a Consent Order on March 7, 2003.  
According to FTC Chairman Timothy Muris, the consent order 
“stands for an important proposition: competition must be on 
the merits, not through misusing the government to stifle your 
competition."  FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern 
of Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug 
Competition, available at: www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm.  
However, the government suit did not reimburse direct 
purchasers for the overcharges they paid BMS as a result of 
the company’s anticompetitive conduct. 
 
367  Notice of Settlement at 1. 
 
368  Id.  The only significant difference between the two drugs 
is that Platinol AQ is the aqueous form of the drug and 
Platinol is a freeze-dried powder form. 
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purchasers of Platinol, sued BMS for maintaining an illegal 
monopoly in the cisplatin market, by fraudulently obtaining 
patents and filing a series of “sham” patent infringement 
lawsuits.369 
Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the FDA grants pharmaceutical 
companies a statutory monopoly when the company develops a new 
drug.  During this exclusivity period, the drug manufacturer 
is free from generic competition.  When the exclusivity period 
ends, generic manufacturers may apply to the FDA for approval 
to sell generic bioequivalents.370  During the generic approval 
process, if a name brand manufacturer files a patent 
infringement suit, it triggers an automatic thirty-month stay 
against generic entry into the market. 
Direct purchasers of Platinol sued BMS on February 13, 
2004 under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.371  They argued that 
BMS unlawfully maintained its monopoly by filing a series of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
369  The market was defined as Platinol which was purchased 
from “Bristol Myers Squibb Company or its wholly-owned 
subsidiary Oncology Therapeutic Network, Inc., any time from 
June 19, 1999 through September 8, 2004” in the United States.  
Id. 
 
370  Generic bioequivalents offer consumers the same 
therapeutic value and active ingredients as their brand name 
counterparts, at a significantly lower cost.  Id. 
 
371  They accused BMS and its wholly-owned subsidiary, Oncology 
Therapeutic Network, Inc. of maintaining a monopoly from June 
28, 1999 to September 8, 2004.  Notice of Settlement at 1. 
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frivolous patent infringement suits against would-be generic 
competitors.  Due to the absence of generic competition, they 
claimed that they were forced to purchase Platinol from BMS at 
supracompetitive prices.  
The putative anticompetitive conduct began in 1995, when 
several generic manufacturers applied for FDA approval of 
generic cisplatin.372  Less than two months before BMS’ patents 
were set to expire, BMS applied for a new patent.373  BMS 
stated it had recently discovered Platinol had additional 
properties that were not included in the earlier patents.374  
Specifically, the prior patents did not contain any “protected 
from light” language.375  The plaintiffs argued that it was 
common knowledge that Platinol and other Platinum-based 
compounds had to be protected from light.376  According to the 
                                                          
372  Complaint at ¶ 111, In Re Bristol Myers Squibb Co., Before 
Federal Trade Commission, available at: 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/bristolmyerscmp.pdf 
 
373  Id. at ¶ 115. 
 
374  Id. at ¶ 113. 
 
375  Cisplatin is a platinum-based compound, which is sensitive 
from light.  More importantly to the plaintiffs, the new 
patent would also prolong BMS’ statutory monopoly in the 
cisplatin market for another thirty months. 
 
376  According to the plaintiffs, the fact that Platinol had to 
be protected from light was common knowledge in the medical 
field for some time.  In fact, they argued that it was known 
as far back as 1967, when this information was published in a 
widely-read medical journal. Id. at ¶ 113.   
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plaintiffs, BMS filed a series of “sham” infringement suits in 
order to prevent generic competition.377  
This case settled less than one year after its inception, 
for $50 million in cash.378  The Court awarded Plaintiffs’ 
Counsel 33% of the settlement fund.379  The 33% award in this 
case has been cited as precedent in other complex antitrust 


















                                                                                                                                                                                    
  
377 In the first year generic competitors entered the cisplatin 
market, Platinol sales decreased by fifty percent.  Notice of 
Settlement at 4.  November 30, 2004. 
 




380 The judge in Remeron cited this case as precedent, noting 
that “the requested fee is consistent with awards in other 
complex antitrust actions involving the pharmaceutical 
industry”.In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 
2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013, 27044. Id. 
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In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litigation (No. II), 186 F.R.D. 403 
(S .D. Tex. 1999), 142 Oil & Gas Rep. 532 (1999) 
 
 This is a noteworthy example of private enforcement  
because: 1) it involved a nationwide class action;  2) the 
case brought a sizeable amount of cash to the class: $164.2 
million under the Global settlement, plus $29.3 million in the 
Stand Alone settlements, a total of $193.5 million;381 3) the 
attorney fees were 25% of the total amount. 
 
In 1996 a class action suit was filed against 39 oil 
companies in federal court on behalf of a putative nationwide 
class of royalty and working interest owners alleging that 
those companies, in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 
conspired for over a decade to artificially depress payments 
made for oil leases.382  These claims, asserted by the 
plaintiffs in the McMahon case, depended on proving that 
defendant oil producers and transporters entered a price-
fixing conspiracy to depress posted prices, and thereby, 
depressed the market price for oil at the lease.   
One year later, the lead plaintiffs in the class action 
suits presented a settlement agreement with 24 defendants.  
Before any ruling on that settlement, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation transferred these suits to the 
District Court, S.D. Texas, for coordinated and consolidated 
proceedings as In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litigation.383 
                                                          
381 None of the recovery came from a foreign corporation. 
 
382  McMahon Found. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 98 Fed. Appx. 267 
(5th Cir. 2004). 
 
383 186 F.R.D. 403, 408 (S.D Tex. 1999). Prior to the 
class action, there was significant litigation and discovery 
in several actions consolidated in this case.  Mr. Godfrey 
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The Court facilitated the division of the parties present 
into four groups: Settling Plaintiffs (including Godfrey and 
Kipple (the two lead plaintiffs in the class action suits 
[above]), and counsel for related settling cases), Settling 
Defendants, Non-settling Plaintiffs and Non-settling 
Defendants.384  The Settling Defendants and Settling Plaintiffs 
presented testimony in support of their respective positions 
and in support of the Global Settlement.  In addition to the 
Global Settlement, counsel for both the Settling Plaintiffs 
and Non-settling Plaintiffs reached seven distinct settlement 
agreements with seven remaining Non-settling Defendants, which 
make up the Stand Alone Settlements.385  Since these seven 
defendants represented all of the remaining significant 
defendants in the oil industry, the final approval, given by 
the Court, of these Stand Alone Settlements along with the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
began investigating this litigation in 1993, and entered 
global settlement negotiations when on the brink of beginning 
a class certification hearing. Id.  Actual notice of the eight 
settlements was attempted to all class members who had 
received payments from Defendants since 1986.  In McMahon, the 
plaintiffs were forced to amend their initial complaint, and 
subsequently, they successfully defended their amended 
complaint from motions to dismiss by various defendants. 
McMahon Found., 98 Fed. Appx. at 267-70.  There were 
approximately five million documents in the MDL-1206 document 
depository, and it is estimated that there were several 
million more documents which counsel have made available for 
review. Id. at 408. 
 
384 Id. at 408. 
 
385 The Stand Alone Settlements adopt the basic structure of 
the Global Settlement with limited exceptions, using the same 
definitions and releasing the same set of underpayment claims 
for the same class of royalty and working interest owners.  
The important difference between the Global and Stand Alone 
Settlements is the consideration provided and the rate of 
recovery to certain class members for their royalty and/or 
working interest barrels. 
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Global Settlement meant the conclusion of the multidistrict 
litigation. 
 In order to understand the basis of the plaintiff’s 
claims for damages, it is necessary to explain some background 
information about the oil industry – in particular, about the 
movement of crude oil from the well or “lease” to the trading 
centers.  There are certain kinds of transactions that take 
place at the two transfer points: 1) at the lease, where oil 
is transferred from the well into a transportation system of 
some type, and 2) at the trading center.  At the trading 
centers oil is sold at a price which unquestionably represents 
the actual market value of the oil at those trading centers.  
The market price at the trading center is certainly a reliable 
measure of market value because hundreds of thousands of 
barrels are purchased each day at these centers by numerous 
refiners which compete for these barrels.  The common factual 
issue is that if there was a differential between the market 
price at the trading center and the posted price greater than 
the value added by its movement to the market center.  The 
legal issue is, if this differential was greater than the 
value added, who was entitled to the profit?   
The plaintiff’s expert witness, Dr. Leitzinger,  
estimated the damages from 1986 to 1998.  Including interest, 
the estimate of damages due to alleged underpayments by Global 
Defendants amounted to $358.8 million.386  Under the Global 
Settlement the first tier royalty owners recovered $116.19 
million, 32% of their estimated damages.  The court accepted 
these calculated figures because it later stated “compared 
                                                          
386 In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. at 434. 
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with other complex commercial class action settlements, a 
recovery of over 32% is substantial.”387 
 Each of the settlements in this case had established a 
common fund for the benefit of the nationwide class of royalty 
and working interest owners of the crude oil companies and the 
funds totaled over $190 million.  Each settlement provided 
that attorney’s fees will not exceed 25% of the Settlement 
Amount.388  The Court acknowledged that “the plaintiff 
attorneys have had to work harder to represent this class due 
to its size and diversity; they have not simply benefited from 
the fact that, a single tortuous act harmed millions of people 
rather than thousands.”389  It stated that the case required 
such a large initial investment by the attorneys, and was made 
more difficult due to the sheer number and variety of 
                                                          
 
387 See In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust Litig., 148 F.R.D. 
297, 325 (N.D. Ga. 1993).  The court in that case stated that 
applying the range of value of the combined settlement, the 
court finds that the settlement in this action amounts to 
approximately 12.7-15.3% of the estimated $2 billion minimum 
possible untrebled recovery. 
 
388 In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. at 434. The 
Fifth Circuit in Johnson recommended 12 factors for the 
district courts to use as they reconsidered the award: 1) time 
and labor required; 2) the novelty and difficulty of the 
questions involved; 3) the skill required to perform the legal 
service properly; 4) the preclusion of other employment by the 
attorney due to acceptance of the case; 5) the customary fee; 
6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; 7) time limitation 
imposed by the client or the circumstances; 8) the amount 
involved and results obtained; 9)the experience, reputation 
and ability of the attorneys involved; 10)the “undesirability” 
of the case; 11) the nature and length of the professional 
relationship with the client; and 12)awards in similar cases.  
See Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, 488 F.2d 714, 717-19 
(5th Cir. 1974).  
 
389 In re Lease Oil Antitrust Litig., 186 F.R.D. at 447.  
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members.390  The Court concluded by stating that since the 
attorneys had done extraordinary work, had tackled novel 
issues, and had gained a relatively high recovery and 
substantial benefit for the class, and since the size of the 
settlement did not warrant a drastic reduction in the 
percentage of the fee in these circumstances, the attorneys’ 
fee award of 25% was accepted.391          
 With respect with the Second Tier Claimants, the expert 
witness calculated the oil barrels were damaged by 32 cents 
per barrel while those barrels were damaged by 49 cents per 
barrel.  The Claimants would then receive 3% of their 
estimated damages for early barrels and 13% of their estimated 
damages for late barrels.  Thus, the Plaintiffs could recover 
$48 million for the Claimants under the Global Settlement.  
The Court found that the recovery aspects of the Global 























391 Id. at 448-49. 
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Netscape Comm. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., Per Local Civil Rule 
40.5, Related to Civil Action Nos. 98-1232 and 98-1233 (D.D.C. 
2002)(a/k/a AOL v. Microsoft).  
 
The Settlement of the lawsuit brought by Netscape 
Communications against Microsoft is noteworthy because (1) it 
was in large part a follow on private suit to the combined 
federal and state government suit against Microsoft392 (2) it 
resulted in a cash settlement of $750 million393; (3) the 
parties who were once fierce competitors have agreed to become 
collaborators of software and distribution of each other’s 
products394; and (4) it leaves outstanding the issue of 
anticompetitive consequences for consumers of Microsoft’s 
continuing domination in the browser and operating system 
markets.395     
In the mid 1990’s Netscape Navigator, an internet 
browser, was dominant with over a 70% share in the browser 
                                                          
392 United States v. Microsoft, Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233 (D.D.C. 
1998).   
 
393 David D. Kilpatrick & Steve Lohr, Microsoft to Pay AOL $750 
Million; End to 'Long War,' New York Times A6 (May 30, 2003); 
David E. Vise, Microsoft, AOL Bridge Digital Divide, 
Washington Post E1 (May 30, 2003); Julia Angwin, Robert A. 
Guth, and John R. Wilke, Microsoft Settles AOL Browser Suit – 
Software Maker to Pay $750 million to Its Rival, Wall Street 
Journal A3 (May, 20, 2003).  
 
394 Id.  
 
395 A Big Deal; Microsoft and AOL Time Warner, The Economist, 
June 7, 2003 at 67. 
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market.396 Netscape was unique as it could be run on different 
operating systems as well as it could be used as a platform 
itself to write software applications.397 The emergence of this 
new browser worried executives at Microsoft.398 Their main fear 
was that Netscape would threaten their Windows monopoly in the 
operating system market.399 
Windows is the dominant operating system as it is used in 
more than 90% of the PC’s in this country.400 Its dominance is 
mainly attributed to the fact that it can run a large number 
of software applications, many of which are written to run 
exclusively on Windows.401 Consequently, Microsoft never faced 
a threat from a competing operating system.402 However, with 
the emergence of Netscape, Microsoft now faced a threat that a 
browser that can be run on any operating system could be used 
                                                          
396 Government’s Complaint at 2, United States v. Microsoft 
Corp. (D.D.C. 1998)(Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233).   
 




399 Id.   
 
400 Id. at 1.  
 





as a rival platform that could run software programs.403 
Therefore, the multi-billion dollar Windows monopoly was in 
jeopardy. 
 What ensued was the so-called “browser wars” in which 
Microsoft sought to minimize the threat to its Windows 
monopoly by increasing its share of the browser market.404 
Microsoft’s browser, Internet Explorer, was the alternative to 
Netscape and an extensive campaign was launched to market 
it.405   
This campaign garnered the attention of Department of 
Justice, who along with Attorney Generals from 19 different 
states filed suit against Microsoft in 1998.406 After more than 
a year of proceedings the District Court for the District 
Columbia issued its findings of facts and conclusions of law 
that Microsoft had engaged in an anticompetitive campaign 
against Netscape.407 Following the conclusions found in the 
government’s case, American Online (AOL), which had purchased 
                                                          
403 Id. at 2.  
 
404 Id. at 4.  
 
405 Id.  
 
406 Plaintiff’s Complaint at 8, Netscape Comm. Corp. v. 
Microsoft Corp., Per Local Civil Rule 40.5, Related to Civil 
Action Nos. 98-1232 and 98-1233 (D.D.C. 2002). 
 
407 Id.  
 152
Netscape, privately sued Microsoft.408 AOL’s allegations 
substantially mirrored the government’s complaint of 
Microsoft’s anticompetitive conduct.409  
Specifically, they made several allegations. First, they 
accused Microsoft of tying Internet Explorer to the Windows 
operating system410. Second, they alleged exclusionary 
agreements that prevented other companies from selling, 
buying, marketing or using Netscape Navigator.411 Lastly, they 
alleged that Microsoft monopolized and attempted to monopolize 
the PC operating system and browser markets.412  
 In May 2003, AOL and Microsoft reached a settlement.413 
The two companies had agreed to several terms. First, 
Microsoft was to pay AOL $750 million.414 Second, AOL will 
receive a seven year, royalty free use of Internet Explorer on 
its online service as well as long term license to use 
                                                          
408 Id. at 1.    
 
409 Id. at 12-19.; United States v. Microsoft (D.D.C. 
1998)(Nos. 98-1232 & 98-1233). 
 
410 Id.  
 
411 Id. at 5-6.  
 
412 Id. at 15-16.   
 
413 David D. Kilpatrick & Steve Lohr, Microsoft to Pay AOL $750 
Million; End to 'Long War,' New York Times A6 (Mar. 30, 2003).  
 
414 Id.   
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Microsoft’s media software.415 Third, Microsoft agreed to 
distribute AOL CD ROM’s to Original Equipment Manufacturers 
around the world.416 Lastly, both companies agreed to make each 
other’s instant messaging services interoperable with one 
another.417   
 Overall, Microsoft and AOL have entered into a win-win 
collaborative effort. Microsoft will be able to further expand 
the dissemination and use of its software into even more 
markets.418 On the other hand, AOL is able to get a badly 
needed infusion of cash as it was $25 billion in debt.419 
Moreover, AOL was able to expand the dissemination of its 
fledgling internet service as well as expand its appeal with 
the royalty free use of Microsoft software.420  
While the settlement might be a good deal for both 
companies, what about the consumers? Critics have charged that 
                                                          
415 Id.  
 
416 Julia Angwin, Robert A. Guth & John R. Wilke, Microsoft 
Settles AOL Browser Suit --- Software Maker to Pay $750 
Million to Its Rival; Wide Collaboration Is Set, Wall Street 
Journal A3 (Mar. 30, 2003).  
 
417 Id.  
 
418 A Big Deal; Microsoft and AOL Time Warner, The Economist, 
June 7, 2003 at 67.  
 
419 Id.  
 
420 Id.  
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this settlement is only about the two companies’ future in 
digital media and not about past anticompetitive behavior.421 
Furthermore, this settlement might be the “final nail in the 
Netscape Coffin.”422 This is so because this settlement does 
nothing to address Internet Explorer’s continuing domination 
in the browser market.423 Therefore, consumers are still left 
with little choice in both the browser and operating system 
markets.424     
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Oncology & Radiation Associates v. Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co., 
Case No. 1:04CV00248 (D.D.C.) (Taxol). 
 
This case is notable because: 1. The class obtained a 
$65,815,000.00 settlement in a Section 2 rule of reason 
action; 2. This was a private action which preceded government 
actions against the manufacturer. 
Bristol Myers Squibb (BMS) manufactures a chemotherapy 
drug under the brand name, Taxol.425  The active ingredient in 
Taxol is paclitaxel.426  BMS developed paclitaxel during a 
research venture with the National Cancer Institute.427  The 
National Cancer Institute awarded BMS the right to manufacture 
paclitaxel exclusively for five years.428   
When the exclusivity period ended, generic competitors 
attempted to enter the paclitaxel market.429  Generic drugs 
have the same therapeutic value and active ingredients as 
                                                          
425 Notice Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action And Hearing 
Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v. 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No. 
1:01CV02313 (EGS) at 2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003)(available at 
http://www.completeclaimsolutions.com/taxol/pdf/notice.pdf). 
 
426 Patrick Cafferty, Miller Faucher & Cafferty LLP,  Collusion 
and Other Anticompetitive Practices: A Survey of Class Action 










their brand name counterparts. 430  However, generic drugs cost 
significantly less than their name brand counterparts.431   
Direct purchasers of paclitaxel filed suit against BMS in 
2001.432  The suit alleged that BMS engaged in anticompetitive 
conduct in order to keep generic equivalents of Taxol off the 
market from January 1999 to March 2003.433  Specifically, 
direct purchasers argued that BMS abused the FDA patent 
process by filing frivolous lawsuits against generic drug 
manufacturers, and paid off would-be competitors to stay out 
of the paclitaxel market.434  Some have estimated during this 
period, BMS made $3 million each day on Taxol.435     
                                                          
430  FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of 
Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug 





432 Notice Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action And Hearing 
Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v. 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No. 
1:01CV02313 (EGS) at 2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003). 







435 Common Cause, Prescription For Power: How Brand Name Drug 
Companies Prevailed Over Consumers in Washington, 
http://www.hatch2006.org/positionpapers/ppPharmaceuticalReport
.html#_4 (June 12, 2001). 
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Drug manufacturers have to record patents related to 
brand name drugs in the FDA publication referred to as the 
“Orange Book”.436  When a generic drug manufacturer seeks FDA 
approval, the generic manufacturer must certify to the FDA 
that the drug will not infringe upon any patents in the Orange 
Book.437  The generic manufacturer must put the brand name 
manufacturer on notice of its intentions to introduce a 
generic equivalent.438  If, within 45 days, the brand name drug 
manufacturer files a patent infringement suit against the 
generic drug manufacturer, the FDA automatically delays entry 
of the generic drug into the market for thirty months.439  The 
purchasers alleged that BMS abused this process, by filing a 
series of baseless patent infringement suits in order to delay 
generic competitors from entering the market.440 
In addition to filing frivolous patent suits in order to 
delay the entry of generic paclitaxel, the plaintiffs also 
alleged that BMS colluded with American Bioscience Inc.(ABI), 
                                                          
436 FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of 
Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug 









440 Id.  
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a generic manufacturer, to settle its “sham” patent case.  BMS 
settled this case with ABI for over $70 million in exchange 
for ABI’s promise that it would refrain from obtaining a 
patent for generic paclitaxel.441   
The direct purchasers filed suit against BMS and ABI in 
November 2001, and the parties settled the suit on August 14, 
2003.442  The class of direct purchasers received 
$65,815,000.00.443  BMS paid $65 million, and ABI paid 
$815,000.00.444   
The Court noted that by the time the parties reached a 
settlement, private counsel had undertaken an “intensive” 
investigation, examined thousands of pages of documents, 
retained and consulted with experts; and had “significant” 
                                                          
441 FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of 
Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug 
Competition, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm (March 7, 
2003). 
 
442 Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, Antitrust, 
http://www.cmht.com/antitrust.php (accessed June 4, 2006). 
 
443 Notice Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action And Hearing 
Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v. 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No. 






knowledge of issues such as liability, causation, and 
damages.445 The attorneys were awarded 30% in legal fees.446 
Following the commencement of this private action in 
2001, several government actions were brought against BMS on 
behalf of indirect purchasers.447  In 2002, several states and 
the District of Columbia filed suits against BMS.448  The 
Federal Trade Commission filed a complaint against BMS in 
2003, alleging the same anticompetitive conduct.449  This case 
was resolved when the FTC and BMS entered into a consent order 
in which BMS agreed to cease its anticompetitive practices in 
order to hamper the entry of generic drugs into the paclitaxel 
                                                          
445 Notice Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action And Hearing 
Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v. 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No. 
1:01CV02313 (EGS) at 2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003)(available at 
http://www.completeclaimsolutions.com/taxol/pdf/notice.pdf).  
 
446 Email from Steig Olson, Esq. to Tara Shoemaker, 
Re: Oncology & Radiation Associates PA Litigation (June 5, 
2006). 
447 Notice Of Proposed Settlement Of Class Action And Hearing 
Regarding Settlement, Oncology & Radiation Associates v. 
Bristol Myers Squibb Co. and American Bioscience, Inc., No. 
1:01CV02313 (EGS) at 2 (D.D.C. May 13, 2003)(available at 
http://www.completeclaimsolutions.com/taxol/pdf/notice.pdf).  
 
448  Terry Carter, A Deluge of Lawsuits 88 A.B.A.J. 45 
(December, 2002). 
 
449  FTC, Plaintiff’s Complaint In the Matter of Bristol-Myers 
Squibb 26, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/04/bristolmyerssquibbcmp.pdf  
(April 14, 2003). 
 
 160
market.450  When generic paclitaxel finally entered the market, 



















                                                          
450  Marcus Meier, Overview of FTC Antitrust Actions In Health 
Care Services And Products 4, http://www.ftc.gov/bc/ 
0604hcupdate.pdf (April 2006). 
 
451  FTC, FTC Charges Bristol-Myers Squibb with Pattern of 
Abusing Government Processes to Stifle Generic Drug 
Competition, http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/03/bms.htm (March 7, 
2003). 
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Stop N Shop Supermarket Company, et. al.v. Smithkline Beecham 
Corp. Civil Action No. 03-CV-4578 (E.D. Pa. 2005), and; 
Nichols v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., No. 00-CV-6222 (E.D. 
Pa.2005) (Paxil) 
 
These cases are notable because: 1:  The Stop N Shop 
direct purchaser case resulted in a “megafund” settlement of 
$100 million dollars; 2: The Court awarded Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
in the Stop N Shop case 20% of the megafund settlement because 
of the extraordinary quality of their work; 3: Plaintiffs in 
the Nichols case, an indirect purchaser action, received a 
settlement of $65 million against Defendant Smithkline Beecham 
for the same anticompetitive conduct, and awarded counsel a 
30% fee; 4:  The Plaintiffs in both cases coordinated 
discovery during the litigation; 5:  These cases were brought 
against Smithkline Beecham under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
in the absence of any formal government investigation or 
lawsuit.  
The plaintiffs in Stop N Shop Supermarket were direct 
purchasers of Paxil.  The Plaintiffs in Nichols  were indirect 
purchasers of Paxil.  Defendant Smithkline Beecham (“SKB”) 
manufactured the antidepressant drug paroxetine hydrochloride 
under the brand Paxil.   
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The plaintiffs claimed one count of monopolization under 
the Section 2 of the Sherman Act.452  Both classes of 
plaintiffs alleged that SKB abused the FDA patent approval 
process in order to illegally maintain its Paxil monopoly.  
Because SKB developed the drug, the company was entitled to a 
five-year statutory monopoly under FDA policy.453  After this 
exclusivity period ended, SKB filed numerous patent 
infringement lawsuits against generic drug manufacturers that 
attempted to enter the paclitaxel market.454   
The plaintiffs argued that SKB filed these “sham” 
lawsuits to illegally maintain their monopoly in the 
paroxetine market and fix prices.455  The Stop N Shop direct 
purchaser plaintiffs estimated that SKB’s anticompetitive 
conduct cost them $880 million in damages.456  The indirect 
purchaser plaintiffs in the Nichols case estimated the 
                                                          
452 Id at 8. 
 
453  J. Padova, Memorandum accompanying Order Granting 
Attorneys’ Fees,  Stop N Shop Supermarket, et. al., p.1.  May 
19, 2005. 
 
454 Id at 2. 
 
455 Id at 2. 
  
456 Id at 21. 
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overcharge that SKB passed along to consumers to be 35 
percent.457 
During discovery, SKB was facing two lawsuits alleging 
the same anticompetitive conduct, the Stop N Shop case brought 
by direct purchasers, and, the Nichols case brought on behalf 
of indirect purchasers.458  Plaintiffs’ counsel in both cases 
coordinated discovery with each other, leading to a timely 
result in Stop N Shop.459  Both of these private cases were 
brought against SKB without of any prior government case or 
even a formal investigation.460   
The Stop N Shop case settled about one year after its 
inception.  Plaintiffs’ counsel filed the Motion For Class 
Certification and the Motion For Preliminary Approval Of 
Settlement with the District Court on the same day.461  The 
$100 million settlement represented about 11% of their 
                                                          
457Smithkline Beecham: News of FTC Probe Triggers Dual Suits 
Over Paxil,  Class Action Reporter, December 14, 2000 Vol. 2, 
No. 142.  
 
458  Id. at 9. 
 
459  Id. at 9. 
  
460  Id. at 29. 
 
461  J. Padova, Memorandum accompanying Order Granting 
Attorneys Fees, Stop N Shop Supermarket v. Smithkline Beecham 
Corp., p. 13, May 19, 2005.  
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estimated damages.462  This was a “megafund” settlement, 
meaning that the case resulted in a recovery of $100 million 
or more. 
Attorneys’ fees are typically awarded on a sliding scale, 
with the percentage awarded decreasing as the amount of 
recovery increases.463  Plaintiffs’ counsel requested 30% of 
the settlement fund,464 and none of the 90 sophisticated 
corporations which comprised the direct purchaser class 
objected to counsels’ request for 30%.465 
Ultimately, however, the Court awarded 20% of the 
settlement fund to Plaintiffs’ counsel.466  The Court observed 
that “the litigation presented enormously complex legal and 
factual issues…moreover, this action was riskier than many 
other antitrust actions because there was no prior government 
investigation, or prior finding of civil or criminal liability 
based on antitrust violations”.467   
                                                          
462  Id. at 21. 
 
463  Id. at 22. 
 
464  Id. at 24. 
 
465  Id. at 35. 
 
466  Id. at 44.  
 
467  PA Judge Slashes Fees in Paxil Case, Class Action 
Reporter, June 1, 2005, Vol 7, No. 107 
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Although the number of hours plaintiffs’ counsel spent on 
the case was relatively small, Judge Padova commented, "The 
court recognizes that plaintiffs' counsel should not  
be penalized for prosecuting this case in an efficient manner, 
or for keeping down the number of hours which they were 
required to devote to this case by coordinating merits 
discovery with plaintiffs' counsel” (in the indirect purchaser 
case).468 
Judge Padova expressed the idea that although it is 
typical for courts to decrease the percentage amount awarded 
for attorneys’ fees as the settlement amount increases, there 
is no hard and fast rule.  In a case such as this, a 20% award 
was justified because class counsel’s work was so “timely and 
well done”.469   
Judge Padova also granted attorneys fees in the Nichols 
case.  From the $65 million settlement, Plaintiffs’ Counsel 
received $19.5 million dollars, which is 30%.470   Attorneys in 
the Nichols case spent more than 17,000 hours working on the 
                                                          
468  J. Padova, Memorandum accompanying Order Granting 
Attorneys Fees, p. 30, Stop N Shop Supermarket v. Smithkline 
Beecham Corp., May 19, 2005. 
 
469  Id. 
 
470  PA Judge Slashes Fees in Paxil Case, Class Action 
Reporter, June 1, 2005, Vol 7, No. 107 
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case to reach the settlement.471  It is believed that SKB paid 
millions more to private plaintiffs that opted out of the 
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 In Re: Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 93 F. 
Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 
The polypropylene litigation is important because 1. it 
started with a different private antitrust suit, that led to a 
government conviction, that led to this litigation; 2. the 
government suit led to a judicial finding of price fixing and 
an executive serving prison time; 3) the cases involved a 
nationwide class action, 4) the settlements totaled $49.7 
million; 4) Legal fees were 33 1/3% plus expenses. 
 
In 1993 Diamond Rug & Carpet Mills, a private carpet and 
fibermaker sued Shaw Industries,473 the nation’s largest 
publicly traded carpetmaker, for illegal monopolization.474  
The suit alleged that Shaw had illegal monopolies in the 
manufacture of residential carpet and polypropylene fiber, 
that Shaw tried to lure Diamond into a price-fixing scheme, 
and that Shaw cajoled Dupont, the maker of the widely popular 
treated nylon carpet fiber called Stainmaster, into refusing 
to sell the Stainmaster fiber to Diamond.475 
                                                          
473 See Susan Harte, Suit Threatens Fiber of Carpet Industry, 
Shaw Accused of Holding Monopolies, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., July 6, 







The suit against Shaw attracted the attention of the 
Justice Department, and it began investigating several carpet 
makers that used Dupont’s Stainmaster nylon carpet fiber, 
including Beaulieu of America, Mohawk Industries, and Sunrise 
Carpet Industries.476  In late 1994, Diamond and Shaw settled 
their suit and had the results sealed.477   
On June 7, 1995 the Justice Department brought charges 
against Sunrise Carpet Industries and its Chairman, Johnny A. 
West.  The charges stated that Sunrise and Mr. West “engaged 
in a combination and conspiracy to fix, raise, and maintain 
prices of twenty-ounce level-loop polypropylene ("poly") 
carpet in the United States” between October 1992 and, at 
least, June 1993 which violated Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act.478   
Sunrise and Mr. West plead guilty to one count of price 
fixing, and a federal judge sentenced Mr. West to a twelve 
                                                          
476 See Susan Harte, Shaw-Diamond Quarrel Possible Trigger, 
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., December 14, 1995, at 6F. 
 
477 See Beenea A. Hyatt, Firms Pile on Carpet Lawsuit; Federal 
Case To Go To Trial By 1999, CHATTANOOGA TIMES, October 8, 1997, 
at B1. 
 
478 Complaint, U.S. v West (N.D. Ga. 1995) (1:95-CR-240). 
Sunrise and Mr. West also were accused of agreeing with fellow 
carpet makers to charge prices above certain levels on 
polypropylene carpet and of communicating with fellow carpet 
makers on prices for polypropylene carpets.  Id. 
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month prison sentence and fined him $150,000; Sunrise was 
fined $750,000.479 
A civil complaint was then filed by seventeen plaintiffs, 
who were direct purchasers, against Sunrise Industries, and in 
December 1995 six other carpet makers were added as defendants 
to the suit.480  The new defendants included Shaw Industries, 
Mohawk Industries, and Beaulieu of America, the three largest 
carpet makers in the country.481  In 1997, the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of Georgia granted the 
plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class Action,482 and it was 
estimated that were potentially 4,000 to 5,000 plaintiffs in 
the suit.   
After class certification, the litigation proceeded and 
the next major development was in 2000 when the court ruled on 
                                                          
479 The sentencing judge stated that “Mr. West provided complete 
information about a multi-corporation price-fixing scheme,” 
but there were no more indictments brought forth by the 
Department of Justice.  The Department of Justice closed its 
investigation of price fixing in the carpet industry in 1997.  
See Susan Harte, Sunrise Carpet Chief Sentenced in Antitrust 
Case, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., September 16, 1995, at 3B. 
 
480 See Don Plummer, Carpet Pricing Challenged; An Expanded 
Lawsuit Now Targets the Industry’s Biggest Manufacturers,  
ATLANTA J. AND CONST., December 14, 1995, at 1F. 
 
481 In 1995, Shaw Industries had $2.96 billion in annual sales, 
Mohawk Industries: $1.64 billion, and Beaulieu of America: 
$903 million.  Id. 
 
482   See In Re: Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 996 F. 
Supp 18 (N.D. Ga. 1997). 
 170
the Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Expert Testimony.483  The 
Plaintiffs intended to introduce the testimony of an economist 
to “analyze whether the conditions in the polypropylene carpet 
market during a particular period were consistent with 
competitive or collusive activity;”484 and an econometrician 
who had developed a model “to forecast competitive prices 
during the time period at issue, and identify any difference 
between the actual prices of polypropylene carpet and the 
forecasted competitive prices during that period.”485  The 
expert estimated that there has been an overcharge of 8.3% by 
Defendants which resulted in the Plaintiffs being overcharged 
$222,963,542.486  The court concluded that the Plaintiffs’ 
expert witnesses satisfied the Daubert criteria and denied 
Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Testimony.487    
Shortly after the court’s decision regarding the expert 
witnesses, Shaw Industries and Mohawk Industries announced 
they had agreed to settle the lawsuit.  Shaw agreed to pay 
$27.5 million and Mohawk agreed to pay $13.5 million.488  A 
                                                          
483 See In Re: Polypropylene Carpet Antitrust Litigation, 93 F. 
Supp. 2d 1348 (N.D. Ga. 2000). 
 




486 Id. at 1360. 
 
487 Id. at 1370, 1352.  
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year later, in March 2001, Beaulieu of America also agreed to 
settle for $8.7 million.489  The final aggregate settlement 
amount was $49.7 million.   
After the settlement was reached, Judge Murphy granted 
the Plaintiffs motion for attorneys’ fess and reimbursement. 
The court awarded the attorneys fees in the amount of 33 1/3% 
of the total settlement fund plus accrued interest.  The court 






















                                                                                                                                                                                    
488 See Patti Bond, Shaw, Mohawk Will Settle in Carpet Price-
Fixing Suit, ATLANTA J. AND CONST., August 12, 2000, at 3F. 
 
489 See Beaulieu of America Settles Antitrust Class Actions, THE 
WEEKLY NEWSPAPER FOR THE HOME FURNISHING NETWORK, March 5, 2001, at 32. 
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RealNetworks, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., Civil Action No. JFM-
04-968, MDL Docket No. 1332 (D. Md.) (2005 settlement) 
 
 This settlement of the lawsuit brought by RealNetworks, 
Inc., (“Real”) against Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) is 
noteworthy because (1) it was the last of the major competitor 
lawsuits pending against Microsoft; (2) the recovery will be 
at least $478 million, and possibly as much as $761 million, 
depending on how many subscribers Real receives from its 
collaborative efforts on MSN; (3) the parties agreed to 
cooperate on the creation and distribution of what had 
previously been competing products; and (4) it resulted in the 
withdrawal of claims against Microsoft before competition 
authorities in the European Union (“EU”) and South Korea 
(“Korea”) as well as the dismissal of Real’s complaint, 
involving Section 1 and 2 claims, in the United States. 
 This was not a “follow on case” to the Department of 
Justice’s (“DoJ”) earlier lawsuit against Microsoft, although 
it alleged similar misconduct by Microsoft. The DoJ case 
concerned Microsoft’s bundling of its web browser with the 
Windows operating system (“Windows”). Real’s lawsuit, on the 
other hand, concerned a different product, i.e., Microsoft’s 
bundling of the media player with Windows. In this sense, 
RealNetwork’s lawsuit could be called a “follow on case” to 
the EU’s preliminary decision in August 2003 that Microsoft’s 
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bundling violated the EU’s competition law.490 RealNetworks had 
participated in the EU proceedings as a witness,491 and in 
October 2004 RealNetworks filed a complaint with the Korea 
Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) regarding Microsoft’s bundling of 
the media player.492 
 Real filed the lawsuit against Microsoft on December 18, 
2003.493 Microsoft and Real competed directly against each 
                                                          
490 C|Net, EU Closes in on Microsoft Penalty (Aug. 6, 2003), 
available at 
http://news.com.com/EU+closes+in+on+Microsoft+penalty/2100-
1016_3-5060463.html. In March 2004, a final decision against 
Microsoft was issued. Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/37.792 
(2004) (Microsoft). Indeed, Real CEO Ron Glaser told 
shareholders in a cover letter to the 2003 Annual report that 
the “recent European Commission ruling against Microsoft 
regarding its media player bundling practices reinforces” the 
company’s view “that the merits of our case are relatively 
strong and that the funds spent pursuing this litigation will 
be money well spent.” RealNetworks, Inc., 2003 Annual Report 
115 (2004). 
 
491 Seattle Post-Intelligencer, RealNetworks sues Microsoft 
(Dec. 19, 2003), avaliable at 
http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/business/153239_realsuit19.html.  
 
492 InfoWorld, Korea to hear Microsoft Competition case (July 
8, 2005) available at 
http://www.infoworld.com/archives/emailPrint.jsp?R=printThis&A
=/article/05/07/08/HNmskorea_1.html. Ultimately, the KFTC 
fined Microsoft and ordered the firm to remedy its bundling 
practices. InfoWorld, Update: Microsoft fined $32M by South 




493 RealNetworks, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., Complaint, No. C03-
5717 (JW) (EAI) (N.D. Cal. 2003). The case was subsequently 
transferred to Judge Motz of the United States District Court 
for the District of Maryland, who was hearing most of the 
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other, as well as Apple and Macromedia (now a subsidiary of 
Adobe), in the media player, server and digital rights 
management (“DRM”) markets.494  
 Although not a true “follow on case” to the DoJ 
litigation, Real’s complaint relied heavily on the findings 
from the DoJ’s case against Microsoft, and alleged that 
Microsoft deliberately pursued the same tactics against Real’s 
products, e.g., bundling of competitive products with Windows, 
exclusive dealing contracts with PC manufacturers and content 
providers for Microsoft products, preventing consumers from 
removing Microsoft’s media player, denying Real access to 
technical information, etc., that Microsoft successfully used 
against Netscape’s web browser. Real alleged that the conduct 
enabled Microsoft to maintain its monopoly in PC operating 
systems as well as to create a monopoly in various digital 
media markets in violation of the Sherman and Cartwright Acts. 
More specifically, Real claimed illegal monopoly maintenance 
in the operating systems market attempted monopolization of 
the digital media markets under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 
as well as tying of the media player and the streaming media 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
follow on cases to the DoJ’s action against Microsoft. See, 
RealNetworks, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., No. JFM-04-968, MDL 
Docket No. 1332 (D. Md.). 
 
494 Michael J. DeMaria, Screaming Streaming Media, Network 
Computing, Feb. 2006, at 47. Interestingly, Real’s complaint 
does not list Macromedia as a competitor. Complaint, at 10. 
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server to the desktop and server operating systems and 
exclusive dealing under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.495  Real 
sought both damages and injunctive relief. 
 Real’s Annual Report for 2005 revealed that it had spent 
$1.6 million on legal fees for the case 2003, $11 million in 
2004, and $55 million in 2005.496 Real received $478 million 
from Microsoft in 2005.497 In the “Shareholder Letter” 
contained in the 2005 Annual Report, CEO Ron Glaser noted that 
the settlement had “substantially enlarged” Real’s profit for 
2005. More precisely, the company would not have “returned to 
GAAP profitability” without the settlement.498 But for the $478 
million from Microsoft, Real would have suffered a $166 
million net loss for 2005.499 
 In addition to the $478 million paid to Real in 2005, 
Microsoft agreed to pay Real an additional $283 million over 
                                                          
495 RealNetworks, Inc., v. Microsoft Corp., Complaint, No. C03-
5717 (JW) (EAI) 46-55 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 
496 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 28 (2006). These 
were not immaterial costs for RealNetworks. The legal fees 
equaled 1% of Real’s total net revenue for 2003, 4% for 2004, 
and 17% of the net revenue for 2005. Id. at 31. 
 
497 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 30 (2006). The 
settlement payment exceeded net revenues in 2005 by $153 
million. Id. at 28, 30. 
 
498 “Shareholder Letter,“ reprinted in RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 
Annual Report (2006). 
 
499 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 28 (2006). 
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the next two years.500 Microsoft also agreed to “promote and 
integrate” Real’s music and game services with Microsoft’s MSN 
network.501 The $283 million may be reduced depending on how 
many subscribers Real receives from the collaborative efforts 
on MSN.502 Microsoft agreed to provide Real with technical data 
and assistance in software development,503 but Microsoft did 
not agree to end its bundling practices or to allow users to 
remove the media player from Windows.504 
 Other than returning the company to profitability for the 
first time since 1999, it is not clear that the settlement 
achieved its objectives. For example, the 2005 Annual Report 
states that the company “cannot predict whether consumers will 
adopt or maintain our media player products …, especially in 
light of the fact that Microsoft bundles its competing Windows 
Media Player with its Windows operating system.”505 Similarly, 
                                                          
 
500 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 30 (2006). 
 
501 “Shareholder Letter,“ reprinted in RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 
Annual Report (2006). 
 
502 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 30 (2006). 
 
503 See Exhibit D to the Settlement Agreement Between Microsoft 
Corporation and RealNetworks, Inc.: Windows Technology 
Commitments in RealNetworks Inc., Form 10-K, Exhibit 10.24, 
”Amended and Restated Settlement Agreement” (March 16, 2006). 
 
504 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 13 (2006). 
 
505 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 13 (2006). 
 177
the Annual Report noted that notwithstanding the settlement, 
“Microsoft will continue to be an aggressive competitor”506 and 
Microsoft’s “dominant position” as well as “its aggressive 
activities … will likely continue to have … adverse effects on 
































                                                          
 
506 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 14 (2006). 
 
507 RealNetworks, Inc., 2005 Annual Report 16 (2006). 
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Red Eagle Resources, et al. v. Baker Hughes Inc., et al., No. 
4:91cv00627(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 11, 1991)(In re Drill Bits 
Antitrust Litigation) 
 
Summary: These related cases concern an agreement between four 
of the major drill bit manufacturers to artificially fix 
prices of roller cone drill bits used in drilling oil and gas 
wells. They are noteworthy because: 1) the primary source of 
the litigation was a private suit. Despite the fact that the 
Drill Bits Litigation followed a government investigation, the 
government investigation had been prompted by a private suit; 
2) Two of the private settlements preceded guilty pleas and 
settlements in their criminal counterpart; 3) Counsel achieved 
a settlement with Dresser Industries, a drill bit manufacturer 
not included in the government suit; 4) The total settlement 
was for $53.4 million dollars; and 5) Counsel was awarded a 
fee of 30.8%.   
This case can be traced back to a private suit between 
two drill bit manufacturers, Rockbit International of Fort 
Worth and Baker Hughes, one of the defendants in the Drill 
Bits Antitrust Litigation.508 Baker Hughes had brought suit 
against Rockbit for violating a patent agreement. While 
discovery was being conducted, Rockbit came across a memo from 
                                                          
508 David Ivanovich, Drill Bit Makers Face Charges of 
Conspiring to Fix Prices, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Oct. 23, 
1993)(Available in 1993 WLNR 3253623).  
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Baker Hughes to a sales manager at Reed Tool Co. in Houston, 
which implicated the parties in a price fixing scheme.509 
Rockbit then filed suit against Baker Hughes in November 
1989 claiming the company violated federal antitrust laws by 
fixing prices, tying its products, and forcing Rockbit out of 
business in order to protect its price fixing conspiracy.510 
Rockbit was not successful in this suit and a motion to 
dismiss was granted on June 24, 1991. The court found that 
Rockbit, as a manufacturer lacked the proper standing to bring 
the suit.511    
 This litigation prompted a Justice Department 
investigation and a private antitrust suit (“Drill Bits”).  
The DOJ conducted a investigation into the pricing practices 
of three of the major drill bit manufacturers named in the 
private action: Baker Hughes, Smith International d/b/a Reed 
Tool Company and Camco International.512 The government brought 
two different suits, one against Baker Hughes and one against 
Smith International and Camco International. Dresser 
                                                          
509 Id.  
 
510 Rockbit Indus. U.S.A., Inc., v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 802 
F.Supp. 1544, 1546-47 (S.D.Tex. 1991).  
  
511 Id.  
 
512 L.M. Sixe, Texas Firms Agree to Settle Price-Fixing 
Dispute, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Sept. 10, 1993)(Available in 1993 
WLNR 3254515).    
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Industries, a defendant named in the private Drill Bits suit 
was not indicted.  
The DOJ charged that between March and November 1989, 
Smith and Camco violated the Sherman Act. The two companies 
allegedly conspired to fix prices for roller cone drill bits 
by reducing discounts and by publishing new price lists. The 
government alleged that 500 customers - including independent 
drilling contractors, major oil companies and oil and gas 
property owners- were victimized by the price fixing.513 These 
cases resulted in criminal fines.514   
In March 1991, a class action suit was brought on behalf 
of plaintiffs representing direct purchasers of roller cone 
drill bits. In their complaint plaintiffs allege that four 
drill bit manufacturers violated § 1 of the Sherman Act.515 
Between 1986 and 1992, plaintiffs allege defendants agreed to 
                                                          
513 David Ivanovich, Drill Bit Makers Face Charges of 
Conspiring to Fix Prices, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Oct. 23, 
1993)(Available in 1993 WLNR 3253623).    
  
514 This investigation resulted in Baker Hughes pleading 
guilty and paying a one million dollar fine in 1992. In 1993, 
Smith International paid a fine of $675,000 and Camco 
International settled charges filed against its Reed Division 
by promising to pay $575,000.  
Ralph Bivins, Houston Drill-Bit Price-Fixing Cases Settled, 
HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Nov. 24, 1993)(Available in 1993 WLNR 
3254369).        
 
515 Complaint ¶¶ 28-33, Red Eagle Resources, et. al. v. Baker 
Hughes Inc., et al., No. 4:91cv00627(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 11, 
1991)(In re Drill Bits Antitrust Litigation). 
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fix, stabilize, and/or inflate or raise the prices of drilling 
bits in the United States market by refraining from 
discounting their list prices and by refraining from competing 
among themselves on the basis of price.516 Several similar 
cases were consolidated into a class representing 
approximately 6,000 purchasers of drill bits.517 
 All Defendants settled over a three-year period for a 
total of $53.4 million dollars.518 An attorney’s fee of 30.8% 
or $16,129,271.00 from the settlement funds was awarded to 
                                                          
516 Id. It was reported that defendants controlled 
approximately 75 percent of the domestic drill bit roller cone 
market at that time; Smith International dominated with a 27 
percent share of the market, followed by Baker Hughes with 25 
percent, Camco International with 15 percent and Dresser 
Industries with 12 percent. Ralph Bivins, Houston Drill-Bit 
Price-Fixing Cases Settled, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Nov. 24, 
1993)(Available in 1993 WLNR 3254369).  
  
517  Ralph Bivins, Houston Drill-Bit Price-Fixing Cases 
Settled, HOUS. CHRON.(KRT)(Nov. 24, 1993)(Available in 1993 
WLNR 3254369).   
 
518  See Fine, Kaplan & Black’s website, at 
http://www.finekaplan.com/CustomPage.shtml#1. Baker Hughes paid $17.8 
million in Jan. 1993, Reed Tool Company paid $16.8 million and 
Camco paid $10.8 million in September 1993. Dresser Industries 
was the last party to settle for $8 million in April of 
1994.Order of Approval of Settlement and Final Judgment, Doc. 
372 (April 26, 1994), Red Eagle Resources, et. al. v. Baker 
Hughes Inc., et al., No. 4:91cv00627(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 11, 




class counsel in addition to reimbursement of expenses in the 









































                                                          
519 Order of Approval of Attorney’s Fees and Expenses, Doc. 379 
(April 26, 1994), Id.    
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In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action No. 01-12239-
WGY; 346 F. Supp. 2d 349 (D. Mass. 2004); 231 F.R.D. 52 (D. 
Mass. 2005). 
 
 This case is noteworthy because: 1) Counsel for the 
direct purchaser Class secured a cash settlement of $175 
million, 69% of their estimated class damages520 2) Counsel for 
the indirect purchaser (end payer) class secured a cash 
settlement of $75 million, 26% of their estimated damages;521 
3) The Defendant, UK-based GlaxoSmithKline Beecham Corporation 
(“GSK”) took a $405 million charge in the 4th quarter of 2003 
to provide for Relafen litigation,522 these settlements 
represent a large portion of that amount, much of which will 
be distributed among businesses based in the U.S; 4) 
Apparently there was no federal government investigation, 
although a State enforcer was permitted to intervene523; 5) The 
                                                          
520 Memorandum in Support of Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, Document 290-01, 
filed 4/02/2002, In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Master 
File No. 01-12239-WGY at page 13 note 3. (D. Mass. 2004) 
 
521 End Payer Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Final 
Approval of Proposed Settlement, Document No. 415, filed 
4/25/2005, In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. 
01-12239-WGY at page 3 (D. Mass. 2005). 
 
522 GSK Settles Lawsuit Over Relafen Patent Tactic, Generic Line Copyright 
2004 Washington Business Information, Inc., All Rights Reserved Generic 
Line, Vol. 21, No. 11, June 2, 2004. 
 
523 On July 7, 2004, the states of Arkansas, Idaho, Illinois, 
Maryland, Oregon, and Washington filed motions to intervene in 
the end payer litigation already pending in the Massachusetts 
District Court, however, only Illinois was ultimately 
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allegations involved violations under Section 2 of the Sherman 
Act, and; 6)  Plaintiffs’ success in this litigation will 
discourage other brand name pharmaceutical manufacturers from 
manipulating the patent process and the Hatch-Waxman Act in a 
effort to unlawfully prevent generic competition, and keeping 
pharmaceutical drugs competitively priced is especially 
important because the cost of prescription drugs contributes 
greatly to the rising cost of healthcare.   
 
On November 2, 1982 the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (“PTO”) denied GSK’s sixth application to 
patent nabumetone, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug.  
The PTO cited a 1973 article that described the method and 
synthesis of the drug, thus making any claim to nabumetone 
void for anticipation.  On appeal, GSK persuaded the board of 
patent appeals that the substance and methods described in the 
1973 article were distinguishable from the nabumetone GSK was 
trying to patent.  On December 13, 1983 the PTO issued GSK a 
patent for nabumetone.  The drug, which GSK marketed under the 
brand name Relafen, received FDA approval in February 1992.   
In 1997 several generic drug manufacturers submitted 
Abbreviated New Drug Applications (“ANDA”) to the FDA seeking 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
permitted to intervene. In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 
231 F.R.D. 52, 61 (D. Mass. 2005).  
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approval to begin marketing nabumetone.  As part of their 
applications, each of the generic manufacturers524 certified 
that GSK’s nabumetone patent was, to the best of their 
knowledge, invalid or unenforceable and gave GSK notice of 
their applications as is required by statute.  GSK filed 
patent infringement actions against its would-be generic 
competitors, triggering an automatic stay of FDA approval for 
30 months or until the patent litigation is resolved, pursuant 
to the Hatch-Waxman Act525.  Generic versions of nabumetone 
would have otherwise been on the market on September 1, 1998.  
                                                          
524 The generic competitors included: Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, 
(“Teva”) based in Israel, Copley Pharmaceutical, Inc., which 
was acquired by Teva in 1999; and Eon Labs, Inc., a division 
of Sandoz, Inc. (“Eon”) which is headquartered in Princeton, 
New Jersey. 
 
525 The complicated provisions of the Hatch-Waxman act provide 
the backdrop for this and similar litigation. Under its 
provisions, each ANDA must be accompanied by a certification 
that the drug for which they seek approval does not infringe 
on a legitimate patent right because the patent is either 
invalid, expired, or will not be infringed by the marketing of 
the generic drug. The patent holder is entitled to notice of 
this certification and, can immediately file a patent 
infringement suit against the generic competitor.  Filing a 
patent infringement suit triggers an automatic stay of FDA 
approval of the generic manufacturer’s ANDA for 30 months or 
until the patent litigation is resolved. 21 U.S.C. 355. 
Relevant provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act were amended in 
2003 See: The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Title XI: Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals, sections a-b,  United States Public Laws, 
108th Congress –1st Session, 108 P.L. 173 (2006). The 
amendments adopt several FTC recommendations, including that 
brand-name companies be limited to one 30-month stay of 
approval and that a counterclaim for improper Orange Book 
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 In August 2001, after a sixteen day bench trial, 
District Court Judge Reginald C. Lindsay declared GSK’s 
nabumetone patent invalid due to anticipation.526  The Court 
also held that the patent was unenforceable due to inequitable 
conduct because GSK “engaged in a pattern of misrepresentation 
in its dealings with the PTO so pervasive as to negate any 
possibility that [its] misrepresentations to the PTO were 
inadvertent ….  Such a pattern bespeaks only deliberate 
dissembling….” 527 Judge Lindsay’s finding of invalidity was 
upheld on appeal, but the Federal Circuit Court did not reach 
the issue of unenforceability.528  Within a week of the 
District Court’s decision, Teva Pharmaceuticals, USA529 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
listing be authorized for generic companies faced with patent 
infringement suits. Statement of the Honorable Timothy J. 
Muris before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Aug. 1, 2003. For 
a history of the act and a discussion of the recent amendments 
See: Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The 
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure and Legacy, 71 Antitrust 
L.J. 585 (2003). For a discussion of the 2003 amendments and 
the loop holes that still exist see: Brian Porter, Comment: 
Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Mylan’s Effort 
to Close the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch Waxman Act, 22 J. 
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 177 (Fall 2005).  
 
526 In re ‘639 Patent Litigation, 154 F.Supp. 2d 157. (Dist. 
Mass. 2001). 
 
527 Id. at 194. 
 
528 GSK Beecham Cop. V. Copley Pharm., 45 Fed. Appx. 915, 917 
(Fed. Cir. Aug 15, 2002) (unpublished opinion). 
 
529 Teva Pharmaceuticals USA (“Teva”) is a division of Teva 
Pharmaceuticals, which is based in Israel. 
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(“Teva”) entered the market with a generic nabumetone priced 
at 60% of the Relafen price.530 
Direct Purchasers of Relafen filed a consolidated class 
action complaint in December 2002531 and the District Court 
certified the Direct Purchaser Class on November 10, 2003.532 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
530 Affidavit of Co-Lead Counsel Bruce E. Gerstein and Linda P. 
Nussbaum, Document 295-01, filed 4/02/2002, In re Relafen 
Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. 01-122390WGY at page 7 
paragraph 14. (D. Mass. 2004). 
 
531 In addition to the Direct Purchaser Class, actions were 
filed by GSK’s competitors, Teva Pharmaceuticals USA Inc. 
(“Teva”), and Eon Labs, Inc. (“Eon”) Eon Labs., Inc. v. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp., Civ. A. No. 03-10506-WGY, Doc. No. 
62; and by drugstore Plaintiffs see note 12, infra. The 
website for the National Association of Attorneys General 
(www.naap.org) reports that in 2004 West Virginia was the lead 
state in litigation initiated in 2004 against GSK with the 
help of the U.S. Department of Justice.  The litigation was 
regarding GSK’s efforts to block generic competition with 
Relafen and two other drugs, Paxil and Augmentin. This case 
settled for $500,000 dollars plus attorney’s fees. West 
Virigina ex rel. McGraw v. GlaxoSmithKline, PLC et al. 04-C-
254M, Circuit Court of Marshall County 2005). (Summary 
available at: www.naap.org). 
 
532 In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 218 F.R.D. 337 (D.Mass. 
2003). The Direct Purchaser Class included all entities in the 
U.S. who purchased Relafen directly from defendants between 
September 1, 1998 and December 31, 2002..  Drugstore 
Plaintiffs (Albertson’s, Eckerd, Hy-Vee, Kroger, Walgreens, 
CVS, Rite Aid, and Safeway opt-ed out of the class and chose 
to pursue individual actions) filed complaints against 
SmithKline on March 29, 2002 and January 7, 2003 asserting 
claims under sections 15 and 26 of the Sherman Act. Walgreen 
co. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., Civ. A No. 02-10588-WGY, Doc. 
No. 1, CVS Meridian, Inc. v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., Civ. A. 
No. 03-10040-WGY, Doc. No. 1. These plaintiffs settled with 
SmithKline and the action was closed on January 20, 2004, 
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The Plaintiffs alleged that the nabumetone patent was 
fraudulently obtained and wrongfully listed in the FDA’s 
Orange Book,533 and that the patent infringement suits that GSK 
filed against its generic competitors were baseless sham 
litigation used to delay competition with Relafen.  Plaintiffs 
alleged that this conduct violated section 2 of the Sherman 
Act causing class members to pay substantially higher prices 
for nabumetone than they would have if generic entry to the 
market had not been wrongfully delayed.  
Class counsel spent an aggregate of over 33,700 hours 
litigating this case over the course of two years, taking more 
than 30 depositions and reviewing hundreds of thousands of 
internal company documents during the course of discovery. 
Counsel succeeded in persuading the court that Defendants 
should be collaterally estopped from relitigating key issues 
that were decided in the underlying patent litigation and 
defeated GSK’s motion to dismiss and motion for summary 
judgment.  
 The Direct Purchaser Class reached a settlement 
agreement January 9, 2004, on the eve of trial, for $175 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Walgreen, Civ. A. No. 02-10588-WGY, Doc. No.11, CVS Meridian, 
Civ. A. No. 03-10040-WGY, Doc. No.11.  
 
533 The “Orange Book: is an official FDA publication formally 




million dollars. Not a single member of the class objected to 
the terms of the settlement, which is especially significant 
in light of the fact that this class consists of large, 
sophisticated businesses, many of whom are independently 
represented and could be expected to object.534  The court 
subsequently approved the settlement and granted Class 
Counsel’s request for one-third of the fund in attorney’s fees 
plus $1,799,023.24 in expenses, and a $25,000 incentive award 
for named plaintiff Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc.  Judge 
William G. Young for the District of Massachusetts noted that 
the award was “fair in this case”535 given “that Class Counsel 
vigorously and effectively pursued the Class members’ 
claims.”536  The $175 million dollar cash settlement represents 
a substantial percentage --approximately 69%-- of plaintiffs’ 
total damages according to plaintiff’s expert’s estimate that 
class-wide damages totaled $252.8 million. 
The first indirect purchaser (end payer) action was filed 
on January 30, 2002 and the District Court certified a 
                                                          
534 Memorandum in Support of Direct Purchaser Class Plaintiff’s 
Motion for Final Approval of Settlement, Document 290-01, 
filed 4/02/2002, In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Master 
File No. 01-122390WGY at page 18. (D. Mass. 2004). 
 
535 T.R.O. Hrg. Transcr. 4:3-4 (April 9, 2004) In re Relafen 
Antitrust Litigation, 346 F.Supp. 349. 
 
536 In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
28801 at 19 (D. Mass. 2004). 
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nationwide class for purposes of settlement on September 28, 
2005.537  The class represented actual and potential third 
party payers and consumers of both Relafen and its generic 
alternatives including individual consumers, health care plans 
and insurers.  Plaintiffs asserted claims under federal and 
state antitrust laws, state unfair competition and consumer 
protection statutes, and the unjust enrichment doctrines of 24 
states.538  Similar to the Direct Purchaser Class, the End 
Payer’s alleged that GSK made misrepresentations in pursuit of 
a patent for nabumetone which ultimately resulted in 
substantially higher prices for both Relafen and its generic 
alternatives. 
Class counsel spent four years and more than 29,000 hours 
litigating this case including analyzing more than one million 
pages of documents and taking more than 75 depositions during 
discovery. Counsel successfully opposed a motion to dismiss 
and succeeded in defeating GSK’s motion for summary judgment. 
 The End Payer Class reached a settlement agreement on 
November 18, 2004 for $75 million.  The settlement also 
included a Cy Pres award of $500,000 for consumers and third 
party payers whose claims were limited for procedural 
                                                          
 
537 In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 231 F.R.D. at 57.  
538 Id. at 60. 
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reasons.539  There were no objections to the amount of the 
settlement, and in fact the court noted that “[t]he overall 
reaction to the settlement has been positive,” which is 
significant given the 272,229 class members.540  The court 
approved the settlement on September 28, 2005 and granted 
counsel’s request for one-third of the fund541 in attorneys’ 
fees, plus $1,297,301.10 in expenses, and incentive awards.542  
In approving the final settlement Judge Young commented on 
“the exceptional efforts of class counsel” and had previously 
noted that the proposed settlement was “the result of a great 
deal of fine lawyering on behalf of the parties. . . .”543  
According to the End Payer’s expert the $75 million settlement 
                                                          
539 Id. at 82. 
 
540 Id. at 64, 72.  The settlement was divided between 
consumers and third-party payers, with one third going to 
reimburse consumers and the remainder to third-party payers. 
 
541 Id. at 77 n.18.  Because a portion of the $75 million 
settlement fund was paid to settling health plans as part of a 
separate agreement with GSK, the award of attorney’s fees and 
expenses is based on the $67 million of the fund that remains. 
 
542 Incentive awards included “$8,000 for each named consumer 
Plaintiff, $9,000 for each named consumer organization, and 
$14,000 for each named third party payor.”  Id. at 82. 
 
543 Id. at 80. 
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represents 26% of the estimated $294 million in class 
damages.544 
Most significant is the deterrent effect that the large 
settlements in these cases will have on other brand name drug 
manufacturers seeking to fraudulently obtain or extend patents 






























                                                          
544 End Payor Plaintiffs’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Final 
Approval of Proposed Settlement, Document No. 415, filed 
4/25/2005, In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, Master File No. 
01-12239-WGY at page 3 (D. Mass. 2005). 
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In re: Remeron Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
27013 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 
 This case is noteworthy because: 1) It highlights 
loopholes in the Hatch-Waxman Act545 being used to forestall 
generic competition; 2) Counsel for the Direct Purchaser Class 
persevered after an early setback and after all other 
plaintiff classes settled, and secured a $75 million 
settlement which represents 56-69% of Plaintiffs’ estimate of 
the overcharges paid as a result of Defendant, Organon 
Inc.’s546 (“Organon”) anticompetitive scheme; 3) Private 
counsel was first to investigate the conduct at issue, and 
obtained most of the relief in this matter because the federal 
                                                          
545 Relevant provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act were amended in 
2003. See: The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003, Title XI: Access to Affordable 
Pharmaceuticals, sections a-b,  United States Public Laws, 
108th Congress –1st Session, 108 P.L. 173 (2006). The 
amendments adopt several FTC recommendations, including that 
brand-name companies be limited to one 30-month stay of 
approval and that a counterclaim for improper Orange Book 
listing be authorized for generic companies faced with patent 
infringement suits. Statement of the Honorable Timothy j. 
Muris before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Aug. 1, 2003. For 
a history of the act and a discussion of the recent amendments 
See: Elizabeth Stotland Weiswasser & Scott D. Danzis, The 
Hatch-Waxman Act: History, Structure and Legacy, 71 Antitrust 
L.J. 585 (2003). For a discussion of the 2003 amendments and 
the loop holes that still exist see: Brian Porter, Comment: 
Stopping the Practice of Authorized Generics: Mylan’s Effort 
to Close the Gaping Black Hole in the Hatch Waxman Act, 22 J. 
Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 177 (Fall 2005). 
 
546 Organon Inc., now Organon USA, is a division of Dutch 
pharmaceutical giant Akzo Nobel, NV. 
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government  permanently closed its investigation prior to 
securing any relief;547 and 4) Judge Hochberg, who approved the 
settlement on November 9, 2005, awarded class counsel their 
request of one-third of the recovery in attorneys’ fees and 
thanked counsel on behalf of the entire federal judiciary “for 
the kind of lawyering we wish everybody would do.”548 
 
                                                          
547 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) announced its decision 
to close its investigation in a press release on Oct. 20, 2004 
noting  that “significant evidence indicate[s] that Organon 
may have violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act by knowingly making misleading statements to the FDA in 
order to delay introduction of generic competition to 
Remeron.”  Statement of the Federal Trade Commission Regarding 
the Decision to Close Its Investigation into the Conduct of 
Akzo Nobel, NV and Its Organon Subsidiary (available at 
Federal Trade Commission, For the Consumer, 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2004/10/organon.htm (last updated 
October 13, 2006)). Before closing its investigation, however, 
the FTC worked with state attorney general to incorporate 
injunctive terms into the End-Payer’s proposed settlement.  In 
Re: Remeron End-Payer Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27011 (D.N.J. 2005). 
 
548 In Re Remeron Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action no. 02-
2007 (FSH) (D.N.J. 2005) (Transcript of proceedings at 15:16). 
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In 2003, direct purchasers549 of Remeron filed class 
action complaints against Organon alleging various illegal and 
deceptive means to improperly obtain and extend patents for 
the drug mirtazapine550 in violation of Section 2 of the 
Sherman Act.  Remeron received FDA approval in 1996 and 
Organon’s right to market exclusivity was set to expire in 
June 2001.  In 1999 Organon obtained a patent for a 
mirtazapine combination drug which it listed in the FDA’s 
Orange Book551 in January 2001.  Because mirtazapine was listed 
in the Orange Book, generic drug manufacturers intending to 
market mirtazapine were required under the Hatch-Waxman Act to 
provide notice to Organon as part of their Abbreviated New 
Drug Application (“ANDA”) filed with the FDA.552  After 
                                                          
549 Nine large chain stores opted out of the direct purchaser class and 
settled for a total of $59.8 million in 2004. Technology & Health Brief –
Akzo Nobel NV: Remeron Antitrust Suit Settled In the U.S. for $59.8 
Million, The Wall Street Journal, Oct. 4, 2004.  End-payers, including 
attorney generals for Texas, Florida and Oregon, filed a Consolidated 
Class Action Complaint in September 2002 and settled for $36 million in 
2004. In Re: Remeron End-Payer Antitrust Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27011(D.N.J. 2005).  Organon settled with competitor, Mylan laboratories 
Inc, for $15 million. Dow Jones Newswires, Business Brief –Mylan 
Laboratoires Inc.: Akzo Nobel Pays $15 Million in Depression-Drug 
Settlement, The Wall Street Journal, pg B2 Oct. 4, 2004. 
 
550 Organon holds a patent on mirtazapine, an antidepressant 
drug, which it manufactures and markets under the brand name 
Remeron. 
 
551 The “Orange Book” is an official FDA publication formally 
known as “Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalence 
Evaluations.” 
 
552 Each ANDA must be accompanied by a certification that the 
drug for which approval is sought does not infringe on a 
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receiving notice, Organon filed patent infringement suits553 
against the would-be generic competitors triggering a stay of 
FDA approval of the generic competitors’ ANDA’s for 30 months 
or until a final judgment in the patent infringement suits.   
The litigation was complex and hard fought. The district 
court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss the generic 
manufacturers’ antitrust counter-claims alleging sham 
litigation, holding that the court could not find that Organon 
lacked an objectively reasonable basis for its patent 
infringement claims. 554  The court later held that the Direct 
Purchaser Class was collaterally estopped from litigating its 
similar claims. However, the court upheld the independent 
claims arising from Defendants’ late-listing in the Orange 
Book of the newly-patented combination drug and the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
legitimate patent right because the patent is either invalid, 
expired, or will not be infringed by the marketing of the 
generic drug. The patent holder is entitled to notice of this 
certification and, can immediately file a patent infringement 
suit against the generic competitor.  Filing a patent 
infringement suit triggers an automatic stay of FDA approval 
of the generic manufacturer’s ANDA for 30 months or until the 
patent litigation is resolved. 21 U.S.C. 355. Relevant 
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act were amended in 2003. See 
supra note1.   
 
553 The Direct Purchaser Class’ complaint came on the heels of 
a December 2002 grant of summary judgment in favor of certain 
generic competitors with respect to the patent infringement 
suits filed by Organon. In Re Remeron End-Payer Antitrust 
Litigation, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27011 at 4, (D.N.J. 2005). 
 
554 Organon, Inc. v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 293 F.Supp. 
2d 453 (D.N.J. 2003). 
 197
Defendant’s alleged overarching scheme to forestall generic 
competition.  Although every other plaintiff group involved in 
the litigation chose to settle their claims after this early 
set back, the Direct Purchaser Class persevered and sought 
recovery for the harm wrought by Defendants’ attempts to 
prevent and delay generic competition in the mirtazapine 
market. 
Class Counsel aggressively pursued the surviving claims, 
filing motions for summary judgment, partial summary judgment 
and issue preclusion.  Class counsel invested an aggregate of 
more than 35,000 hours on this complex litigation involving 
research and analysis of a variety of issues including 
regulatory requirements of the Hatch-Waxman Act and FDA’s 
Orange Book listing, the intricacies of the pharmaceutical 
industry from scientific and production processes to sales and 
marketing, as well as patent law and economic issues. The 
contentious discovery process produced more than one million 
pages of documents and class counsel conducted more than 45 
depositions and spent thousands of hours researching, 
analyzing and consulting with experts.  These efforts led to 
vital evidence indicating, among other things, that Defendants 
knew their listing of the combination drug in the FDA’s Orange 
Book was improper and was undertaken with the express intent 
of delaying generic competition.  After more than two years of 
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negotiation and numerous mediation sessions, the parties 
agreed to settle for $75 million to be distributed pro-rata 
among the direct purchaser class after the deduction of one-
third in attorneys’ fees plus expenses.  The $75 million 
settlement represents a significant proportion − 56-69% − of 
the class damages as estimated by the Direct Purchasers’ 
expert.555 
At the hearing on the motion for final approval of 
settlement, District of New Jersey Judge Faith S. Hochberg 
thanked counsel on behalf of the entire federal judiciary “for 
the kind of lawyering we wish everybody would do”556 and noted 
that “[t]he settlement entered with Defendants is a reflection 
of Class Counsel’s skill and experience.”557  Judge Hochberg 
approved the settlement and plan of allocation, and granted 
Class Counsel’s request for one-third in attorneys’ fees plus 




                                                          
555 Memorandum of Law in Support of Direct Purchaser Class 
Plaintiff’s Motion for an Award of Attorneys’ Fees, 
Reimbursement of Expenses, and Incentive Award, filed 
10/26/2005, In re Remeron Antitrust Litigation, Master Docket 
No. 03-CV-0085 (D.N.J. 2005) 
 
556 In Re Remeron Antitrust Litigation, Civil Action no. 02-
2007 (FSH) (D.N.J. 2005) (Transcript of proceedings at 15:16) 
 
557 In re Remeron, (2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27013) [Not for 











In Re Rubber Chemicals Antitrust Litigation, 350 F.Supp.2d 
1366, 2005-1 Trade Cases P 74,804 (Jud.Pan.Mult.Lit. Dec. 21, 
2004((No. MDL 1648).  
 
Summary: These related cases concern an agreement between 
three of the largest manufacturers of rubber chemicals in the 
world to artificially fix prices in the sale of rubber 
chemicals and to allocate markets and customers in the United 
States. They are noteworthy because: 1) Counsel for the direct 
purchaser class secured a settlement of over $268 million 
dollars, all of which came from foreign corporations and their 
American affiliates; 2) Counsel in the direct purchaser class 
was awarded a fee of twenty-five percent (25%); and 3) Counsel 
secured an $18 million settlement with a defendant which was 
not indicted in the parallel government investigation, 
Akzo/Flexsys corporations and their affiliates.    
This case initially started on or about September 26, 
2002, with a series of government raids on a number of rubber 
chemical producers, including Bayer AG and Flexsys NV, in 
several European cities. These unannounced inspections were in 
connection with an investigation into the alleged cartel 
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agreement and related illegal practices concerning the price-
fixing of rubber chemicals.558   
As a result of this investigation, a number of companies 
and their top executives plead guilty, paid criminal fines and 
served jail time starting in 2004. Crompton and two of its top 
executives plead guilty to price fixing in the international 
rubber chemicals market,559  after admitting to “participating 
in a combination and conspiracy to suppress and eliminate 
competition by maintaining and increasing the price of certain 
rubber chemicals” sold in the United States from 1995-2001.560 
Bayer AG agreed to plead guilty and pay a $66 million fine for 
participating in the conspiracy.561 A number of its top 
                                                          
558 Second Amend. Consol. Compl. for Violations of the Fed. 
Antitrust Laws ¶ 51 (Mar. 18, 2005).  
 
559 Crompton was sentenced to pay a $50 million criminal fine 
and its executives await sentencing. Press release, U.S. Dept. 
of Justice (Sept. 14, 2004), First Executive in the 
International Rubber Chemicals Cartel Agrees to Plead Guilty, 
available at  
http://searchjustice.usdoj.gov/search?q=cache:6MwGZC767v0J:www
.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2004/205419.wpd; See also 
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice (Sept. 21, 2004) 
Executive in the International Rubber Chemicals Cartel Agrees 




560 Id.  
 
561 Press Release, U.S. Depart. Of Justice (July 14, 2004). 
Bayer Agrees to Plead Guilty and Pay $66 Million Fine for 
Participating in Rubber Chemicals Cartel. Investigation to 
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executives were sentenced to fines and imprisonment.562 Flexsys 
NV was not a target of the DOJ investigation.563   
On April 8, 2003, the first private complaint in this 
multi-district litigation was filed. Several subsequently-
filed cases were consolidated and a Second Amended 
Consolidated Complaint for violations of federal antitrust 
laws was filed on March 18, 2005 in the United States District 
Court Northern District of California. Direct purchasers of 
Rubber chemicals, including the companies and industrial 
manufacturers, brought this lawsuit alleging that from at 
least as early as May 1, 1995 through December 31, 2001, 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Date Yields Over $100 Million in Criminal Fines. Available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/July/04_at_480.htm.   
 
562 On November 23, 2004, Martin Petersen, a German national 
and Head of Marketing and Sales for Bayer’s Rubber Business 
Group agreed to plead guilty. He was sentenced to four months 
in jail and a $50,000.00 fine. Available at  
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/215514a.htm#a. 
On May 16, 2005, Wolfgang Koch, a German national of Bayer 
plead guilty and was sentenced to four months in jail and a 
$50,000 fine. Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice (May 16, 
2005) Former Bayer AG Executive Agrees to Plead Guilty in 
International Rubber Chemicals Price-Fixing Conspiracy. Former 
Executive Faces Jail Time in U.S. Available at 
http://usdoj.gov/atr/public/press_releases/2005/209038.wpd. 
On August 10, 2005 Jurgen Ick and Gunter Monn, top executives 
at Bayer, were indicted. Both Ick and Monn are German citizens 
and remain international fugitives. Press release, U.S. Dept. 
of Justice (Aug. 10, 2005) Former Top Bayer Executives 







Defendants conspired to fix the prices of Rubber Chemicals 
sold in the United States and/or to allocate markets and/or 
customers in the United States.564  
In 2005 Plaintiffs settled with two of the three groups 
of defendants for approximately $268 million:565 Bayer, and its 
affiliates in Germany, Pennsylvania, Ohio and New Jersey566; 
and Akzo/Flexsys and its affiliates in the Netherlands, 
Illinois, Belgium and Ohio.567 The case against Crompton 
appears to be ongoing. 
In the course of this litigation class counsel analyzed 
hundreds and thousands of documents produced by Defendants.568 
They also conducted an independent investigation of the facts 
and analyzed Defendants’ sales and pricing data. Class counsel 
was awarded an attorney’s fee equal to 25% of the Flexsys 
                                                          
564  Second Amend. Consol. Compl. for Violations of the Fed. 
Antitrust Laws ¶ 2 (Mar. 18, 2005). 
 
565  Flexsys paid $18,500,000. Settlement Agreement of 
Defendants Flexsys N.V. and Flexsys America L.P., and Akzo 
Nobel Chemicals International B.V. and Akzo Nobel Chemicals, 
Inc. (“Flexsys Defendants”), Doc. 12 (Feb. 18, 2005), ¶ 7. 
Bayer settled for $250,375,190. Notice of Settle. in Class 
Action and Hearing on Settle. Approv., Plan of Allocation and 
Request for Atty’s Fees and Costs (June 26, 2006), ¶ 17.  
 
566 Id. ¶¶ 18-21. 
 
567 Id. ¶¶ 13-17.  
 
568 Id. ¶ 13.   
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Settlement Fund, or $4,625,000 (and $692,523.57 for costs).569 
Counsel was awarded approximately 20% of the Bayer Settlement 

































                                                          
569 Order Granting Interim Atty’s Fees and Reimburse. Offof 
Costs to Class Counsel Based on the Settlement with the 
Flexsys Defendants, Doc. 150, (June 21, 2005), ¶ 1.  
 
570 Notice of Settle. in Class Action and Hearing on Settle. 
Approv., Plan of Allocation and Request for Atty’s Fees and 
Costs (June 26, 2006), ¶ 17.   
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In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation, Not 
Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2002 WL 31655191 (N.D. Cal.).  
 
 
 This case is noteworthy because: 1. the primary 
defendants/manufacturers, who formed a price fixing cartel 
between 1979 and 1996, were spread out between three countries 
(United States, Germany, and four in Japan) and  defended 
their actions globally (United States, Canada, and Europe), 
making this litigation a complex and extensive process; 2. 
civil actions were brought by both direct purchasers of 
sorbates and on behalf of indirect purchasers of many states 
within the U.S.; 3. total recovery for direct purchasers in 
the U.S. was roughly $96.5 million (at least $36.5 million of 
which came from foreign defendants)571; 4. attorneys fees 
varied between the direct purchaser and state actions from 22-
33% of the total recovery. 
 In 1998 the U.S.D.O.J. began an investigation into the 
alleged price fixing of sorbates, a chemical manufactured for 
use in the food preservatives industry, by several large 
multinational corporations. The Dept. of Justice investigated 
Eastman Chemical, Co. (U.S. manufacturer), Hoescht AG, 
Nutrinova Nutrition Specialties & Food Ingredients GmbH, CNA 
Holdings (German manufacturer), and Daicel Chemicals Industry, 
                                                          
571  In addition, several actions, brought by individual States 
on behalf of indirect purchasers, settled for a total of more 
than $12 million. 
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Ltd., Nippon Synthetic Chemical Industry Co., Ltd., Ueno Fine 
Chemicals Industry Ltd., and Chisso Corporation (the four 
Japanese manufacturers) to determine whether they had formed a 
cartel for the purpose of fixing the prices of sorbates 
between 1979 and 1996.572  
In response to the DOJ investigation, several of the 
industries “[pled] guilty to participating in the antitrust 
conspiracy to suppress and eliminate competition by fixing 
prices and allocating the market shares of sorbates sold in 
the United States.”573 Following this, the European Commission 
held similar investigations which resulted in additional 
criminal fines. 574 The Commission found that by 1995, the 
                                                          
572 Williams Food Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., Not Reported in 
P.3d, 2001 WL 1298887 (Kan. Dist. Ct.). 
 
573 Id. Between 1998 and 2001, Diacel, Hoescht, Nippon, Eastman 
and Ueno, agreed to pay fines of $53 million, $36 million, $21 
million, $11 million, and $11 million, respectively, as a 
result of litigation with the Department of Justice. U.S. 
Department of Justice, Antitrust Division, Sherman Act 
Violations Yielding a Fine of $10 Million or More (January 23, 
2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/criminal.htm. 
 
574 These fines totaled EUR $172 million; divided between 
Hoescht ($123 million), Diacel ($20.6 million), Ueno ($15.3 
million) and Nippon ($13.1 million). Chemicals: Monti’s Cartel 
Clampdown: Sorbates Firms Fined EUR 138 M: Hoescht, Chisso, 
Daicel Chemical Industries, Nippon Synthetic Chemical Idustry 
and Ueno Fine Chemicals, Chemical Business NewsBase - Europe 
Environment, October 9, 2003. “The Commission calculated the 
fines according to the gravity and duration of the 
infringement, but took into account the level of cooperation 
from the companies.” Chisso Corp. was granted full immunity 
for its role as a whistleblower. Id. 
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cartel had control of 85% of the sorbates market in Europe.575 
Additionally, Hoescht AG and Eastman Chemicals both pled 
guilty to violations of the Competition Act of Canada.576 
In addition to the fines, several civil actions were 
brought in the U.S. by both direct purchasers represented by 
private counsel, and by States on behalf of classes of 
indirect purchasers within those States. The direct purchasers 
led the way with a consolidated class action in the Northern 
District of California; followed by a few separate smaller 
classes of direct purchasers in other states. Finally cases 
brought by States had varied success in different State courts 
throughout the country. 
A large group of direct purchasers brought suit in the 
Northern District of California, which resulted in final 
approval of a settlement for $81,978,000;577 followed shortly 




576 They were fined a total of $3.28 (Canadian) in a Canadian 
federal court Companies Guilty of Price Fixing, The Toronto 
Star October 27, 1999, Wednesday, Edition. 
 
577 In re Sorbates, Master File C 98-4886 Cal  (N.D. Cal. 2000) 
(combined settlement of Diacel, Nippon, Hoescht and Eastman).  
“Japan's Daicel Chemical Industries Ltd. and Nippon Synthetic 
Chemical Industry Co. revealed in separate statements that 
they would pay $16 million and $7.2 million, respectively to 
US food firms.” CHEMICAL COMPANIES: Japanese Firms To Settle 
Antitrust Suit For $23.2M, Wednesday, Dec. 12, 2001, Vol. 3, 
No. 242, at http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/011212.mbx.   
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by a second settlement for $14.6 million.578 At least 1/3 of 
direct purchaser recovery, which covered the vast majority of 
private civil recovery, came from foreign defendants.579 
Defendants were required to make yearly contributions into a 
net settlement fund, where purchasers could recover damages 
measured by a mathematical formula approved by the court.  
 Successful suits by states on behalf of indirect 
purchasers were brought in Wisconsin, California, Kansas, Ohio 
and Illinois, totaling over $12 million.580 Notably, the 
Wisconsin suit was brought on behalf of purchasers in 12 
                                                          
578 In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litigation,  Not 
Reported in F.Supp.2d, WL 31655191 (N.D. Cal. 2002). With $6.5 
million being allocated to Euno. EUNO FINE CHEMICALS: Judge 
Approves $6.5M Settlement Deal, Thursday, November 28, 2002, 
Vol. 4, No. 235, http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/021128.mbx 
 
579 See supra notes 7 & 8. The remaining 2/3, totaling over $60 
million was divided b/w Hoescht (a german corporation), 
Eastman (an American corporation) and one other. FOOD FIRMS: 
Freeman, Freeman Files Sorbate Price-Fixing Suit, Thursday, 
July 27, 2000, Vol. 2, No. 145, 
http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/ 000727.MBX. 
 
580 EASTMAN CHEMICAL: Indicates Openness to Settle Remaining 
Sorbates Cases, Tuesday, May 15, 2001, Vol. 3, No. 95, 
http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/010515.mbx; Sorbates Prices 
Cases, JCCP NO. 4073 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 2003) 
http://www.sorbatessettlement.com/not.html;  Williams Food v. 
Eastman Chemical, Not Reported in P.3d, 2001 WL 1298887 
(Kan.Dist.Ct. 2001); State v. Diacel Chemical Ind., No. 
02CH19575 (Illinois 2004);  Children’s Hunger Alliance 




states and constituted a large bulk of non-direct purchaser 
recovery with a settlement of $7.8 million.581  
Attorneys fees and costs awarded have varied between 
jurisdictions and plaintiff classes.  The percentages were 




















                                                          
581  Of those state’s that have recovered, there is a general 
trend toward cy pres distribution of the funds. For instance, 
several states have donated large portions of their 
settlements to food banks, boys and girls clubs, and other 
charitable local institutions PRESERVATIVE MAKERS: Judge 
Approves Settlement of Wisconsin Suit, Monday, April 30, 2001, 
Vol. 3, No. 84 http://bankrupt.com/CAR_Public/010430.mbx. 
 
582 See id. (direct purchaser settlement of Euno and Chisso at 
25%); Proposed Final Judgment and Order, State v. Daicel Chem. 
Ind., et.al. (No. 02CH19575) at 
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/consumers/sorbates/prop
osed_ final_judgment&order.pdf (Illinois settlement at 22.5%); 
Williams Food Inc. v. Eastman, et. al., 2001 WL 1298887 (Kan. 
Dist. Ct.)(opt out Kansas direct purchaser litigation at 33 
1/3%). 
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Sun Microsystems v. Microsoft, 333 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 
 
 This case is notable because 1. It involved an 
exceptionally large payment for the settlement of an antitrust 
claim, $700 million out of a $2 billion overall payment by 
Microsoft to Sun; 2. While the action relied in part upon 
findings of fact and conclusions of law made in the U.S. 
Government’s Microsoft case, its allegations were much broader 
then those in the government’s case; 3. Sun provided much of 
the evidence that it accumulated for this case to the European 
Union, and this evidence apparently helped form much of the 
basis for its action against Microsoft involving the server 
market; 3. The allegations involved rule of reason violations, 
not “hard core” cartel violations; 4. The agreed-upon relief 
helped protect Java from pollution by Microsoft, and helped 
ensure that only pure, non-Microsoft Java would in the future 
be distributed on PCs.  This was a significant victory for the 
PC ecosystem and the consumers who benefit from it.  
 
 In March 2002 Sun filed an antitrust suit against 
Microsoft, charging that Microsoft had engaged in a number of 
antitrust violations, some of which mirrored the charges in 
the U.S. government’s case against them, and others of which 
were broader.  Sun also charged a number of intellectual 
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property violations. Among the specific antitrust violations 
were the allegations that Microsoft illegally attempted to 
monopolize the Intel-compatible PC operating systems market, 
the browser market, and the Office suite market.  Sun also 
charged Microsoft with attempting to monopolize the workgroup 
server market.  In addition, Sun charged Microsoft with 
illegally tying Internet Explorer to its PC operating system,   
its workgroup server to its PC operating systems, and its 
exchange server software to its Office productivity suites.  
Sun also charged that Microsoft illegally entered into 
exclusive dealing arrangements for its browser, and that it 
entered into exclusionary agreements with Apple and Intel not 
to develop, distribute or use non- Microsoft compatible 
implementations of Sun’s Java platform, in violation of 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.   
 On January 21, 2003, the United States District Court for 
the District of Maryland granted Sun’s motion for preliminary 
injunction.583  Microsoft was, inter alia, enjoined from 
distributing its Windows PC Operating System or Browser unless 
they contained unpolluted Java software. 
 Microsoft appealed this decision, however, and the 4th 
Circuit lifted the preliminary injunction.  The reasons for 
this reversal were that: “(1) future and present harm alleged 
                                                          
583  Sun v. Microsoft, 240 F. Supp. 2d 460 (D. Md. 2003).  
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by competitor were insufficient to support mandatory 
preliminary injunction requiring manufacturer to distribute 
competitor's middleware software with every copy of 
manufacturer's operating system and web browser; [and that 
the] (2) mandatory preliminary injunction was not necessary to 
prosecute competitor's claim that manufacturer had monopolized 
operating system market...” The Court of Appeals remanded the 
case for a trial on the merits.  
 On April 2, 2004, Sun and Microsoft agreed to settle 
these antitrust and intellectual property issues, and also 
agreed on a variety of patent license and other issues.  Of 
the overall $2 billion settlement, a joint Sun-Microsoft Press 
Release attributed $700 million to a settlement of Sun’s 













                                                          
584  See April 2, 2004 Press Release, “Microsoft and Sun 
Microsystems Enter Broad Cooperation agreement; Settle 




In Re: Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation Case No. 
99-MDL-1317-Seitz/Klein, a/k/a Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., 
Inc. v. Abbot Laboratories, et al. S.D. Fla. Case no. 98-3125 
and Valley Drug Co. v. Abbot Laboratories, et al. S.D. Fla. 
Case No. 99-7143. 
 
Summary: This case is noteworthy because: 1) Although the 
government was first to investigate, the litigation was 
primarily initiated and led by private counsel;585 2) Private 
counsel obtained a substantial monetary recovery, whereas the 
federal government secured only injunctive relief;586 3) 
                                                          
585 The first federal government action in this case was the 
complaint and consent order proposal issued by the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) on March 16, 2000, more than one year 
after the first Direct Purchaser complaint was filed in 
December 1998.  Attorney Generals for Colorado, Kansas and 
Florida filed suit alleging antitrust violations based on the 
same facts on September 27, 2001 “on the heels of an 
investigation started [in 1999] by the Federal Trade 
Commission.” Michael Perrault, Suit: Drug Makers Were In 
Collusion, Rocky Mountain News, Pg. 4B, September 28, 2001.   
 
In many cases the Attorneys General or the FTC will conduct a 
non-public investigation before filing a complaint, making it 
difficult to determine whether the government or private 
counsel began investigating first, or were conducting 
separate, parallel investigations. 
 
586 The FTC finalized a consent order against Abbott and Geneva 
on May 22, 2000. In the Matter of Geneva Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., Docket No. C-3946, Decision and Order (available at 
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition: Case Filings, 
http://ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3946.do.htm (last updated December 
14, 2001)). The order, which terminates on May 22, 2010, 
prohibits both companies from entering into any further 
similar agreements and requires that Geneva report to the FTC 
annually for five years on the manner and form of its 
compliance.  Despite the range of remedies available to the 
government, “including possibly seeking disgorgement of 
illegally obtained profits,” the order was the only relief 
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Counsel for the Plaintiffs’ class were successful in 
persuading the District Court that the agreement between Abbot 
Laboratories587 (“Abbott”) and its generic competitor, Geneva 
Pharmaceuticals, now Sandoz, Inc.,588 (“Geneva”) effectively 
delayed generic competition with the brand name drug Hytrin589 
and was thus anticompetitive and a per se violation of the 
Sherman Act; 4) Counsel for the Plaintiff class secured a 
total cash settlement of $74.5 million,590 which, according to 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
obtained directly by the government in this case, although 
state attorney general joined in the Direct Purchaser private 
action.  In the Matter of Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Docket 
Nos. C-3945 and C-3946, Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky 
and Commissioners Sheila F. Anthony, et. al (available at 
Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Competition: Case Filings, 
http://ftc.gov/os/2000/05/abbottgenevastatement.htm (last 
updated December 14, 2001)). 
 
587 Abbot Laboratories is based north of Chicago in Abbot Park, 
Illinois. 
 
588 Sandoz, Inc. is owned by Novartis, which is based in 
Switzerland. 
 
589 Hytrin is the brand name for terazosin hydrochloride, a 
drug used for the treatment of high blood pressure and 
enlargement of the prostate gland.   
 
590 The $74.5 million figure includes the $72.5 million 
settlement between Direct Purchaser Class and Abbot and Geneva 
as well as a settlement with Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., now known as Ivax pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Zenith”), also 
named by Valley Drug it its original complaint alleging 
substantially similar Sherman Act violations. Zenith settled 
for $2,072,327 plus interest. This settlement was finally 
approved by the Court on June 13, 2002. 
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plaintiffs’ expert,591 is enough to reimburse a substantial 
percentage – 40% to 60% – of overcharges suffered by the class 
members while generic competition was delayed; 5) Plaintiffs’ 
success in this litigation will discourage other brand name 
pharmaceutical manufacturers from unlawfully preventing or 
delaying generic competition, and keeping pharmaceutical drugs 
competitively priced is especially important because the cost 
of prescription drugs contributes greatly to the rising cost 
of healthcare; and 6) Judge Patricia A. Seitz for the Southern 
District of Florida awarded in awarding Counsel for the Direct 
Purchaser Class one third of the total recovery plus over 
three million dollars in expenses, Judge Patricia A. Seitz for 
the Southern District of Florida said that the relationship 
that counsel had with the class members combined with the fact 
that there were no objections to the settlement was “a 
testament to the great clientmanship that [Class Counsel] 
provided.”592 
 
                                                          
591 Sherman Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorneys’ 
Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Incentive Awards for the 
Named Plaintiffs and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support Thereof, In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litigation, MDL 1317 at page 15, submitted April 6, 2005 (S.D. 
Fla. 2005). 
 
592 In re: Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, Case 
No. 99-1317 MDL, Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before Hon. 
Patricia A . Seitz at pg 15 ln17-18, April 15, 2005. 
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The $72.5 million settlement agreement entered into on 
February 24, 2005 concluded over five years of litigation 
stemming from Abbot Laboratories’ “attempts to protect its 
patents’ exclusivity with respect to the brand name drug 
Hytrin, and the competing efforts of generic manufacturers to 
develop and launch bioequivalent drugs for entry in the 
terazosin hydrochloride market.”593 Plaintiffs alleged that 
Abbot made multi-million dollar payments to generic 
manufacturers of the drug to delay the entry of generic 
versions of Hytrin to the market.  
On March 30, 1998, Geneva obtained final approval from 
the FDA to market and sell its generic, capsule version of the 
drug terazosin hydrochloride, brand-name Hytrin.  Two days 
later, April 1, 1998, Abbot entered into and agreement with 
Geneva. In exchange for $4.5 million a month from Abbot, 
Geneva agreed not to put its generic version of Hytrin on the 
market, an arrangement that would continue until Abbot’s 
patent expired or until a final judgment in the patent 
infringement suit that Abbot filed against Geneva regarding 
Geneva’s tablet formulation of Hytrin.  Abbot and Geneva 
voluntarily terminated the agreement in August 1999 after the 
                                                          
593 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352 
F.Supp.2d 1279, 1286 (S.D. Fla. 2005). 
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FTC began an investigation.594 Geneva launched its generic 
product on August 13, 1999.  During the last five months of 
1999 Geneva’s generic terazosin hydrochloride had sales of 
$71.8 million, an 8.8% share of the market.595 
Named Plaintiffs of the Direct Purchaser Class,596 
Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. (“LWD”) and Valley Drug Co. 
(“Valley Drug”) filed complaints against Geneva and Abbot in 
December 1998 and August 1999. They alleged that the agreement 
between Geneva and Abbot was an illegal market allocation 
agreement in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.597 
                                                          
594 In the early months of 1999, the FTC launched a “probe of 
the drug industry’s alleged efforts to block generic rivals 
and thus protect sales of brand-name medications.” Jerry 
Guidera and Ralph T. King, Abbott Labs, Novartis Unit Near 
Pact With FTC Over Agreement on Hytrin, The Wall Street 
Journal, Aug. 21, 1998, Pg B1. 
 
595 Ralph T. King Jr., FTC Panel Backs Suit Against Abbot, 
Novartis on Deal for Hypertension Drug, The Wall Street 
Journal, pg B20 Feb. 7, 2000. 
 
596 In addition to the Direct Purchaser Class litigation 
summarized here, similar claims were pursued by individual 
Direct Purchasers such as Walgreens and Shop-Rite and an 
Indirect Purchaser classes including seventeen certified state 
classes of end payers for Hytrin consisting of Third Party 
Payers (e.g., insurance companies) and individual consumers. 
In re Terazosin Hydrochloride, 335 F.Supp. 2d 1336, 1342 fn 5, 
(S.D. Fla. 2004). 
 
597 Valley Drug also named Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc., now known as Ivax pharmaceuticals, Inc. (“Zenith”) in 
its complaint alleging substantially similar Sherman Act 
violations. That case settled for $2,072,327 plus interest. 
This settlement was finally approved by the Court on June 13, 
2002. 
 217
Plaintiffs argued that this agreement blocked the introduction 
of generic versions of Hytrin, which “resulted in reduced 
output, artificially inflated prices, and eliminated 
competition in the market for terazosin hydrochloride.”598  
Plaintiffs sought damages for the financial loss incurred by 
direct purchasers of Hytrin who paid inflated prices while 
entry of the generic versions of the drug was delayed by the 
agreement between Geneva and Abbot.  
On December 13, 2000, the United States District Court 
for the Southern District of Florida granted Plaintiff’s 
motion for summary judgment holding that the agreement between 
defendants Geneva and Abbot was a per se violation of Section 
1 of the Sherman Act.  The court concluded that the agreement 
essentially allocated the entire United States market for 
terazosin drugs to Abbot.599  This ruling was reversed by the 
11th circuit as “premature” and remanded to the district court 
to consider the exclusionary scope of the patent before making 
any determination.600  On January 5, 2005, the district court 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
 
598 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 352 
F.Supp. 2d at 1287. 
 
599 Id. at 1292. 
 
600 Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 
1304 (11th Cir. 2003).  In reversing the District Court’s 
Ruling, the  Eleventh Circuit explicitly rejected the 
reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in In re Cardizem CD, 332 F.3d 
 218
ruled on multiple motions for summary judgment filed by 
parties on both sides of the litigation.  The district court 
again granted Plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment on this 
issue holding that the agreement exceeded the exclusionary 
rights Abbot enjoyed as a result of the patent it held on 
terazosin hydrochloride not due to expire until 2014 and that 
in light of this, the agreement was indeed a per se violation 
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.  The Direct Purchaser Class 
settled with Geneva and Abbot for $72.5 million the following 
month.  
Class Counsel spent more than 51,000 hours over the 
course of six years litigating this case, not including the 
pre-complaint investigation. The litigation involved obtaining 
admissible testimony from witnesses, working with experts, 
conducting market research and analysis, several rounds of 
motions for summary judgment and class certification and a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
896 (6th Cir. 2003).  In Cardizem, the court held that a 
similar agreement was a per se violation of the Sherman Act, 
adding that “[i]t is one thing to take advantage of a monopoly 
that naturally arises from a patent, but another thing 
altogether to bolster the patent's effectiveness in inhibiting 
competition by paying the only potential competitor $40 
million per year to stay out of the market.") Id. at 908.  In 
Valley Drug, the Eleventh Circuit responded that “[w]hen the 
exclusionary power of a patent is implicated, however, the 
antitrust analysis cannot ignore the scope of the patent 
exclusion.”  Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1311. However, not 
withstanding the Valley Drug opinion, on remand the District 
Court did find the agreement to be a per se violation. In re 
Terazosin Hydrochloride, 352 F.Supp 2d. 1279 (S.D. Fla. 2005).   
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complex and protracted discovery process.  Class Counsel’s 
significant investment of time and resources resulted in a 
substantial settlement – 40% to 60% of the direct purchasers’ 
total loss601 – on February 24, 2005.  The court granted Class 
Counsel their requested fees in the amount of one third of the 
settlement proceeds, plus interest and $3,133,070.86 in 
expenses.602  The remaining settlement funds will be 
distributed pro-rata, reimbursing class members603 for the 
difference between the price they actually paid for terazosin 
                                                          
 
601 Sherman Act Class Counsel’s Joint Petition for Attorneys’ 
Fees, Reimbursement of Expenses and Incentive Awards for the 
Named Plaintiffs and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support Thereof, In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litigation, MDL 1317 at page 15, submitted April 6, 2005 
(S.D..Fla. 2005). 
 
602 Including the Zenith settlement, supra n. 5, for $2,072,327 
the total recovery in this litigation was $74,572,327.  The 
proceeds of the Zenith settlement are being applied to the 
reimbursement of out-of-pocket expenses only. Class Counsel 
are not seeking attorney’s fees from the Zenith settlement.  
The Judge also approved incentive awards for the named 
plaintiffs “[i]n light of their six years of service on behalf 
of the class.” In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust 
Litigation, Case No. 99-1317 MDL, Order and Final Judgment, pg 
11, ln 27, Apr. 19, 2005.  Louisiana Wholesale Drug Co., Inc. 
was awarded $45,000 and Valley Drug Co. was awarded $30,000.  
Id. 
 
603 Ultimately the class was defined as all purchasers of both 
brand name and generic drugs who also purchased terazosin 
hydrochloride directly from Abbot at any time during the 
period commencing March 31, 1998 when Geneva obtained FDA 
approval to sell its generic version of terazosin 




during the period that generic competition was illegally 
delayed and the price they would have paid if a generic 
version of the drug was available.  District Court Judge 
Patricia A. Seitz approved the final settlement on April 15, 
2005 noting the quality of the advocacy and that “this is a 
case in which I think justice was accomplished by a 
settlement”604 and said that the relationship that counsel had 
with the class members combined with the fact that there were 
no objections to the settlement was “a testament to the great 
clientmanship that [Class Counsel] provided.”605 
In addition to obtaining a substantial monetary award for 
direct purchasers who overpaid for terazosin hydrochloride, 
Plaintiffs’ success in this litigation will benefit consumers 
in the future.  In particular, the district court’s 
determination, on remand, that the agreement between Abbot and 
Geneva was a per se violation of the Sherman Act will 
discourage other brand name drug manufacturers from using such 
agreements to delay or prevent generic competition, helping to 
reduce national healthcare costs by keeping prescription drugs 
competitively priced.  
                                                          
604 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, Case 
No. 99-1317 MDL, Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before Hon. 
Patricia A . Seitz at pg 15 ln 6-7, April 15, 2005. 
 
605 In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, Case 
No. 99-1317 MDL, Transcript of Fairness Hearing Before Hon. 
Patricia A . Seitz at pg 15 ln17-18, April 15, 2005. 
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Transamerican Refining Corp. v. Dravo Corp., et al., No. 
4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 10, 1988)(Specialty Steel 
Piping Antitrust Litigation)(1992 settlement) 
 
 
Summary: This case is noteworthy because: 1) It resulted in a 
$50 million settlement in 1992; 2) The Court awarded 30% 
attorney’s fees; 3) All of the overcharged victims were 
American businesses; and 4) The private action was a follow-up 
to a federal enforcement action that involved a large 
nationwide class action slightly broader in its scope than the 
federal suits that were brought.606  
 
 This litigation began as a result of a task force that 
the federal government appointed to investigate the sale of 
pipe to the Washington Public Power Supply System (“WPPSS”) in 
Seattle.607  Apparently this investigation was sparked by the 
closing of several public power projects. Numerous suits 
involving securities fraud and contract matters were filed 
                                                          
606 The private action spanned a time frame of 1966-1985. The 
federal cases alleged activity no earlier than 1974 and no 
later than 1987, with many cases spanning only a few years 
Aff. Of Lynn Lincoln Sarko in Support of Pls’ Mot. For Class 
Cert. Re: Summary of Crim. Procs. Ex. 2. Parallel Crim. Procs. 
In Re Spec. Steel Antitrust Litig. Pgs. 1-5.  Transamerican 
Refining Corp., et. al. v. Dravo Corp., et. al., No. 
4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 10, 1988)(Specialty Steel 
Piping Antitrust Litigation).  
 
607 Dravo and others Settle Pipe Price-Fixing Suit, 228 ENGR. 
NEWS-RECORD 14 (Apr. 6, 1992)(Available in 1992 WLNR 1682774).   
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against the WPPSS due to the failure of these nuclear power 
projects. There was much public interest in their completion 
because it was hoped that they would provide an economical 
energy supply to Washington residents.608   
 As a result, a price-fixing scheme was uncovered by  
the WPPSS Task Force of the Justice Department, the  
Internal Revenue Service and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation.609 From 1986-1988, numerous corporations  
and their officers were criminally charged with price fixing 
schemes. The alleged mastermind, Gerald Profita, president and 
CEO of Shaw Corporation, Inc., plead  
guilty and received a jail sentence of eight years plus a  
$25,000 fine.610 
                                                          
608 Per telephone conversation with Mark Griffin, Esq, Partner 
at Keller Rohrback in Seattle, Washtington. He was a co-lead 
in the Specialty Steel Piping Antitrust Litigation.   
 
609  Dravo and others Settle Pipe Price-Fixing Suit, 228 ENGR. 
NEWS-RECORD 14 (Apr. 6, 1992)(Available in 1992 WLNR 1682774).     
 
610  Aff. Of Lynn Lincoln Sarko in Support of Pls’ Mot. For 
Class Cert. Re: Summary of Crim. Procs. Ex. 2. Parallel Crim. 
Procs. In Re Spec. Steel Antitrust Litig. Pgs. 1-5.  
Transamerican, No. 4:88CV00789 (Docket)(S.D.Tex. Mar. 10, 
1988)(Specialty Steel Piping Antitrust Litigation). The 
government’s “star” witness, Shaw Co.’s manager of purchasing 
from 1976-1985, W. Robert Short, was found guilty of violating 
the Sherman Act and received a jail sentence of three years 
plus a fine of $11,000. Id. at Pg 21,22. Two other main 
participants included the president and vice president of 
Standard Pipe & Supply Company Inc., Daniel Petrone and Allan 
Miller. Both plead guilty and received a jail sentence of two 
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 This suit, filed on March 10, 1988, arose out of an  
alleged conspiracy to illegally fix the price of specialty  
steel piping materials sold under cost-plus arrangements  
throughout the United States between 1966 and 1985.611 The 
class of Plaintiffs, numbering approximately 6,000, consisted 
of refineries, and other buyers who purchased the specialty 
steel piping material on a cost-plus basis. There were thirty 
one defendants representing the sellers of the specialty steel 
piping material.612  Plaintiffs’ counsel successfully defeated 
several motions to dismiss based on plaintiffs’ failure to 
state a claim upon which relief can be granted and lack of 
proper pendent jurisdiction.613  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
years each. Id. Many others received lesser prison sentences 
and fines. Id. 
 
611 “The manufacturers or distributors, as suppliers of 
specialty steel piping, allegedly made arrangements with 
pipe fabricators to quote an inflated price on steel which 
was to be resold by the pipe fabricators on a cost-plus  
basis. It is alleged that the supplier and fabricator later  
divided the price differential through payments or  
credits.” Transamerican Refining Corp., et al. v. Dravo Corp., 
et al. Available in 1990 WL 122228, 1990-2 Trade Cases P 69, 
127,1 (S.D.Tex. June 22, 1990)(No.CIV. A. H-88-789).  “Some 
defendants allegedly marked up the cost of  
the pipe by about 25% and kicked back a portion to the  
fabricators”, said Lynn L. Sarko, an attorney for the  
plaintiffs. Dravo and others Settle Pipe Price-Fixing Suit, 
228 ENGR. NEWS-RECORD 14 (Apr. 6, 1992)(Available in 1992 WLNR 
1682774).    
 
612 Id.  
 
613 Transamerican, Available in 1990 WL 122228, 1990-2 Trade 
Cases P 69, 127 (S.D.Tex. June 22, 1990) and Transamerican 
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 The case settled in 1992 for about $50 million.614  
Attorneys fees of 30% were awarded Plaintiffs’ counsel in 








                                                                                                                                                                                    
Refining Corp., et al. v. Dravo Corp., et al. Available in 
1991 WL 261765, (S.D.Tex. Oct. 29, 1991)(No.CIV.A.H-88-789).  
 
614 Of the thirty one defendants, Allied Signal, Inc.  
paid the largest single settlement of $14,000,000.00Adam 
Goodman, LaBarge Settles Antitrust Case, ST. LOUIS POST-
DISPATCH (SAT. FIVE-STAR ED.) 9C (Aug. 8, 1992)(Available in 
1992 WLNR 509337). 614  See attached in its entirety as Exhibit 
1 the Notice of Class Notice and Proposed Partial Settles., 
Attachment A. Transamerican, No. 4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex. 
Mar.10,1988)(Specialty Steel Piping Antitrust Litigation). 
Pullman Power Products and Resco Holdings Inc., paid 
7,300,000.00. See attached in its entirety as Exhibit 2 the 
Notice of Hearing on Proposed Partial Settles. of Class 
Actions and Application for Interim Award of Counsel Fees and 
Expenses, Attachment A. Transamerican, No. 
4:88CV00789(Docket)(S.D.Tex.  Mar.10,1988)(Specialty Steel 
Piping Antitrust Litigation) as Exhibit 2.  Dravo settled the suit 
for $6,000,000.00. Id. Crane Company was one of the last defendants to 
settle for $5,300,000.00. See attached in its entirety as Exhibit 3 the 
Notice of Hearing on Proposed Partial Settle. of Class Actions; 
Application for Award of Counsel Fees and Expenses; Proposed 
Plan of Distrib; Verified Proof of Claim Form; and Claim Proc. 
at 2.  
 
615  Id. at 3. . Transamerican, No. 4:88CV00789(Docket) 









In re: Urethane Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1616, 232 F.R.D. 
681 (D. Kan. 2005). 
 
Summary: The urethane litigation is noteworthy because: 1) It 
started when the DOJ discovered a conspiracy involving 
polyester polyols (Chemical 1), for which defendants paid a 
criminal fine; 2) Counsel for the direct purchaser class filed 
a follow-on suit, involving a longer conspiracy period, which 
secured an $18 million settlement from one defendant, Bayer.  
The case against the other defendant is still pending; 3) 
While pursuing the case against Chemical 1, plaintiffs’ 
counsel brought suit alleging another conspiracy involving a 
related chemical, polyether polyols (Chemical 2); 4) 
Plaintiffs in the Chemical 2 class action, again the direct 
purchasers, secured a $55.3 million settlement from one 
defendant, Bayer, and the cases against the other defendants 
are still pending; and 5) Both settlements received so far, 
$73.3 million, were from the wholly owned subsidiary of a 
foreign corporation. 
 Polyurethane (urethane) is an elastic type of rubber 
produced by either a polyester polyol (Chemical 1) or a 
polyether polyol (Chemical 2).616  The Chemical 1 case began 
                                                          
616 Polyester polyols “are used to manufacture a variety of 
foam-based products such as packaging, automobile air filters, 
sound-deadening materials, and furniture as well as non-foam 
products such as certain coatings and adhesives.”  In re 
Urethane Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 440, 443 (D. Kan. Aug. 
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after a U.S. government investigation revealed an unlawful 
price-fixing conspiracy between Bayer Corp., a U.S. subsidiary 
of Bayer AG, and Crompton Corp., now known as Chemtura Corp.617  
In March 2004, Crompton issued a press release stating that it 
was being granted amnesty for participating in the 
investigation.618  Nearly a month later, a private follow-on 
case ensued, as the first Chemical 1 case was brought by 
direct purchasers.619  In August 2004, the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Kansas consolidated the Chemical 1 cases 
into the In re Urethane Antitrust Litigation.  Plaintiffs 
alleged that Bayer and Crompton fixed prices between January 
1, 1998 and December 31, 2004. 
 The Chemical 2 case arose out of an investigation by a 
private law firm in Fall 2003, which was actually before any 
of the Chemical 1 cases were filed.  Apparently, the private 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
16, 2006). Polyether polyols are softer and more elastic, and 
are usually used to make spandex and soft rubber parts. 
 
617 Bayer Unit to Pay $33 Mln Fine, Plead to Price Fixing; see 
<http://www.cbgnetwork.org/296.html (Sept. 30, 2004)>. 
 
618 Crompton Corp., Crompton Announces Agreements in U.S. and 
Canadian Rubber Chemicals Investigations, BusinessWire (2004); 
see < http://phx.corporate-ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c= 
68079&p=irol-newsArticle_Print&ID=547653&highlight=>. 
 
619 Per telephone conversation with Christopher J. Cormier, 
Esq., of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. in 
Washington, D.C (Jan. 12, 2007).  This law firm is co-lead 
counsel in the Chemical 2 cases. 
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plaintiffs wanted to see if either the investigation or 
lawsuit involving Chemical 1 would include Chemical 2.  When 
they saw that it did not, then they chose to pursue the 
Chemical 2 case.620  The named defendants in this suit are 
Bayer, BASF, The Dow Chemical Company, Lyondell Chemical 
Company, and Huntsman International LLC.  These defendants 
control 75% of the Chemical 2 market and 100% of two other 
markets closely related to Chemical 2.621   
The suit alleges that these defendants consistently 
announced and implemented price increases at the same or 
similar times between January 1, 1999 and December 31, 2004, 
and the complaint offered four specific periods describing in 
detail each defendant’s involvement.622  Plaintiffs allege that 
these price increases cannot be explained by changes in the 
price of raw materials or by changes in demand, and that the 
defendants participated in secret meetings and conversations 
during which they agreed to fix prices and allocate 
                                                          
620 Pl. Coordination Req. at 4-5, In re Urethane Antitrust 
Litig., 237 F.R.D. 440 (D. Kan. August 22, 2005). 
 
621 These markets are the methylene dyphenyldiisocyanate (MDI) 
and toluene diisocyanate (TDI) markets. 
 
622 In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 409 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1280 
(D. Kan. Jan. 18, 2006).   
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customers.623  In June 2005, these cases were coordinated with 
the Chemical 1 cases.624 
On September 30, 2004, Bayer agreed to plead guilty to 
charges of participating in a criminal conspiracy to fix 
Chemical 1 prices between 1998 and 2002, and to pay a criminal 
fine of $33 million.  Note that the private suit alleged 
overcharges between 1998 and 2004, which encompassed two years 
more than the government suit.625 
 The government began an investigation on Chemical 2 
price-fixing in February 2006.  Defendants of the private suit 
were issued subpoenas from the DOJ seeking information 
relating to the manufacture and sale of Chemical 2, MDI and 
TDI.  Because of the timing of the investigation, we believe 
that it stemmed from the private suit.   
 In August and October 2006, the court approved 
settlements with Bayer releasing the company from liability in 
the two private suits.  Bayer agreed to pay $55.3 million to 
                                                          
623 Id. at 1279.   
 
624 Because of the arguably differing nature between the 
Chemical 1 and Chemical 2, the court elected not to 
consolidate the two groups of cases, but rather consolidate 
each individually, and the two sets of cases would proceed on 
separate tracks for scheduling purposes. 
    
625 Notice of Class Action Settle. with Bayer and Fairness Hrg. 
at 1, In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 237 F.R.D. 440 (D. Kan. 
June 13, 2006). 
 
 229
Chemical 2 plaintiffs, and $18 million to Chemical 1 
plaintiffs.  These have been the only settlements thus far, 
and the cases against the other defendants are still 
ongoing.626   
In granting preliminary approval of the Bayer settlement 
for Chemical 2, the Honorable John W. Lungstrom praised the 
private plaintiffs’ attorneys, stating that “these law firms 
have performed extensive work identifying and investigating 
the potential claims in this action, have ample experience 
handling cases similar to this one, have demonstrated adequate 
knowledge of the applicable law, will devote adequate 
resources to representing the class, and have done a 
commendable job thus far prosecuting the polyether polyol 
plaintiffs’ claims.”627  Attorneys’ fees have not been awarded 





                                                          
626  The Chemical 1 cases have finished class discovery and are 
currently in merits discovery.  The Chemical 2 cases are still 
in class discovery. Per e-mail conversation with Christopher 
J. Cormier, Esq., of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, 
P.L.L.C. in Washington, D.C (Dec. 28, 2006).   
 
627  T.R.O. Hrg. Transcr. at 18, In re Urethane Antitrust 
Litigation, 237 F.R.D. 440 (D. Kan. March 27, 2006). 
 
628 Per e-mail conversation with Christopher J. Cormier, Esq., 
of Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll, P.L.L.C. in Washington, 
D.C (Dec. 28, 2006).   
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In Re: Visa Check/MasterMoney Antitrust Litigation, a/k/a Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc. et. al v. Visa U.S.A. Inc. and MasterCard 
International Inc., 396 F. 3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005).  
 
 
Summary: This case is unusually noteworthy because: 1. It 
resulted in payments to victims that had a present value of 
$3.383 billion in cash, the largest settlement in antitrust 
history (in fact, it was “the largest settlement ever approved 
by a federal court”629.); 2. It also resulted in significant 
injunctive relief that the court valued at “$25 to $87 billion 
or more”630; 3. It did not involve a classic “hard core” 
conspiracy, but rather involved a number of complex Section 1 
and Section 2 allegations; and 4. The awarded attorneys fees 
were only 6.5% of the monetary recovery, and were far less 
than 1% of the total value that the Court ascribed to the 
combination of the monetary recovery and injunctive relief.631 
 
 On October 25, 1996, a class of approximately 5 million 
merchants, including Wal-Mart, Sears, and Safeway, sued Visa 
and MasterCard for alleged violations of Sections 1 and 2 of 
the Sherman Act. “First, plaintiffs claimed that the 
                                                          
629 See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 297 




631 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al., v Visa USA & MasterCard 
International, 396 F. 3d 96, 114 (2d Cir. 2005). 
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defendants’ ‘Honor All Cards’ policy, which forced merchants 
who accepted Visa and MasterCard credit cards to accept Visa 
and MasterCard debit cards, was an illegal ‘tying arrangement’ 
that violated Section One of the Sherman Act.  Second, 
plaintiffs alleged that defendants used their Honor All Cards 
policy in conjunction with other anti-competitive conduct to 
monopolize the debit card market, in violation of Section Two 
of the Sherman Act.  As a consequence, plaintiffs claimed that 
they incurred supra-competitive ‘interchange fees’ ... during 
every debit and credit transaction made between October 1992 
and June 2003.”632 
 Although the DOJ began its preliminary investigation into 
antitrust violations by Visa and MasterCard in December of 
1993,633 that investigation focused primarily on alleged 
duality and exclusionary conduct, resulting in the U.S. v. 
Visa litigation.  That case established the relevant market, 
but as the district court noted, the Plaintiffs here “did not 
benefit from any previous or simultaneous government 
litigation....”634  Instead, “the Government piggybacked off of 
                                                          
632 Id. at 100. 
 
633 U.S. v. Visa, Civil Action No. 98-7076 (BSJ) (S.D.N.Y.), Declaration of Mary Jean 
Moltenbrey, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/cases/f2100/2188.pdf. 
 
634 In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 297 F.Supp.2d at 523. 
 232
plaintiffs’ counsel’s work,”635 filing a motion to participate 
in the distribution of the private settlement.  Moreover, 
class counsel petitioned the FTC, numerous state Attorneys 
General, and the DOJ to enjoin the conduct alleged in 
Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which “contributed to the filing of the 
[DOJ’s] suit against Visa and MasterCard roughly two years 
after In re Visa Check was initiated.”636 
 The litigation was complex and lasted for years.  During 
proceedings spanning almost a decade, more than 400 lawyers 
and paralegals, led by Constantine, Cannon, P.C., litigated on 
behalf of plaintiffs, obtaining class certification, winning a 
motion for summary judgment and defeating defendants’ motion 
for summary judgment.  The parties settled on the eve of 
trial. “Counsel for the class took and defended approximately 
400 depositions, including 21 expert depositions, and reviewed 
more than 5 million pages of documents....”637 The quantity and 
quality of this effort, the difficulty of the legal issues 
involved, and the spectacular results obtained, underlay the 
                                                          
635 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al., v Visa USA & MasterCard 
International, 396 F.3d at 122. 
 
636 Id., Brief of Appellees/Class Representatives in Response to Brief of Appellant Nucity 
Publications, Inc. at 11. 
 
637 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. et. al., v Visa USA & MasterCard 
International, 396 F.3d at 111. 
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Court’s decision to award $220 million in legal fees (the 
above-mentioned 6.5% of the monetary recovery alone).638  
 The case was settled in April 2003 for “$3.383,400,000 in 
compensatory relief, plus additional injunctive relief valued 
at $25 to $87 billion or more."639  Under the terms of the 
settlement, Visa will pay slightly more than $2 billion to the 
merchants and MasterCard will pay slightly more than $1 
billion. Both firms also agreed to implement a wide variety of 
injunctive relief.  For example, they agreed to significantly 
lower their charges for debit transactions on August 1, 2003.  
This saved merchants more than $1 billion from August 2003 to 
April 2004 alone. On January 1, 2004, merchants in the United 
States gained the freedom to choose to accept Visa and 
MasterCard debit products based upon their quality, speed, 
safety and price. They are no longer forced by the 
associations' rules to accept debit cards if they take credit 
cards. Not surprisingly, the District Court judge in the case 
characterized the injunctive relief as of “substantial” 
value.640 
                                                          
 
638 Id. at 114. 
 
639 Id. at 111. 
 
640 See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litigation, 297 
F. Supp. 2d 503, 525 (E.D.N.Y. 2003). 
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 Judge John Gleeson granted final approval of the 
settlements and the plan of allocation on December 19, 2003. 
The United States Court of Appeals affirmed this decision on 
January 4, 2005. Distributions to class member merchants from 





















In re Vitamins Antitrust Litigation (many related cases) 
 
This series of more than 100 related cases is historic 
because: 1. Settlements in total resulted in approximately 
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$4.2 to $5.6 billion being returned to overcharged U.S. 
purchasers of vitamins and related products641, the largest 
total for any related series of antitrust cases in history; 2. 
Of this, between $3.7 billion and $5.1 billion was returned to 
direct purchasers; 3. Of this total, an additional $500 
million was returned to indirect purchasers; 4. Almost all of 
the private vitamins cases settled.  A jury in the only 
vitamins case that went to verdict, a separate conspiracy 
involving choline chloride, decided that the cartel had 
overcharged purchasers by approximately $49.5 million, e.g. a 
61% price rise; 5. It has been estimated that on average 
prices increased by approximately 15% to 80% for the 16 
different vitamins that were cartelized, with an average 
overcharge of 43.7%. 6. Of the amounts paid to U.S. 
purchasers, more than 99%, or $4.2 to $5.6 billion, was paid 
by foreign cartel members; 7. Although the precise sequence of 
events is not without controversy, it appears that much and 
perhaps all of the crucial original discovery of the illegal 
behavior was made by private counsel; 8. These cases also 
resulted in criminal fines of approximately $915 million by 
the U.S. enforcers and approximately $946 million by the 
                                                          
641  Unless noted, all of the empirical estimates in this 
Section are from John M. Connor, “The Great Global Vitamins 
Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence,” Draft of 2/14/06, 
available at www.antitrustinstitute.org 
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European Union and other foreign enforcers; 9. A number of 
defendants went to jail; 10. Because of the huge number of 
separate vitamins cases, we are not able to estimate precisely 
the average percentage of the refunds that went to class 
counsel in the form of legal fees.  However, one source 
estimates that on average the legal fees were no more than 10% 
of the settlements, while another source lists the percentage 
for the indirect purchaser cases at 14%. 
It is difficult to determine the exact origin of these 
cases: who first discovered the first evidence of, or enough 
hard evidence to prove the existence of, the vitamins 
cartels642.  Cause-and effect is especially difficult to 
determine because the “vitamins cartels” actually consisted of 
16 different cartels with partially overlapping memberships 
that, generally speaking, fell into two major groups.  Some of 
the earliest indications that one or more vitamins markets 
might have been cartelized, moreover, did not seem fruitful 
and were not pursued vigorously by the government enforcers, 
but were later re-opened and pursued and led to strong 
evidence of collusion.  
                                                          
642  We attempted to find an public account of the origin of 
the vitamins cases that written by the Department of Justice 
Antitrust Division but could not.  When we sent them the 
version contained in this document they would not comment on 
its accuracy or completeness. 
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David Boies relates that one of his partners uncovered 
evidence that Roche was discussing prices with its 
competitors.643  Boies and his colleagues investigated, and by 
May 1997 had found evidence consistent with collusion.  They 
then found more evidence, and by December 1997 decided they 
had enough to file suit.  But first they gave their 
information to the Antitrust Division.  Boies says that his 
firm uncovered and ultimately proved the collusion "without 
the benefit of government involvement."644  Professor John 
Connor presents a more complicated analysis of the events, but 
ultimately also gives these private counsel credit for 
uncovering the first solid evidence of collusion.645  As will 
                                                          
643 David Boies, Courting Justice (2004) at 226-30. Another 
source said this evidence was uncovered while he was in the 
course of preparing a patent-infringement suit. John M Connor, 
“The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and 
Deterrence,” Draft of 2/14/06, at 26, available at 
www.antitrustinstitute.org 
 
644 David Boies, Courting Justice (2004) at 230. 
 
645 "U.S. investigators first got wind of the vitamins cartel 
and Roche's role in it in late 1996 from sources at ADM 
cooperating with the DOJ in its investigation of the citric 
acid cartel ..." As a result the FBI interviewed Dr. Kumo 
Sommer, the head of Roche's Vitamins division, in March 1997. 
"Sommer denied the existence of any vitamins cartel and the 
DOJ apparently decided to wind down its investigation for the 
meanwhile...[However, in] "late 1997 a partner of the law firm 
of Boies & Schiller...." presented the DOJ with evidence that 
a conspiracy was occurring. John M Connor, “The Great Global 
Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanctions and Deterrence,” Draft of 
2/14/06, at 25-26, available at www.antitrustinstitute.org 
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be seen infra, this perspective is confirmed by the defendants 
themselves. However, many of the details of the Department of 
Justice investigation are non-public, and it is clear that 
both private counsel and the U.S. Department of Justice were 
on parallel tracks and discovered much of the critical 
evidence at around the same time, and that the investigation 
of each helped that of the other. 
 Class counsel filed the first Vitamins Complaint in March 
1998, on behalf of a class of direct purchasers.  They alleged 
that as early as 1990 and continuing into 1998, Defendants646 
conspired to fix prices, allocate markets, and engage in other 
collusive conduct with respect to certain vitamins, vitamin 
premixes and other bulk vitamin products.647   
Following this complaint, the full dimensions of the 
Defendants’ conspiratorial conduct began to become known.  In 
March 1999, the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice announced that Defendant Lonza AG had 
pleaded guilty to violating Section 1 of the Sherman Act for 
                                                          
646 The defendants were F. Hoffman-La Roche, Ltd., Hoffman-La 
Roche, Inc., Rhone-Poulenc S.A., Rhodia, Inc., BASF AG, and 
BASF Corporation. 
 
647 Class Counsel uncovered Defendants’ illegal 
conspiratorial conduct before any grand jury investigation 
became public, before guilty pleas began to be entered in 
1999, before federal cooperation agreements became public, and 
before any Defendant confessed to any wrongdoing. 
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fixing the price of vitamin B3 (niacin), and that Defendant 
Chinook Group Ltd., certain of its executives and certain 
executives of non-settling Defendant DuCoa, LP, had pleaded 
guilty to violating Section 1 for fixing the price of vitamin 
B4 (choline chloride).648  
It is clear that Class Counsel significantly contributed 
to the discovery of this illegal activity. At the May 21, 1999 
press conference in Basel, Switzerland announcing the Roche 
guilty pleas, Hoffman-La Roche’s CEO, Franz Humer, explained 
how it was the early 1998 class action lawsuit (and not a 
government investigation) that prompted a new internal 
investigation that caused Roche to terminate its 
conspiratorial conduct and begin to cooperate with the 
government: 
In 1997, responding to the settlement in the 
citric acid case and to the news of an 
investigation of the bulk vitamins industry, 
Roche initiated an internal inquiry of its own, 
which at the time did not turn any evidence of 
wrongdoing.  A second internal inquiry prompted 
by class action lawsuits filed against Roche 
and other companies in early 1998 for alleged 
price-fixing in the bulk vitamins market 
revealed that further action was needed.  The 
inquiry was carried out in collaboration with 
US experts.  Internal measures were implemented 
without delay to ensure an immediate halt to 
any antitrust violations.  The findings from 
                                                          
648 Two months later, Defendant F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. 
pled guilty and BASF AG agreed to plead guilty to fixing the 
prices of various vitamins products.  
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this second inquiry formed the basis for 
Roche’s decision to offer, on 1 March this 
year, its full cooperation in the US Justice 
Department investigation.649 
 
As part of the cooperation prompted by lawsuits filed by 
Class Counsel, Roche employees interviewed by the U.D. 
Department of Justice implicated other conspiracy participants 
– including several of the Settling Vitamin Products 
Defendants – and provided substantial information about the 
duration and scope of the price-fixing conspiracy.  The facts 
detailed in these interviews regarding conspiratorial conduct 
in the vitamins industry were subsequently relied on by Roche 
in preparing its written Fed. R. Civ. P. Rule 30(b)(6) 
statement, which described Roche’s view of the scope of the 
conspiracy.650  Roche’s Rule 30(b)(6) statement, which 
implicated other conspirators, placed substantial settlement 
pressure on the Settling Vitamin Products Defendants. 
                                                          
649  See Exh. 9 to Class Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of 
Motion for Preliminary Approval of Niacin and Biotin 
Defendants, at 3. 
 
 650  As described by the Special Master, the Roche Rule 
30(b)(6) statement “at 101 pages, the longest of the 
statements, contains charts listing the date and location of 
events or meetings for particular vitamins, participants and 
the companies they represented, the vitamins products 
discussed, and additional details about the meetings.”  
Special Master’s Report & Recommendation, dated August 8, 
2002, at 11.  [Verilaw No. 11362.) 
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During this period, as a result of additional 
investigation and discovery, Class Counsel added several 
Defendants to the all-vitamins Complaint,651 and also filed a 
separate Complaint that alleged a conspiracy relating only to 
choline chloride.652  These and subsequent complaints have 
resulted in a large number of settlements.653 Plaintiffs also 
pursued their investigation of price-fixing654 in the choline 
                                                          
651 These defendants included Hoechst Marion Roussel; Takeda 
Industries, Ltd., Takeda Vitamin & Food USA, Inc., and Takeda 
U.S.A., Inc.; Eisai Co., Ltd., Eisai U.S.A., Inc., and Eisai 
Inc.; Daiichi Pharmaceuticals Co., Ltd., Daiichi Fine 
Chemicals, Inc., and Daiichi Pharmaceuticals Corporation; 
Merck KGaA and EM Industries, Inc.; Sumitomo Chemical Co., 
Ltd. and Sumitomo Chemical America, Inc.; Tanabe Seiyaku Co., 
Ltd. and Tanabe USA, Inc. (Sumitomo and Tanabe are referred to 
collectively as the “Biotin Defendants”); Reilly Industries, 
Inc. and Reilly Chemicals, S.A.; Lonza Group Ltd., Lonza Inc. 
and Lonza AG; Degussa AG and Degussa Corp.; and Nepera, Inc. 
(Lonza, Degussa, Nepera and Reilly are referred to 
collectively as the “Niacin Defendants”). 
 
652 They named as Defendants Akzo; UCB Chemicals; Chinook 
Group, Ltd., Chinook Group, Inc., and Cope Investments, Ltd.; 
Bioproducts, Inc. (United States company), Mitsui & Co. 
U.S.A., Inc., and Mitsui & Co. Ltd.; and various individual 
Defendants. 
 
653 For example, on November 3, 1999, Class Plaintiffs reached 
a settlement with the Hoffman-La Roche, BASF, Rhone-Poulenc, 
Hoechst, Takeda, Eisai and Daiichi Defendants regarding those 
Defendants’ sales of bulk vitamin products, and with the BASF 
Defendants regarding their sales of Choline Chloride (the 
“Initial Settlement”).  See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 
Misc. No. 99-197, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8931 (D.D.C. Mar. 31, 
2000), at *16 
 
 654  These settlements and agreements followed and preceded 
several guilty pleas with government authorities.  For 
example, on March 1, 1999, DuCoa/DCV employees Lindell 
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chloride industry, settled with some defendants, and reached 
cooperation agreements with most individual Defendants. Two 
defendant groups did not settle, however, and this case went 
to verdict. The jury found that the Mitsui Defendants and the 
DuCoa/DCV Defendants conspired to fix the price of choline 
chloride (vitamin B4).  The jury also found that Class 
Plaintiffs had been damaged in the amount of $49,539,234 
(before trebling).655 After the trial, Class Plaintifs settled 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Hilling, John “Pete” Fischer, and Antonio Felix, and Chinook 
employees John Kennedy (formerly of Bioproducts) and Robert 
Samuelson pled guilty to price fixing and market allocation of 
choline chloride.  On May 20, 1999, BASF AG pled guilty in the 
United States to price fixing and market allocation of certain 
vitamins, and on September 17, 1999, BASF AG pled guilty in 
Canada to price fixing and market allocation of choline 
chloride.   
 
655 On the first day of the choline chloride trial (In re 
Vitamins Antitrust Litigation -- Animal Science Products, 
Inc., et al. v. Chinook Group, Ltd., et al.) between Class 
Plaintiffs and the Mitsui and DuCoa/DCV Defendants, Chief 
Judge Thomas Hogan stated in his opening remarks to the jury 
pool that: 
 
”[T]his is a very challenging and interesting case involving 
what we call antitrust issues between the parties. That's 
anticompetitive-type business issues involving, I think, some 
of the finest business litigating lawyers or litigation-type 
lawyers in the country that are before you that you will have 
the privilege to listen to.”  May 28, 2003 Trial Tr. at 25:1-
6. 
 
After the jury returned a verdict of $49.5 million in damages 
for the Class Plaintiffs, Chief Judge Hogan thanked the jurors 
for their service and stated: 
 
”[T]his is a serious case, and you had the pleasure of having 
very excellent lawyers on both sides appear before you.”  June 
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with the Mitsui Defendants for an amount greater than the 
verdict and presently are engaged in post-judgment discovery 
with the DuCoa and DCV Defendants.  
Professor Connor estimates that on average the attorneys 
received no more than 10% of the settlements in the form of 
attorneys fees.656 A survey of 24 indirect purchaser class 
action cases found that in all 24 cases the attorneys were 
awarded a 14% fee, in addition to the total of $267 million 
that was returned to overcharged purchasers.657 We have heard 
anecdotes of fees in particular vitamins cases as high as 33%, 
however, but are aware of no other average figures. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
13, 2003 Trial Tr. at 1520:8-10.  
 
656 John M. Connor, “The Great Global Vitamins Conspiracy: 
Sanctions and Deterrence,” Draft of 2/14/06, available at 
www.antitrustinstitute.org 
 
657 See Settlements of Indirect Purchaser Class Actions Under 
State Law - September 30, 2005, submitted by Patrick E. 
Cafferty to the Antitrust Modernization Commission. 
